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Thesis Abstract
The thesis is a study of equity joint ventures between 
producing country governments and foreign oil companies in the 
Middle East. These joint ventures became the dominant form of 
arrangement for producing oil from new acreage between 1957-1972, and 
after 1972 it was attempted to extend the principle of these ventures 
to cover the major Middle Eastern operating companies. The thesis 
attempts to examine the factors which led to, and shaped,the development 
of joint ventures in Middle East oil, both in the general context, and 
also in terms of individual countries. Following from this, the 
effect of the development of these joint ventures on the industry 
is also considered.
The method by which the above objectives are sought is as 
follows. An examination is made of the economic and managerial 
problems which might be associated with the setting up and operation 
of a joint venture. In the light of these difficulties, all the 
joint ventures agreements signed between 1957-1972 are examined in an 
effort to discover what mechanisms are incorporated in the agreements 
to deal with these problems. This is done not only with respect to 
different activities in oil such as exploration etc,, but also in 
terms of the general principles of joint ventures. Experience from 
Egyptian joint ventures is then used to examine how far the agreements 
have succeeded in solving some of the problems discussed earlier in 
the context of operating joint ventures.
In this way some aspects of the actual and potential contri­
bution of joint ventures to the development of the oil industry can 
be assessed, Finally, the findings which emerge from the above analysis 
are related to an evaluation of some aspects of participation in the 
form and context in which it arose from 1967 on.
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Introduction
Three types of joint venture have operated in the Middle 
East for the purpose of oil production. The first type comprises 
the operators of the ’old style1 concessions who have dominated 
oil production in the area until the time of writing. The com­
panies which operate these concessions are joint ventures fomed 
by foreign companies. A foreign company is defined as a company 
which is incorporated outside the host country and is owned and 
controlled by an owner or owners who are not nationals of the
host country. The host country is defined as the country in
(l)which the operations are carried out. f
The second type of joint venture is the contract 
agreement^ in which a foreign company acts as a contractor on 
behilf of the national oil company of the host country* The contract 
agreement first appeared in the area in 1966. The third type of 
venture is the equity joint venture in which one or more foreign 
companies and the national oil company of a host country share the 
equity of the operating company* These equity ventures are of two 
types* The partially integrated venture which is intended to be a 
profit making company whose function is to find, produce and market 
oil for its own account; and the operating agency which is intended 
to be a nonprofit maiding agency concerned only with finding and 
producing oil as the agent for the partners.
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(3)The equity joint venturex is the main subject of this 
thesis. The area in which these joint ventures mil be examined 
includes Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan, Since
AtiO
Egypt^Iran are the only countries to have actually operated joint 
ventures, their experiences mil provide the bulk of the factual 
material used.
The purpose of the thesis is to examine joint ventures 
from two points of view, first, we shall consider the factors 
which have affected the development of joint ventures. These 
include the trends which have developed in the industry as a whole, 
the objectives of both parties to the ventures, andthe limitations 
to the achievement of these objectives. Secondly, we shall examine 
the way in which the development of joint ventures have in turn 
affected the oil industry, including its effect upon the operational 
aspects of the industry, and its effect upon relations between the 
foreign oil companies and the host countries.
CHAPTER I
The Background To The Development of The Joint Venture Agreement
The extension of the told style1 concessionv
The form of agreement which dominated oil production in the
Middle East between 1901-1972 was the concession. This is an agreement
between a landlord (the host country government) and a company or
individual (the concessionaire)* By the agreement, the concessionaire
has the right to explore for petroleum in the geographic area
'granted* to him* Some concession agreements automatically gave
the concessionaire the right to develop, produce and market any oil
discovered on its own account* Other concession agreements required
the concessionaire to negotiate a new agreement in the event that
oil was found under the initial concession.
The first successful agreement of this type in the area
was the concession granted to D*Arcy in 1901 by the Persian
Government* In 1908 a great oil field was discovered by DfArcy
and Burmah Oil, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed 
(2)
to develop it; Similarly, in 1911, the Turkish Petroleum Company
(TPC) was granted an exploration license for parts of Mesopotamia
by the Turkish Government. The TPC shares were held by APOC,
Royal Dutch/Shell (Shell) and a German financial and industrial
group* After the 1914-18 war, the San Remo agreement of 1920 handed
over the shares held by the German group to the French and the TPC
(3)became the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPG). The other two major
(4)
concessions in the area came in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait 
in 1933, a concession was granted to the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) 
which was jointly owned by APOC and the Gulf Oil Company (GULF).
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In the same year, Saudi Arabia also granted a concession to the 
Standard Oil Company of California (Socal).
Before the start of the second world war, the ownership
(s)of the operating companies had begun to change. In 1925, the
American companies succeeded, with help from their Government, in
securing a foothold in the Middle East when the Near East Development 
(6)Corporation^  } acquired a 23.75% share in the IPC. After the end
of the second world war ownership changes continued largely because
the production of crude oil in the Middle East rose rapidly* In
1939 production totalled 112 million barrels and by 1950 it had
(7)reached 630 million barrels.
Because of this rapid expansion in supply the operators 
of the concessions were obliged either to arrange long term contracts 
for the sale of crude oil, or to take into the ownership of the 
operating companies new partners who required crude oil. In 1947 
the Saudi Arabian concession to Socal was transferred to the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco) which was composed of Socal, Jersey 
Standard, Mobil and the Texas Oil Company (Texaco). Mobil had 10$ 
of the equity, the others 30$ each* The change in the ownership 
of the major concession operators was completed in 1954 when owner­
ship of the APOC concession in Iran was transferred to the Iranian
Oil Participants Ltd. (the Consortium) as a solution to the 1951
(8)Iranian Nationalization, '
Thus by 1954, the concessions were operated by companies
which were owned by various combinations of the seven major oil 
(9)companies. * Together, the seven majors controlled 85$ of gross 
crude oil production for the whole world (excluding USA, Canada,
Eastern Europe, China and USSljl^^ Since all the majors were
vertically integrated companies, this domination also extended
(11)downstream into refining and marketing in Europe and Asia;
For the Middle East, if CFP is added to the list, then control of
(12)oil production by the majors in 1950 was almost 100%.
The operating companies, as has already been pointed out,
were joint ventures* As such, they faced numerous problems in the
resolution of different conflicts, in particular over the dis«
tribution of offtake. However, an examination of these joint
(13)ventures is a study in its own right; Our concern with them is
only as the operators of the concession under the terms of the
concession agreement since we seek to explain the rise of the equity
joint venture as the dominant form of agreement for new acreage
after 1960* Thus our interest is with the 'old style* concession
agreement rather than its operators.
While the terns of the concession agreement varied, not
only, between countries, but also over time, four common features
can be identified.
The first feature was the length of life of the concession.
The average life of the four main concessions in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait
(14)and Saudi Arabia was 82 years; Although the length of life of
the concession tended to decline the later the concession agreement
was signed, even in 1961, the offshore concession granted to Shell
(15)by Kuwait hid a life of 45 years; The reason for such a long 
period was to give the companies time in which to secure for them­
selves the maximum return for their investment which, at least at
/*i r  \
the time of signature, involved a high risk. }
The second feature was the area of the country covered 
by the concession. The four main agreements on average covered
(17’)
88$ of the four countries. ' In addition, with the exception 
of the Saudi Arabian agreement, there were no clauses which forced 
the companies to relinquish any part of the area* In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, there was $0 provision for relinquishment by ARAMCO 
of areas it did not exploit, but at its own discretion. Even so,
(ig\
not until 1948 did ARAMCO agree to a programme of relinquishment.
In the other concessions, pressure to relinquish was brought to 
bear by the host countries in the fifties. As a result of this 
pressure, coupled with the threat of sequestration, made real in
(19)
the case of Iraqv the companies agreed to relinquish parts of 
the concession area^^ Newer agreements incorporated automatic 
relinquishment clauses
The third feature of the agreements was the financial 
provisions, although the details did vary between the different 
agreements. Before 1950, payment to the host government was a 
royalty made at a fixed rate per ton. While revenues increased 
as offtake rose, pressure was put on the companies by the host 
countries to change the terms of the original agreement to increase 
revenues which accrued to the host countries. The American companies 
in Saudi Arabia were the first to acede to this demand, and in 1950 
the terms were renegotiated. In future, payment would be made on 
the basis of a tax of 50$ on the profits attributed to crude oil 
production. This switch to a fiscal system of payment rapidly 
spread to other countries in the area, although with differences of 
detail.
The final common feature of the concession agreement
was the managerial freedom given to the companies in the development
of the concession area* Beyond provisions concerning Tgood oil
field practice1, the companies had sole right to decide the extent
of exploration, whether any discovery was worth exploiting, and to
what extent it should be exploited* While some moves were made to
give the host country the appearance of influencing these decisions,
such as allowing government representatives on the Boards of the
(22)operating companies , the companies were able to retain their 
control over the concession areas* Of course the host countries 
could and did exert pressure on the companies to take decisions in 
the light of the country fs interests* Offtake levels in particular 
was a question over which the countries exerted such pressure, and 
the companies could only ignore such pressure at their peril. How­
ever, the decisions were influenced indirectly rather than by a 
direct participation in the decision process.
Criticism of the concession agreements
In the period described in the previous section, criticisms
related to the four features of the agreements were being voiced by
(23)groups within the host countries. These criticisms were based 
around the rrigidityr of the agreements and the managerial freedom 
granted to the companies.
The *rigidity* of the agreements. The source of this criticism is 
the idea that the agreements were contracts which contained no 
clauses which allowed for renegotiation. Yet at the same time the 
agreements had a long life span, and covered a very high proportion 
of the available acreage
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At first sight, the criticism appears to be a tautology, 
since by definition a legal agreement is binding, and therefore 
rigid. However, in practice, the criticism does have validity.
The terms of the original agreement reflected the circumstances at 
the time of signing, notably the relative bargaining positions of 
the two sides. Over such a long life span, these initial circums­
tances were likely to alter drastically, thus the unchanging terms
would result in demands being made that the agreements were revised
(25)to be more Appropriate1 to the new situation; What the criticism
amounts to is that the companies had acquired for themselves a
good bargain, and were intent upon maintaining their position. It
is in this sense that the agreements were rigid.
The aspects of the operations affected by the Aigidity1
of the agreements were the question of managerial freedom to be
examined shortly, the question of relinguishment and the financial 
( 26 )terms. As described earlier, there were changes in the existing 
agreements with respect to relinquishment and financial terms which 
favoured the host countries. Nevertheless, these changes were 
produced as a result of considerable conflict, although during the 
sixties the companies increasingly accepted the idea of renegotiation. 
An example of this is that the expensing of royalties in 1964 was 
agreed by the companies in return for host countries allowing
(27)discounts off posted prices for the calculation of taxable profits; * 
Such alterations in terms as occurred were possible without 
the definition of a concession being changed i.e. the operating 
company still acted on its own behalf with the Government acting as 
tax collector. The same was not the case for the question of
Managerial freedom. The source of the criticism that the operating
companies had too much freedom of action was the fact that the
original agreements limited the freedom of action of the countries
with respect to oil operations* The host countries wanted this
(28)
freedom restored to them*
The host countries wanted greater control for three
reasons* Hrstly,the host countries wanted to play a greater part
in the decisions which affected the extent to which the oil was
exploited* This especially covered the decisions concerned with
developing fields or altering the level of offtake from existing
fields* As oil production and revenues increased, so the economies
(29)of the host countries became more dependent on the revenues;
In Saudi Arabia between 1966-69 nearly 90% of Government revenue
came from oil, and in 1965, oil accounted for more than half the
gross domestic product*'*^ As the significance of oil revenues in
the economies grew, so the pressure increased to allow the host
(31)countries greater control over such a strategic sector;
Secondly, the feeling had arisen in the host countries
that the oil sector should be directed towards playing a more
integrated role in the development of the domestic economy, particularly
( 32)as an encouragement to industrialization; 7 It seemed logical 
that this could be more easily achieved if the host country had 
more control over decisions, for example over procurement* Because 
the foreign companies* interests extend beyond the frontiers of 
the producing countries there is no reason why they would be auto-
matically concerned with maximizing local linkages in relation to
(3 3 )
procurement policy. 7 A further example is the flaring of the
(34)natural gas produced as a bye product of oil production* 7 As
a result of this flaring, the host countries have been making
demands that this gas should be conserved or provided free of
(35)charge as a raw material or energy source for local indusry.
The final aspect of the demand for control is the question 
of politics* The domination of the industry by the majors 
described earlier, coupled with the presence in the area of the 
European powers between the wars} led elements in the host countries 
to feel that their political sovereignty was threatened by the 
companies* The logical outcome of such an assumption was for the 
host country governments to reduce the power of the majors by 
taking greater control themselves* Because of the political 
competition in the Middle East, both internal and external to the 
countries, no host country government could afford to ignore this 
assumption, without risking its own position* Consequently a 
government may make demands for control purely as a political 
expedient to secure its own position; either domestically, or 
to secure prestige in the Arab world*
Conclusion,. The terms of the concession form of agreement did
alter to meet the changing situation in the fifties and sixties.
But as the host countries became more interested in the question 
of control, so even the modified concession agreement became less 
appropriate to the new situation* The replacement of the old style 
concession by the joint venture agreement as the dominant agreement
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for new acreage^  began in the late fifties* By the early sixties, 
apart from some Gulf States, no new agreements followed the 
concession form of agreement. Although the existing concessions 
continued to dominate oil production, they too came under increasing
/ n r  \
pressure which culminated in the participation agreements of 1972.
The rise of the joint venture agreement 1957-65
The rise of the joint venture agreement between 1957-65
was the result of four factors. The obsol^bence of the concession
agreement for new acreage already outlined; the availability of
new acreage; the limited ability of the host countries to pursue a
course of sole development; and the rise of the new oil companies*
In the late fifties and early sixties, a considerable
amount of acreage became available for exploitation outside the
control of the existing concessionaires. This development, described
earlier, was the result largely of the major concessionaires
(37)Voluntarily1 relinquishing acreage. Yet few of the producing
(38)countries were in a position to develop^ the acreage alone. } To
do so required technology, risk capital, markets etc. While the
national oil companies had access to these requirements, the extent
of the availability varied considerably between countries. Even
where some acreage was explored by the national oil companies, it
was apparent that to maximize the development of the acreage, foreign
(39)companies would have to be involved in some way; It was in this 
context that the rise of the new oil companies was important.
Before 1954, with the exception of Gulbenkian1s 5% holding 
in the IPG, all the operating concessions in the Middle East were 
eventually owned by the majors. In 1955 each American major in the 
Iranian Consortium sacrificed l/8th of its holding to permit the 
division of the resulting 5% between a group of nine American 
independents^0  ^These formed the IRICON agency* This ‘break in1 
by the non majors commenced a process whereby the American, European 
and Japanese independents be’gan to successfully compete for acreage
(41)
in the Middle East*
The entry of these newcomers had two effects. Firstly,
they created a demand for the new acreage which the host countries
were unable to fully develop themselves. An important aspect of
this was that the independents were regarded as a welcome counter-
balance to the majors. To have allowed the majors to develop the
acreage would imply that ‘one would strengthen the walls of the
prison1 Secondly, because the bids for the acreage were on a
competitive basis, and demand was strong, a sellers market for the
new acreage was created* When Kuwait opened territory for bids in
(4 3)
1961, there were 13 potential bidders* In 1963, when Iran also 
invited bids for territory, 30 companies applied^^ This inevitably 
meant that the host countries would be able to secure more favourable 
terms in any agreement signed.
Early in the period 1957-65 only two agreements followed the 
form of the old style concession, but with terms very favourable to 
the host country compared to the existing concessions. The Arabian 
Oil Company (Japanese) which obtained a concession in the Neutral Zone
*-* 13 —
offered the Kuwaitis and Saudis 57% and 56% of the profits respectively,
(45)plus options to each Government for 10% of the operating company; 
Similarly, in 1961 the offshore concession granted to Shell by Kuwait 
gave Kuwait an option of 20% of the operating c o m p a n y B o t h  agree­
ments contained relinquishment clauses.
However, in 1957, two new agreements were signed between Ente 
Nazionale Idrocaburi (ENl) and Egypt and Iran which were the first 
joint venture agreements in the area. These agreements, as to.11 be 
described late^47) seemed to allow the entry of a foreign company, 
at the same time giving the maximum opportunity for the requirements 
of the host countries to be met, particularly with respect to control* 
Because these agreements appeared to fulfill the requirements of the 
host countriei^^ at a time when the competing bidders were prepared 
to pay well for acreagi^^, they rapidly became the dominant form of 
agreement for the development of new acreage* Of the 19 new oil 
agreements signed in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Egypt between 
1957^ 65, two were concession agreements and seventeen were joint venture 
agreements.
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CHAPTER II
The Evolution of Joint Venture Agreements
Egypt
The development of the oil industry In Egypt before 1953
Three aspects of Egypt!s oil experience before 1953 are
relevant for the later development of joint ventures*
The first aspect was the failure of the industry to discover
oil in quantities sufficient to meet the growing domestic demand.
(1)In 1953, the largest oilfield in production was the Gharib field, '
(2)
which in the same year produced only 8*5 million barrels. Table 2*1 
below illustrates this low total production, which together with 
rising domestic demand led to an increasing deficit between domestic 
oil production and consumption.
Table 2,1 Production, and consumption of petrole inn products
in Egypt for selected years
1910-1960 
(Million Barrels)
Year 1910 1920 1930 1940* 1950 1960
Consumption 
Production of
.86 .94 3.83 6.32 20,67 34,91
Crude .12 1.01 1.98 6.76 16.27 22,73
Balance -.74 + *07 -1,85 + *44 —4,40 -12,18
x Figures for 1940 are distorted by the wartime situation.
Sources: Petroleum op*cit Tables 8-1 p* 535-6
8-15 p, 552-3.
Table 2*2. Joint Venture Oil Production in Iran 1962-1971
(Million barrels)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
SIRIP *3 5.4 9.2 6.0 6.5 7.5 6.6 9.7 11.6 20.8
IPAC - - 1.2 16.0 22.0 36*6 37 *.5 37*9 33.8 45.5
LAPCO - - - - - 5.0 43.5 52.0 49.2
IMINOCO - - - - « - - 5.6 20*2 21.5
TOTAL *3 5.4 10.4 *2.0 28.5 44*1 49.1 96.7 l$7 .6 137.0
Source: Iranian Oil Journal* House magazine of NIOC.
-Relevant years.
The second aspect was the continued involvement of the
Egyptian Government. live times after 1906, (3) in 1910, 1920,
1937, 1948 and 1953, the Egyptian Government made major alterations
to the laws which governed the granting of exploration and development
(4)licenses]; The purpose of the alteration has usually been to try
to encourage an expansion in the rate of exploration. By the 1948 /
law, the Government attempted to Egypticjnize the industry by allowing
(5)only Egyptian owned companies to hold exploitation licenses; More
direct involvement in the industry took the form of the Government
itself exploring for oil. This led to the discovery of the Abu
Durba field in 1921. At no time in the development of Egyptian /  //
oil have the companies had complete managerial freedom over very
large areas in Egyp^as occurred in other Middle Eastern Countries.
The final aspect of the pre 1953 oil development which is
relevant for the later appearance of joint ventures was the existence
of a large cadre of indigenous skilled manpower in the industry.
In 1922 when a small refinery was built at Suez, the labour force of
(7)302 included 300 Egytpians; In 1950 the Anglo-Egjrptian oil Company
(AEO), an affiliate of Shell and the largest company in Egypt, set
up a vocational training school to provide the necessary training
for the local l a b o u r I n  1952, over 94$ of AE0Ts labour force
(9)were Egyptians while in 1960 the figure was over 97%. 1 Figures 
of this magnitude are now fairly commonplace in Middle East operating 
companies, but such figures were common in Egypt from early in its 
oil development* As early as 1937, the government made it compulsory by 
law that at least 90$ of the labourers and 50$ of the staff of any 
lessee would have to be Egyptians
The development of the General Petroleum Authority 1956-1960.
By 1956, the Government machinery which concerned the
e
oil industry was becoming more unworldly because the control of the
industry was spread among various institutions and ministries.
As a result law 135 of March 1956^^ created the General
Petroleum Authority to act as a central agency. The GPA took over
all the functions of the State in relation to oil which meant
granting licences and leases, and monitoring existing operations.
The control of the GPA was vested in its Board of Directors
(12)which was to act as the Supreme Authority over oil matters.
Six months later, the status of the GPA Board was altered by Law 
No. 332 of 1956* This restored control to the Ministry of Industry 
who was to supervise the activities of the GPA Board, For example, 
under the previous law the GPAts Advice1 on the granting of licences 
and leases was in fact binding on the Minister* Under the new law 
the Minister^ control was restored. The role of the GPA was 
expanded in November* 1956 when it took over the running of AEO which 
had been nationalized as a result of the Suez Affair. Although in 
1959 AEO was returned to the ownership of Shell,
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(13)The GPA was again reconstituted by Law 167 of 1958;
This law endowed the GPA as an independent corporate body with
power to cover and be responsible for all petroleum activities in
the UAR* The Minister of Industry however retained his right of
veto over decisions taken by the GPA, This was modified in 1959
(14)by Presedential Decree No, 2344 which confined the GPA to 
technical and commercial activities, and returned the right to 
grant licences and leases plus the monitoring of operations to the 
State.
To a large extent the constant alterations in the role of
the GPA since 1956 reflect the uncertainty of the direction in the
Egyptian econony as a whole up to the early sixties, particularly
(15)in relation to the role of the Government; This uncertainty of 
direction was also reflected in the development of the first joint 
venture, the Compagnie Orientale des Petroles (Cope).
The Development of Cope 1952-1960
After the introduction of the Mining Law 136 of 1948, 
because of the stipulation that any developer must be Egyptian
(ig 'j
owned, by 1951 all the foreign companies had ceased drilling,v }
In an effort to offset the effects of this, a prospecting licence 
was issued to the Petroleum Co-operative Society (Coop), COOP had 
been set up in 1934 by a number of agricultural co-operatives to 
refine and market oil thereby breaking the monopoly of the foreign
(17)
companies over Egyptian marketing,' ' Because of its success as a 
marketer, it was a natural progression for COOP to expand into 
upstream operations.
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Because COOP lacked any experience in the exploration 
and producing side of the industry it formed the National Petroleum 
Company (NPC) which included Soca.1 and a Swiss Bank, Bank Hoffmann, 
to deal with this aspect of the operations. In 1953, COOP was given 
the concession for the Wadi Feiran field discovered by Jersey
(is ')Standard in 1947, } Later in the same year the International
Egyptian Oil Company (IE0C) took over the exploration of COOP
(19)areas from the NPC. IEOC was registered in Panama in 1953 and
the equity was divided 40% to Agip Minararia (AGIP) an affiliate of
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), 40% to Petrofina of Belgium and
the remaining 20% to American interests* The terms on which LEOC
took over from the NPC have never been made public, but Mughraby
reports that on a commercial discovery being made it was intended to
create a joint venture company with IEOC holding 80% and COOP
holding 20%*^^
In 1955, the Bel^ petw field was discovered and found to be
commercial. But when COOP and IEOC decided to implement the 1953
agreement, the Egyptian Governmerit interviened, and demanded a share
. (21)
in the development of the discovery,' 7 Two reasons lay behind this 
decision of the Government. Firstly, in 1955-56, the period of 
rfree enterprise1 in the Egyptian economy was showing signs of being 
regarded by the Government as being inadequate for development and the 
ideas of fstate capitalism1 were being put forward as an alternative. 
Secondly, the field was already large by Egytpian standards and it 
was believed to extend westward offshore into the Gulf of Suez, 
which suggested to the Government a very large field indeed. Given
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the previous involvement of the Government in oil, it was natural 
that the Government should want to be directly involved in the 
apparent long desired breakthrough.
The field was to be developed by the joint venture COPE 
which was created by the Act of Constitution on February 7th, 1957. 
Cope was to be a partially integrated venture in which IEOC held 51% 
of the equity, COOP held 20% and the GPA 29%, The actual agreement 
which created COPE has never been published, but since a commercial 
discovery had already been made, and the legal situation in respect 
of development leases was clear from the 1953 Law, a complex agreement 
was not required. The only matter which needed clarification was 
how IEOC^ outlays between 1952-1957 were to be paid for. Despite 
the apparently simple situation which the agreement had to deal 
with, the agreement was badly written, and caused a considerable 
number of difficulties in the later development of COPE.
In 1959, COPE as an independent company was granted
prospecting licences on 13 areas* These licences were to last for
eight years, but would be renewed annually. The contract did not
include any of the exploration control devices such as minimum
exploration expenditure or rapid relinquishment which were a common
(22)feature of later joint venture, agreements. Also, because the 
contract was with COPE as a whole, the risk of exploration did not 
fall soley upon the foreign company but was shared by both parties*
The whole contract was rather loosely written and the only new feature 
was an increase of royalty to 20% on the first half of the develop­
ment block, and 30% on the second half of the block.
- 20 -
In April 1961, Agip bought Petrofina's share in IEOC to
avoid sequestration of the whole company as a result of events in 
(23)the Congo * * In November of the same year IEOC yielded 1% of the
equity of COPE to the GPA thus creating an equal division of the
• *. (24)equity*
The decision to encourage foreign investment in oil
The decision to secure further foreign assistance in the
oil industry was taken in the cearly sixties. Since at this time
(25)the Egyptian Government had begun to nationalize private firms, 
and had in May 1960 limited the right to develop the Western Region 
oil to Egyptian companies, some explanation of this apparently 
paradoxical decision is required*
An official explanation was made by the then Minister of 
Industry, Dr* A* Sidqi at the time of the signing of the 1963 
joint venture agreements to be outlined shortly# In this statement 
Dr* Sidqi outlined four reasons why foreign investment had been 
allowed into Egypt# firstly, to avoid risking valuable foreign 
exchange in the very uncertain field of exploration* Secondly, 
the development of an oil industry required heavy capital investment 
at a time when other sections of industry and agriculture were 
competing strongly for the same resources. Thirdly, large amounts 
of oil were needed immediately to provide an energy base for other 
industrial sectors, and finally, if large quantities of oil were 
found, the possibility might arise that Egypt would require the 
experience and assistence of the foreign company with respect to 
marketing.
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Behind these four reasons lay two factors of paramount
importance, the failure of the General Petroleum Company (GPC)
to find sufficient oil and the balance of payments problem.
{ 26)The GPCV } was formed in 1957 to act as the operating
company for the GPA. Its capital was LE 6 million, and in July
1957 it acquired 63 exploration blocks. By 1960 Le 23*6 million
had been invested by the GPC which had resulted in only 1.3 million
(2?)barrels of oil being produced: As a result the policy of sole
development pursued by the GPC was reviewed and it was realized
that if large reserves of oil were to be found, a great deal of
investment would have to be undertaken, much of it in badly needed
foreign exchange.
The second factor was the growing balance of payments
difficulties faced by Egypt. Crude oil and petroleum products
(28)
were an increasing element in the import bill; 1 In 1955, 37% of
the balance of trade deficit could be accounted for by imported
(29)crude and petroleum products. In 1960 the figure was 54%; ' At a
time when the first five year plan projected a growth rate of 14.6% 
per annum for industry, it was obvious that oil would be an even 
larger part of the import bill. Foreign investment not only might 
discover oil to reduce these oil imports, but it would also provide 
the foreign exchange needed for exploration.
However, although there was interest expressed by foreign 
companies to explore; after the nationalization of the early sixtiei^
(31)
the bidders for acreage rapidly lost interest; 7 As a result, very 
good guarantees would have to be given to any foreign company before
22 -
they would be prepared to risk capital in Egypt. Late in 1962 it 
( 32lwas announced' f that the United States Government had concluded
an investment guarantee agreement with Egypt which enabled the
United States Government to insure private American investment against
non-commercial risk. At the time of reporting the agreement;MEES
described the Egyptian press as 'notably silent1 on the subject,
despite the Egyptian Governments reluctance there was little option
if the necessary foreign investment was to be secured.
Once the decision was taken to encourage foreign investment
the question arose as to what form this investment should take.
The old style concession was completely unthinkable for political
reasons, and since a joint venture was already in existence i.e.
(33)COPE, further joint ventures seemed to provide the solution.'
The 1963 joint venture agreements
In 1963 Egypt signed three agreements, one with IEOC, one 
with the Pan American Oil Company (Pan Am}^^ and one with the 
Phillips Petroleum Company UAR (Phillips
The first agreement with IEOG gave IEOC areas in the Delta 
and the Red Sea. IEOC was to incur all the risk of exploration
and to bear all the expenditure in the event of no oil being found. 
IEOC was obliged to spend on exploration a minimum of $20 million 
in the first twelve years, of which half had to be spent in the first 
four years. The contract was to be 30 years, renewable for 15 years. 
However, IEOC had to relinquish 25$ of the area after the fourth 
year, a further 25$ at the end of the eight year and 90$ of the 
remaining area after the twelvth year* After the 22nd year all 
undeveloped areas had to be returned.
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Mien commercial discovery had been made, the agreement
introduced a novel feature to joint venture agreements. Although
the joint venture which would operate any find already existed,
i.e. COPE, it would not take over the development and production
of the discovery immediately. Instead, IEOC was to develop the
field and to receive all the oil. Once the field began to show a
profit after IEOC had recovered all expenditure then COPE would
take over operations.
The other two agreements of 1963 introduced the idea of
operating agencies. The Pan-Am agreement leased 73,000 sq.km. in
the Western Desert to Pan-Am for nine years, with options to renew
for 15 years. In this period Pan-Am was to expend at its own risk
$17 million in the first nine years on exploration, of which $5 million
were to be spent in the first three years. The area was to be
relinquished at a rate of 1 every three years* If commercial oil
3
was found, then an operating agency known as the Fayoum Petroleum
Company (FAPCG) would be set up with the equity divided equally
between the two parties, who would also provide all FAPC0fs expenses.
EAPCO would itself own nothing, but simply act as the owners1 agent
to produce oil. This oil would be divided at the well head between
the two partners who could then dispose of it as they wished, Pan-Am
(37)
would recover half its exploration expenditure from EGPC 7 after 
commercial discovery.
The agreement with Phillips followed a similar pattern 
with Phillips acquiring 96,000 sq.km. of the Western Desert for 
12 years* Phillips was to spend on exploration $3 million in first
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3 years, $3 million in the next 3 and $4 million in the following 
four years, and in the 11th and 12th year $25,000 per exploration 
block retained. The rate of relinquishment was to be 25% after 
three years, a further 25% after six years, and 40% in the tenth 
year. The operating agency to be formed if commercial oil was found 
was to be the Western Desert Petroleum Company (WEPCO).
The Development of the Joint Ventures 
COPE 1960-1967
In this period, the development of COPE was dominated by 
problems and conflict which arose from the problems of finance 
organization and nationalization*^®®^
Despite its early promise, Belayim failed to live up to 
expectations, and while it became a large producing field by 
Egyptian standards, it never provided the solution to Egyptrs oil 
shortage. Under the agreement which was signed in 1963, IEOC carried 
out its exploration obligations but failed to find commercial oil.
In 1967 gas was discovered at Abu Madi in the Delta, but EGPC decided 
to develop this alone since IEOC showed little interest.
In 1962, COPE was nationalized as part of the programme 
of increased state control over key sectors of the econony which had 
begun in 1961* In an effort to resolve the outstanding disputes, 
an agreement was signed in 1966 between IEOC and EGPC,^®^ but had 
little time to be of use, since in June 1967 when Israel took Sinai, 
they also took Belayim, COPE’s only field. While IEOC continued
to explore under the terms of the 1963 agreement, their interest was 
minimal, and no further acreage was sought by IEOC* In 1973 the 
Continental Oil Company acquired 50% of IE0Cts rights in the Delta 
concession.
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Despite the disappointment of COPE, its development provided
Egypt with invaluable experience. As will be seen later, COPE made many
of the mistakes and suffered many of the problems which are now
associated with the creation and operation of a joint venture.
Because of this previous experience, the other two joint ventures
were able to avoid many of the difficulties and pitfalls which
characterized the history of COPE.
Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company (CUPCO) 1966-1972
In 1964, a further joint venture agreement was signed with
Pan-Am which gave Pan-Am exploration leases on 6,500 sq.km. in the
Gulf of Suez. This agreement was. similar to the one signed in 1963,
although because the acreage promised more than the 1963 acreage,
exploration obligations were higher. Pan-Am agreed to spend a minimum
on exploration of $27.5 million in nine years of which $10 million
was to be spent in the first tiro years. Upon commercial discovery,
GUPCO was to be set up as an operating agency, but to save on overheads
would have the same staff, offices etc. as FAPCO.
Exploration began under the two agreements, and 1965 the
El Morgan field was discovered in the Gulf of Suez. As a result
GUPCO was formed in 1966 and the first oil was shipped in the middle
of 1967. In June 1967 an unexpected benefit accrued to Egypt because
of the nationality of its foreign partner in Gupco. If Pan-Am had not
been of American nationality then the El Morgan installations would
probably have been victim to Israeli attacks. Although further
exploration was halted, and there were more problems over reallocating 
(41)offtake,v 7 the oil continued to flow.
Further small discoveries were made in the Western Desert 
on which basis FAPCO was formed* In 1969 a further joint venture 
agreement between EGPC and Pan-Am was signed which gave Pan-Am
28,000 sq.km. of territory in the Western Desert and along the Nile* 
This new agreement was very much a reflection of the fact that 
relations between Pan-Am and EGPC had been 'ProductiveJ co-operative 
and mutually beneficial'The exploration period was eight years 
in which Pan-Am was to spend a minimum of $15*5 million* Of the area, 
40% was to be relinquished after four years, 30% after six years and 
20% after eight years. The form of the agreement was much the same 
as earlier agreements, except Pan-Am agreed to provide all the capital 
needed to develop any find, being repaid in crude oil from EGPC's 
share. Also the 15% royalty for the first time was to be fully 
expensed.
By 1972^  although no commercial oil had been found by Pan-Am 
in the 1969 areas, considerable gas finds were made at Abu Ghanadiq 
which are to be developed by GUPCO.
WEPCO 1967-1972
The development of WEPCO has followed much the same sort 
of pattern as GUPCO* The first commercial discovery took longer 
than the Pan-Am discovery, and WEPCO was not formed until March 1967 
on the basis of Phillip's discovery at El Alamein* Despite some 
other discoveries, notably at A1 Milihan>the discoveries have been 
relatively small* In 1971, Phillips, with the agreement of the EGPC 
transferred 25% of its 50% interest in WEPCO to the Spanish oil 
company the Cia. Hispancia De Petroleos S.A, (Hispanoil).
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The development of EGPC 1960-1972 and other agreements
By 1960, the direction which the economy was to take was
becoming clearer as key elements of the economy were nationalized
in the early sixties* All companies in the oil industry were brought
into the public sector. This process was completed in 1964 when COOP
was nationalized. In 1961, all the foreign oil companies also had to
allow a majority of the equity holding to go to the Government* By
1964 Shell and BP interests were completely nationalized after $27.6
(43)million compensation was agreed upon with the Egyptian Government. 7
To control and co-ordinate all these companies, some form
of central agency was required, and in 1962 the GPA was altered to
fulfill this role and was renamed the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation
(EGPC). EGPC was to act as a holding company which was to own the
majority of the equity (if not all the equity) of the nationalized
c o m p a n i e s . B y  virtue of this central position, EGPC was to be
responsible for planning, co-ordinating and executing all aspects
of policy which related to the industiy in Egypt. Control over EGPCTs
policy lay in the Board of Directors which consisted of the Chairman
and General Manager of EGPC, plus the Chairman of all the affiliated
companies and two directors appointed from the Ministry. Control
by the Government over the Board of EGPC came from two sources.
The Ministry of Planning allocated the oil sectors’ financial 
(45)resources, while the Ministry of Industry held the right of 
veto over the Board’s decision.
The central position of BGPC in the oil sector was further
strengthened when the State1s functions of granting licences and
leases were given to EGPC together with the general supervision of
the companies previously carried out by the Ministry of Industry.
Apart from the, agreements described earlier, two other
agreements were also signed by Egypt in this period.
In 1972 a further joint venture agreement was signed.
This agreement gave Transworld Oil Company 20-24,000 sq.km, of
onshore and offshore areas. The terms were the same as the earlier
joint venture agreements setting up an operating agency. In the
event of a commercial discovery. Transworld was to spend $23 million
in nine years on exploration. The only new feature of the agreement
was that revenue, which included a 50% income tax on Transworldts
profits, was to be based on the realized price or on a posted price
less 10%, whichever was higher. As part of the agreement another
agreement was signed whereby Transworld was to participate in a
$25 million project to recover gas from GUPCO’s El Morgan lield*^^
The other agreement which was signed in May 1970 departed
from the joint venture form of agreement. The agreement with the
North Sumatra Oil Development Co-operation Company (N0SQ)(Japanese)
resembled the Indonesian style contract agreement. N0S0 was to
of
explore 100 sq.km. offshore of Ras Gharib in the Gulf/Sues, and in 
three years was to spend a minimum of $3 million* If no oil was found 
N0S0 would withdraw after three years. If commercial oil was found 
then N0S0 was to act as a contractor for EGPC over a fifteen year 
development period. Of the offtake, 40$ was to be put aside to cover 
all N0S0Ts expenditure with any balance being sold by N0S0 on behalf 
of EGPC. Of the remaining 60%, 69,5% was to go to EGPC and 31*5% to
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NOSO, although if production exceeded 50,000 b.d. then NOSO was to
receive only 25$* The operation would be controlled by NOSO. The
advantage of this agreement from Egyptls viewpoint was that it
involved them in no expense whatsoever at any point in the operations.
(47)
After a short time with no success NOSO withdrew. '
By the end of 1972, it became apparent that Egypt wbuld
have some difficulty to reach the Plan target of 45-50 million tons
(48)of oil per year by 1983. As a result Egypt began to seek new
agreements by offering acreage on a production sharing basis, with
agreements modelled on the EGPC-NOSO agreement of 1970*^^
Early in 1973, three new agreements were announced^^
Eastern Resources Ltd of the United Kingdom obtained 10,000 sq.km.
in the Western Desert which had previously been relinquished by
Pan-Am. Pacific International Inc. (USA) obtained 400 sq.kin, in
the A1 Razzaq area and agreed to spend $3 million on exploration in
39 months. Finally Geoquest of Canada obtained 2,000 sq.km* of
offshore Mediterranean acreage with the commitment to spend $13 million
on exploration over 8 years.
This was shortly followed by a further four agreements with
( 51)Mobil, Exxon, Transworld oil and Petrobras (Brazil)*v '
The agreement with Mobil was a production sharing contract for
6,500 sq*km* offshore of the Delta, in an area previously relinquished 
by IEOC* Mobil was to bear all the exploration costs at $23 million 
over eight years. In the event of commercial discovery, EGPC was to 
receive 70$ of production up to 150,000 b.d. on a discovery in less 
than 200 metres of water, 72.5$ on production up to 200,000 b.d. and
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75$ on production above that. If the discovery was in greater than 
200 metres of water, EGPC was to receive only 65$ of the offtake. In 
addition there was a signature bonus of $2,5 million and a production 
bonus of $6 million, EGPC was to repay its share of the exploration 
and production costs in crude oil.
In the other three agreements, Exxon obtained 15,000 sq.km. 
of offshore Mediterranean acreage, on which $50 million was to be 
spent on exploration over 12 years ($18 million in the first four 
years). Transworld obtained 100 sq.km, of offshore acreage for a 
signature bonus of $125,000, and a commitment to spend $5,6 million 
on exploration over four years, Finally, Petrobras obtained 18,000 
sq»Ion* in the Nile Delta and the Western Desert on which they were 
committed to spend $14,4 million on exploration in eight years.
These agreements introduced a new policy by EGPC with 
respect to the form of the agreements. Those agreements which 
covered onshore acreage were joint venture agreements of the operating 
agency type, while those which covered offshore acreage were of the 
production sharing type of agreement. The reason for this division 
arises from the fact that offshore exploration is more expensive than 
onshore, and therefore the companies require the incentive of 
greater reward* At first sight the production sharing formula 
appears more favourable to the foreign companies than the joint 
venture formula. Since the foreign company also acts as the contractor, 
it also involves Egypt in less resource commitment than the joint 
venture arrangement.
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A further agreement followed these agreements with Deminex of
(52)West Germany, The agreementv ' covered 2,000 sq.km, offshore in the
Gulf of Suez. Deminex was to spend $22 million on exploration over
eight years* Upon commercial discovery 40$ of the offtake was to
be takenby Deminex to cover costs, while the remaining 60$ was to be
shared with EGPC, on much the same basis as the EGPC-N0S0 1970 
agreement.
That so many foreign companies were prepared to sign 
agreements with Egypt, two of them majors, is indicative of the 
1administrative1 success of GUPCO and WEPCO* Also the advantages of 
relatively rapid relinquishment can be seen since many of the 
agreements covered acreage which had already been relinquished,
Iran
Iran was the only other country in the area, apart from
Egypt, to have developed oil through a jojnt venture at the time of
writing. From the standpoint of the effect of joint ventures on the
oil industry Tthe changes pioneered by Iran are of great importance,
(5 3)
not only for Iran, but also for the Industry generally1, f Iran
also has more in common with the other major oil producers than 
(54)Egypt. 7 Both these factors are likely to make the Iranian case 
more representative than the Egyptian case with respect to the effect 
of joint ventures on the industry.
The Development of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 1951-1957
(55)In May 1951 AI0C was nationalized. In order to provide 
an alternative administration for the operations, the Iranian 
Government set up NIOC, although such an organization had been
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authorized by law as early as 1947* In October 1954, the dispute 
was eventually resolved and NIOC became the owner of all producing, 
refining and auxiliary installations owned by AIOC before nationa­
lization. Two companies were created, the Iranian Oil Exploration 
and Producing Company and the Iranian Refining Company, which were $ 
Netherlands Corporations, but registered in Iran* These Companies 
(collectively known as the Consortium) were to operate the properties 
•on behalf of Iran and NIOC1.^^
NIOC was to own the oil produced, but was to sell it to 
Trading Companies set up by each member of the Consortium. Also 
NIOC had the right to appoint 2 out of the seven members of the 
Board of Directors of each of the two companies which formed the
Consortium. However, the 1954 agreement gave to NIOC only Tthe
(57)shadow of control, not the substanceT. *
Outside of the 100,000 sq.miles granted to the Consortium,
NIOC could carry out or delegate any operation it wished. In 1954,
NIOC had control of the Naft-i-Shah producing field, and a small
(3,500 b/d) refinery at Kirmanshah, However, the important fact
was that the potential institutional framework had been created to
further IranTs aspirations with respect to oil*
The aims of NIOC after 1954 were broadly twofold, both
of which were interlinked. Firstly, there was the desire to secure
( 58 )a greater participation in the development of Iranian oil. This
aim was a natural progression from the decision to nationalize 
Anglo-Iranian in 1951, but the idea was to achieve the aim in a 
more gradual fashion than was attempted in 1951. Linked to this 
was the second aim which was to provide Iran with the institutions,
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equipment and experience whose absence, to a certain extent,
contributed to the failure of the 1951 nationalization* In effect,
(59)
•nationalization launched Iran on a programme of self help1*
As a result^ were, laid by NIOC for the development of refineries,
oil transportation etc^^ in order to provide the services absent
during nationalization.
In 1951 the operating arm of NIOC the Iranian Oil Company
(IOC) had been created, and some exploration had been carried out
(61)by Swiss and American concerns under contract to IOC. ; In mid 
1955, IOC’s exploration effort was increased, and in August 1956 
oil was discovered at Qunu However this discover  ^contrary to 
early shows, failed to live up to expectations. Consequently,
Iran was faced with a situation similar to the one which faced 
Egypt in the late fifties and early sixties with respect to sole 
development, but on a larger scale. The Consortium had control 
of 100,000 sq. miles of territoiy which left NIOC with about 500,000 
sq* miles in which to explore for and develop oil.
Obviously, to develop such an area alone would not only 
be very expensive, but, as indicated by the failure of the Qum 
discovery, also very risky. This problem also came at a time when 
Iran was attempting to make up the financial losses incurred between 
1951-54, and to institute large scale development programmes at 
the same time. These factors together made it clear that if NI0Cts 
aims were to have any hope of being achieved, foreign investment 
would have to be involved in some wqy. To allow foreign investment 
under an old style concession was politically unthinkable after the 
experience between 1951-54 which left the alternative of joint ventures
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or contracts. In 1957, the Petroleum Act created the legal frame­
work for NIOC to enter either form of agreement.
In the 1957 Act, the task of NIOC was to Textend as rapidly 
as possible ... the research, exploration and extraction of petroleum 
through the country.1 To achieve this objective, NIOC's
functions were broaded by the Act to include features of the States' 
control of the oil industry, such as the right to grant acreage for 
exploration and development. Areas outside the control of the 
Consortium were divided into districts not greater than 80,000 sq.km. 
in whfch exploration was to take place. To permit the use of foreign 
investment, NIOC could form with a foreign company a 'mixed organi­
zation' in which NIOC was to hold a minimum of 30% of the equity.
To avoid 'monopoly* and to assist the prompt development of these 
areas, no company could have a block greater than 160,000 sq.km. 
in any one area* Of this area, at least half must be returned 
after 10 years. While the Government was not to be a party to the 
agreements which set up these 'mixed organizations', Article 2 of 
the Act required that the Government had to 'approve* any such 
agreements made.
The 1957 Agreement with Agip
Immediately after the publication of the 1957 Act in July, 
the first of the 'mixed organization' agreements was announced.
/ g3 \
with Agip. Without doubt, Enrico Mattei of ENI had worked 
long and hard to secure the Agip-NIOC 1957 agreement. A state visit 
of the President of Italy had been 'arranged', and it was even 
alleged that Mattei had offered a Princess of the House of Savoy to 
the Shah as a wife! The agreement gave Agip exploration rights
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in 23,000 sq.km,, consisting of three blocks North of the Persian 
Gulf, on the Eastern slopes of the Zagros Mountains, and along the 
Gulf of Oman* The relinquishment of the area was to be as follows. 
Twenty-five percent of the area was to be returned after the fifth 
year, and a further 25$ returned after the ninth year* After the 
twelfth year, all remaining areas were to be returned. During the 
twelve years the exploration licence lasted, Agip was to spend a 
minimum of $22 million on exploration. $6 million of this was to 
be spent in the first four years* If no oil were found, then Agip 
bore the loss alone* Once commercial oil had been found, Agip and 
NIOC were together to form a partially integrated venture called 
the Societd Iran-Italienne des Petroles (SIRIP)* SIRIP was to have 
a life of twenty-five years, renewable three times for a further 
five years each time* The initial capital of SIRIP was to be held 
in equal proportions by the two partners* SIRIP, like its counter­
part in Egypt, was envisaged as an independent company. The crude 
oil was to be disposed of by SIRIP on the world markets, and the 
object was to *raise to the maximum the sale of oil, using all 
possible efforts'. SIRIP would have exclusive use of the income
earned. In addition, SIRIP was allowed to borrow any of its 
financial requirements in the world money markets, although if the 
financial terms were rnot favourable* then the two partners had to 
supply the necessary funds.
When details of the agreement were announced, there was
a tremendous adverse reaction from the major oil companies. For
some time afterwards the rumours surrounding ENI and the agreement
abounded. It was announced that the majors had offered ENI a share
/ /* /* \
in the Iranian Consortium in return for abandoning the agreement. }
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The State Department was reputed to be putting considerable pressure 
011 the Italian Foreign Ministry, which was promptly denied by the 
Foreign Minister. It was even rumoured that the Iranian Government 
was in imminent danger from the CIA.
The reasortfwhy there was such a reaction are more diffi­
cult to identify. Only six months before, the similar AGIP-EGPC 
1957 agreement, was announced with very little comment from anyone. 
There are two obvious explanations# Firstly, Egypt was regarded by 
the majors as fairly open territory while Iran was regarded, together 
with the other major producing countries, as the special preserve 
of the majors* Thus, the later agreement was regarded by many as
(f\7
a victory for Enrico Mattei against the xseven sisters* } with 
whom Mattei had had a running feud since the battle over the Po Valley 
gas in 1952*^^ Secondly, and more importantly, apart from injured 
pride, the new agreement posed a more serious threat to the majors, 
not only in Iran, but throughout their major concessions in the Middle 
East. The terms of these Middle East Concessions were based very 
much upon a series of precedents* Once a precedent had been accepted 
in one country, within a short time it was generally accepted. The 
adoption of the 50-50 1profit1 share in Saudi Arabia provides a 
good example* On the face of it, this new agreement created two 
very significant precendents* Firstly, it gave the producing 
country an apparently equal controlling interest in the operations 
of the company. Secondly, it apparently introduced a new profit, 
division of 75-25 in favour of the host country. While this profit 
split was misleading, as will be shown later, it appeared that
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dangerous new precedents had been set* While the same was true of 
the Egyptian agreement, since Egypt was not a major producer it 
could not be responsible for the setting of such a significant 
precedent.
Despite the reaction at the time of signing, the outcome 
of the agreement proved disappointing. Although there have been 
numerous discoveries they have not lived up to the announcements.
Only relatively small oilfields have been found, notably at Bahr- 
gansar and at Nowraiz, and SIRIP1 s offtake has been relatively small. 
The Hybrid Agreements of 1958
The first Iranian Venture agreement was followed by a 
second in May 1958. This involved the Iranian counterpart of Pan- 
Am in Egypt. The Pan-Am-NIOC 1958 agreement gave Pan-Am exploration 
rights in 16,000 sq.km. of territory, all offshore. The rate of 
relinquishment was to be the same as the earlier agreement, but 
Pan-Am incurred a minimum exploration obligation of $82 million.
In addition Pan-Am had to pay $25 million as a signature bonus.
The nature of the venture to be set up in the event of a commercial 
discovery was something of a hybrid between the partially integrated 
venture and the operating agency. The venture, the Iran-Pan American 
Oil Company (IPAC),was described as a TJoint structure relationship1 
and while many of its characteristics were to be similar to SIRIP, some 
were different. The venture was to own nothing, ownership being 
vested solely with the two partners on an equal basis. It was also 
to be non-profit-making. The offtake was to be offered to the two 
partners in relation to their equity shares i.e. 50-50, but if one 
or both sides elected to take less, the balance was to be sold on
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their behalf by IPAC» In general the terms were more favourable 
to NIOC than those in the earlier agreements. For example, transport 
preference was to be given to Iranian flag tankers, and the penalties 
for failing to meet drilling and exploration obligations were heavy.
In 1961 the Darius field was found, followed a year later 
by the Cyrus field. Latest additions to the IPAC fields include the 
Fereidon and Ardeshir fields* In fact to date IPAC has been the 
largest producer of all the Iranian ventures as can be seen from 
table 2.2 page /5.
Shortly after the Pan-Am agreement, a new agreement was 
announced with the Sapphire Petroleum Company of Canada. This 
agreement was identical to the Pan-Am agreement, except it granted 
a 10,000 sq.km* area both onshore and offshore. Sapphire was to 
spend $18 million on exploration in the twelve years, and to drill 
the first well within two years or pay a $350,000 fine. The sig­
nificance of this agreement was to show that the minimum exploration 
obligations were to be taken very seriously indeed. In August 1959 
it was announced^^ that NIOC had seized the £130,000 deposited by 
Sapphire in an Iranian bank as Tgood behaviour1 money, NIOC claimed 
that in the first year Sapphire had only;.spent £16,000 on explo-
(71)
ration. In 1960 a settlement was announced , but relations 
deteriorated until Sapphire was forced to withdraw in 1961, after 
paying compensation for failing to fulfill its minimum obligations. 
The 1965 Vintage of Agreements
Between 1960-63, because of disputes between Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait over bouhdaries within the Gulf, no new acreage 
came into the market* Y/hen these disputes were settled, acreage was 
opened for bidding in the middle of 1963* This resulted in the 1965
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vintage of six new agreements. The basic formula for all these 
agreements was the same* The exploration areas were to be relin­
quished as follows. Twenty five percent after five years, a further 
25% after ten years, and all the areas after twelve years* This 
represented a slightly slower rate of relinquishment than the previous 
agreements* Upon the discovery of commercial oil, the parties would 
set up with NIOC a purely operating agency type of venture for a 
period of twenty-five years. These ventures were to be entirely 
dependent on their parents both for offtake sources, and financial 
assistance. For the first time a royalty was introduced of 12.5$ 
based upon the posted price of the crude. Both partners were also 
liable to a 50$ tax on their share of the offtake, again based on the 
posted price. A significant innovation in the agreements was the 
buyback policy. If NIOC did not wish to take its full entitlement 
of crude, then the foreign partner was obliged to buy this back at a 
halfway price.
The individual details are as follows. Shell received 
6,036 sq.km, for a signature bonus of $59 million, and a production 
bonus of $28 million. A French group received 5,759 sq.km, for a 
signature bonus of $27 million, and a production bonus of $2 million. 
The Atlantic refining group received 8,000 sq.km. for a signature 
bonus of $25 million, and a production bonus of $6 million* The 
Tidewater group received 2,250 sq.km. for a $40 million signature 
bonus, but with no production bonus. A German group consisting of 
Deutche Endsel and Preussag received 5,000 sq,km., for a signature 
bonus of $5 million, and a production bonus of $5 million. Finally,
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a conglomerate collection consisting of AGIP, Phillips and the 
Indian Government got 7,960 sq,ltm. for a signature bonus of $34 
million, and a production of $10 million. Overall, the six groups 
undertook a minimum exploration obligations over the twelve years 
totalling $164 million. Mthough the bonuses were all recoverable out 
of future production, their importance should not be under-rated* 
Together they meant a boost to Government revenues in 1965 of some 
$190 million, and since some of the groups were destined not to find 
oil, part of this could be regarded simply as a windfall gain to Iran* 
All the potential bidders for acreage had also paid for the cost of 
preliminary surveys in the acreage costing $3*5 million.
Of the six agreements, by 1972, only two reached the stage 
of creating joint ventures.
The Atlantic group formed with NIOC the Lavan Petroleum 
Company (LAPCQ) on the basis of the Sasoon field. The Agip, Phillips 
and Indian Government formed with NIOC the Iranian Marine International 
Oil Company (IMINCO) on the basis of the Rostam field, adding later 
the Rakhch field. The figures for offtake are given in table 2.2 .
The 1971 Vintage of Agreements
In 1971, three further agreements were announced in which 
the terms to Iran improved considerably* The period of exploration 
was reduced to six years, in which 25$ of the area would be relinquished 
after three years, a further 25$ after five years, and all areas at 
the end of the sixth year. The ventures to be set up were to have 
an operating life of twenty years with options for two five year 
extensions. The most interesting aspect of the 1971 vintage of 
agreements was the introduction of taxation on a system similar to the 
OPEC pattern. Royalty was to be expensed according to the OPEC
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formula at 12*5$ of posted price, until the foreign companies share 
of cumulative production reached 5 million barrels when royalty 
increased to 14$* When the foreign companies share of cumulative 
production reached 75 million barrels, royalty increased to 16$*
Income tax on the earnings of the foreign company were to be assessed 
at current rates on posted price* The details of the three agreements 
were as follows. A Japanese group received 8,000 sq,lan. for a 
signature bonus of $35 million, and a production bonus of $10 million, 
and agreed a minimum exploration obligation of $25 million over the 
six years* Amerada Hess received 3,100 sq,km. for a $5 million 
signature bonus, plus $6 million production bonus, agreeing to spend 
on exploration a minimum of $22 million. And finally, Mobil received
3,500 sq*km. for a signature bonus of $2 million, and a production 
bonus of $10 million, agreeing to spend $11 million oyer the six 
years*
Other Countries 
Saudi Arabia
The national oil company of Saudi Arabia, the General
Petroleum and Mineral Organization (Petromin) was not formed until
November 1962, Its role was intended to be wider than most of the
national oil companies, since it was expected to take part in various
industrial and commercial activities connected not only with petroleum,
(72)but with minerals in general.
Its financial requirements were to be provided by the 
Saudi Treasury together with loans from the Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Agency plus any income accruing from the operations.
In the case of Petromin unlike Iran or Egypt, neither 
securing foreign exchange nor securing domestic fuel supplies have
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been significant reason for entering joint ventures. The first 
A
motive of Petromin has been Tdiversification of the sources of
income to avoid the political and economic risks which may result
(73)
from dependence on one source, namely petroleum*1 ' In other words,
the aim has been to use petroleum as a base from which to create new
industries, and also to integrate petroleum activities more fully
into the economy.
The constraints which faced Petromin in achieving this
objective have been the lack of skilled manpower, coupled with
market limitations. The joint venture arrangement would seem to
provide these requirements, and of the fourteen new projects or
agreements instituted by Petromin by 1968, nine were joint ventures,
and four had specific agreements for foreign firms to provide both
skilled labour and management.
Petromin entered only three oil producing venture agreements,
but they are of interest because they have been responsible for
several innovations in the venture agreement formula*
(74)
The first agreement was signed with Auxirapv in April 
1965. This gave Auxirap 26,000 sq.km. of territory along the Red 
Sea coast in which Auxirap was to spend at least $5 million in the 
first two years. Upon commercial discovery, a partially integrated 
venture was to be formed in which Petromin was to have options on 40% 
of the equity. This agreement had some remarkable features in it 
when the time involved, i.e. 1965, is remembered. There was to be 
a signature bonus of $1,5 million with a production bonus of $4 
million when production averaged 70,000 b.d. But these bonuses
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were non-recoverable, unlike the Iranian bonuses which could be 
recovered as a cost of production* In addition, there was to be a 
15$ royalty fully expensed, rising to 20% when production averaged
80,000 b*d. this being based on posted prices* No income tax rate 
was fixed, but the company would be subject to the normal income
tax rate which could be unilaterally altered by the Government.
(75)The Arbitration procedures were based entirely in Saudi Arabia; '
Finally, there were relatively strict clauses on the 
conservation of gas, a problem which had become a serious issue 
in Saudi Arabia because of the wastage practised in the Eastern 
Province by ARAMCO. This agreement gave to Saudi Arabia a degree of 
sovereignty and potential control quite unheard of in the middle 
sixties. Yet, while the agreement raised considerable interest at 
the time, very little of its innovations were taken up by other 
countries for a long time afterwards. In 1969 the Tennessee Oil 
Company acquired a third interest in the area, granted to Auxirap, 
but by 1973 no commercial oil had been found.
In December 1967, the Saudi Government granted Petromin 
two licences to explore 86,489 sq.km. in the Rub al Khali which 
had been relinquished by Ararnco, and 25,000 sq.km. on the Red Sea 
Coast. Of this area, 20$ was to be relinquished at the end of the 
third year, and every fifth year after that a further 20$ was to be 
relinquished. Also, Petromin undertook to spend a minimum of $5 
million on exploration in the first three years. Immediately,
Petromin signed an agreement with AGIP who agreed to undertake the 
exploration for Petromin in the Rub al Khali on the same terms, paying 
a signature bonus of $2 million for the privilege. The exploration
period for AGIP was to be three years, renewable for a further 
three years. Upon the commercial discovery of oil, an operating 
agency venture was to be formed with Petromin having options on 
30$ of the equity until production exceeded 300,000 b.d. when Petromin 
would be offered a further 10$ of the equity. The life of the 
venture was to be thirty years, renewable for ten* Production 
bonuses were to be paid at a rate of $3 million on the granting 
of an exploration licence, and $8 million when production reached
300.000 b.d* These bonuses, as in the Auxerap-Petromin 1965 
agreement were non-recoverable. Royalty was to be 14$ of the posted 
price, again fully expensed, and the tax arrangements were the same 
as the earlier agreement. Once the venture was actually operating,
AGIP was obliged to be responsible for marketing all of PetrominTs 
share, if petromin wished. However, once production of crude reached
200.000 b.d., both sides were to undertake a study to discover if the 
venture could go downstream into refining and marketing, thus
forming a completely integrated oil company from the original operating 
agency. The criterion was to be whether the integrated operation 
would be more profitable than simply marketing crude oil.
There was an interesting adjunct to the agreement. A 
separate agreement was signed with ANIC, another subsidiary of ENI.
This was to set up a jointly-owned company to establish a petro­
chemical industry with each side investing $10 million. It was 
tied to the production agreement since if AGIP received no interest 
in ail oil exploitation concession, then the agreement was ended, 
with ANIC paying the Saudi Government $5 million. In 1968, AGIP 
assigned 50$ of its interests to Phillips, but by 1973 no commercial 
oil had been found.
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At the same time as the AGIP agreement, a similar 
agreement was signed with a group consisting of the Sinclair Arabia 
Oil Company, the Natomas International Corporation and the Government 
of Pakistan. This granted to the group the Red Sea area given to 
Petromin* The terms were identical to the AGIP agreement, except 
Petrominfs option was on a straight 50% of the equity. In 1968,
Sinclair assigned its rights to the Sun Oil Company who became the 
group operator*
By 1970 no joint ventures had been set up, and after 
participation in the Aramco concession became probable, Petromin 
lost interest in further producing ventures.
Kuwait
The national oil company of Kuwait, the Kuwait National
Petroleum Company (KNPC), was established in 1960, The company is
of particular interest because 40% of its equity was put out to
public subscription, thereby making profitability an important
factor in the aims of the company. The one Kuwait venture with
the Spanish Company Hispaniol was announced as having been initialled
in August 1965, and was finally signed in May 1967, The area granted
was to be relinquished at a rate of 2Q%> after three years, and a
further 20% every fifth year after. Hispanoil agreed to spend a
minimum of 16 2% per hectare per month, and also to undertake 
3
specific drilling requirements over the first eight years. On 
commercial discovery, an operating agency venture was to be set up 
with KNPC holding 51% of the equity. A 12,5% royalty was charged 
on the posted price, but if there was no posted price, then royal.ty would 
be a straight 50 Kuwaiti fils per barrel. Tax was to be 50% of the 
foreign companies1 profits, and the venture was obliged to provide,
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free of charge to Kuwait, any incidental gas produced from the 
operation. As an adjunct to the agreement the Spanish Government 
guaranteed KNPC 25% of the Spanish crude import market for fifteen 
years *
Prom 1965, until the agreement was ratified by the Kuwaiti 
Parliament, there was very considerable argument over the agreement. 
The dissent came basically from the private shareholders of KNPC 
who wanted to pursue a course of sole development. As well as 
criticising the form of the agreement, they also heavily criticised 
Hispanoil on the grounds that the company was both untried and 
unexperienced. The Government side felt the agreement to be useful 
on several grounds. The oil was expected to be deep, and drilling 
expensive. Therefore, they felt it better that this high cost risky 
investment should be borne by someone other than KNPC. The marketing 
arrangements were also regarded as an advantage, particularly the 
preference given in the Spanish market. As to criticisms of Hispan­
oil, the Government representatives simply pointed out that very 
few companies had bothered to bid for the acreage, and Hispanoil 
offered the most favourable terms. The argument reached its climax 
when the agreement was finally signed, and the four private Directors 
on KNPC’s Board resigned. At the time of writing no commercial 
oil has been found.
Iraij
The Iraqi venture agreement came as part of a package 
settlement which would have returned to the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(IPC) the North Rumaila field, in return for a recognition of the 
legality of Law 80 of 1960^^ The joint venture agreement was
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between the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) and B.P* Shell CFP,
Mobil and Portex. The foreign companies were to have 32,000 sq.km.
on which they were to spend on exploration $30 million in the first
six years, and $20 million in the next six years. Twenty-five
percent of the area was to be relinquished after six years, and a
further 25$ after nine years* After twelve years, all the area was
to be returned. On commercial discovery, an operating agency was
to be set up in which INOC was to hold 331$. There was to be a 12.5$
3
royalty tax on the OPEC formula, plus a 50$ profits tax, both based 
on a posted price. If INOC could not dispose of its crude entitlement 
then the other companies would buy it at a halfway price, but not 
greater than 60$ of the posted price. A sole risk clause was also
C77)
included in the agreement. Although the agreement was never ratified, 1 
it was of interest since it was the first time that the m^ajors* agreed 
in principal to accept a joint venture in the sense used in this 
thesis. In effect it was the first particpation agreement eight years 
before its time.
Jordan
The Jordanian joint venture agreement was signed in 1968 
between the National Resource Authority of Jordan (NRA) and 
Industrija Nafte Zagreb (INA) (JUGOSLAVIA). The agreement was modelled 
almost exactly upon the 1963 Egyptian operating agency agreements.
INA was to explore 16,000 sq.km. in Wadi Sirhan over six years.
If commercial discovery were made then a jointly owned operating 
agency, the Jordanian Jugoslavian Petroleum Company (J0YUPEC) was 
to be set up* At the time of writing no commercial oil has been 
found.
CHAPTER III
The Characteristics of Joint Venture Agreements
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly,to 
examine what the agreements are trying to achieve in relation to 
the different aspects of oil operations* Secondly, to examine how 
the agreements attempt to deal with the problems encountered in 
achieving these aims.
Exploration
The objectives of the joint venture agreements in relation to 
exploration
The outcome of exploration for oil, as with any form of
research is uncertain. This is because there is no way of knowing
where the oil is, without spending money on the search, and then
finally drilling a well* While the result of exploration is
knowledge, the purpose is eventually to find oil in commercial
quantities which will justify the expenditure of funds*
(1)The risk of exploration ' is that large sums of money 
may be spent which only provide knowledge as to where oil is not. 
While this may be useful, it does not in itself provide a financial 
return. Thus, as illustrated in the earlier discussions of why 
foreign investment in oil was encouraged in Egypt and Iran, there 
is a high risk of financial loss for any limited exploration 
pro gramme.
As a result of the uncertainty of exploration, the purpose 
of the joint venture with respect to exploration is that the risk
of financial loss should be borne by the foreign company rather than
by the host country. While such a situation is by no means an
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(2)innovations * , that the host country would then participate directly 
in the fruits of the foreign company's risk talcing was new.
It is however important to qualify the assertion that the 
foreign company bears all the exploration risk in a joint venture.
The foreign company need only bear exploration risks to the limit 
of its minimum financial obligations, as set out in the agreement. 
Once these minimum obligations have been reached, if no commercial 
discovery has been made, the company can withdraw; and in that sense 
has borne the exploration risk alone. But once a commercial 
discovery has been made, exploration does not stop* If the foreign 
company has fulfilled its minimum obligations, then the joint venture 
continues to explore with the host country providing its share of 
the risk capital.
Minimum Exploration Obligations
The agreements contain such obligations because of a 
potential conflict between the host country and foreign companyi 
which arises from their motivations in exploring for oil. The host 
country seeks the maximum exploration effort in the minimum possible 
time. Clauses to this effect are usually written into the acts which 
create the National Oil Companies. Since the product of exploration 
is knowledge, the greater the effort, the greater the amount of 
information available. More information reduces the level of un­
certainty, and even if the impact of this additional knowledge is 
small it is a gain, although it may be a very expensive gain.
On the other hand, the motivation of the foreign company 
can be assumed to be slightly different, and could be stated as 
the maximum possible commercial results for the minimum outlay.
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Information which does not produce commercial results is of limited 
interest to the foreign company if it must relinquish the area in a 
relatively short time. The companies may incur a total loss on the 
operation, while the host country gains from this same information.
The difference, arises because the exploration in a specific area is 
usually a once and for all effort for the foreign company, while 
it is a continuous process for the host country* This difference in 
time horizons gives rise to a potential clash of interests, and 
agreements must take it into account. So-called rencouragementT 
or minimum obligation clauses are attempts to deal with this problem.
The object of these clauses is to ensure that the foreign 
company maximizes input into exploration, not only to maximize 
expenditure and minimize the lag between the signing of the agreement 
and the date of commercial discovery, but also to maximize the data 
produced for use by the host country. Various methods have been 
employed in different agreements, each having advantages and 
disadvantages•
The signature bonus paid by the foreign company when
(3)
the agreement is first signed, although not used in Egypt,v f 
has been common elsewhere, notably in the Iranian agreements. It 
has two purposes: to increase revenues and to speed exploration 
activities. Which of the two is more important depends on whether 
the bonus is recoverable or not. Where the bonus is non-recoverable 
it provides no special incentive to speed exploration and can be 
regarded as a way of increasing revenue for the host country. Where 
the bonus is recoverable from future earnings, then presumably, 
it is, ceteris paribus, an incentive to the company to find commercial 
oil as soon as possible so that it can begin to recover its outlay
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on the bonus* The bonus also acts as an advance on revenue to the
host country, in the sense that the host country gets an interest
free loan if a discovery is made; while if no commercial discovery is
made, the host country has at least gained some revenue in the form
of the bonus* In the Iranian 1965 vintage of agreements, Shell and
the Tidewater group, both of which failed to find commercial oil,
paid to Iran $99 million, a sum equivalent to 55% of the Consortiums’
payment to Iran in the same yearl The signature bonus is intended
to reflect the prospects of the area but it has often proved an
inaccurate measure.^
A minimum work obligation in terms of financial outlay
and/or the number of rigs*to be operated or metres to be drilled,
is common to all the agreements, It provides the most direct
1 encouragementx to the foreign company to maximize input and minimae
the lag. One drawback is the possible lack of flexibility if the
obligation is couched in technical rather than purely financial terms.
It is of little value to insist that a rig should drill x metres in
y months, if the geological data is inadequate to site the well
within the y months.^
A valid point made by F, Parra^ is that if the foreign
company can withdraw before the end of the contract period, then
a minimum work obligation becomes meaningless. Some agreements
however cover this by forcing the foreign company to fulfill certain
obligation before opting out and to pay compensation if there
(7)
obligations are not met, although if those minimum 1 withdrawal 
obligations1 are less than the complete obligations (as they usually 
are), then the force behind the measure is certainly weakened.
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There are several ways of encouraging a foreign company
to fulfill its minimum obligations as rapidly as possible, for
example, in the Pan-Am-ECrPC 1964 agreements, royalty on all production
is 20$ until the minimum exploration input ($27*5) million) has
(8)been met, after which royalty becomes 15$, Also EGPC need not make
any financial contribution to develop a commercial discovery until
(9)
Pan-Am has fulfilled its minimum obligations; Together, these 
make oil production for Pan-Am far less attractive if outstanding 
exploration obligations exist,
A further Tencouragement1 clause provides for rapid 
relinquishment, whereby the foreign company is allowed to keep an 
area only for a limited period. While this might be expected to 
speed exploration, a too rapid rate of relinquishment may well defeat 
its own end since the company may not have sufficient time to carry 
out the work properly, How far this is likely to happen depends on 
the size of the area to be covered and the uncertainty (i*e* the degree 
of knowledge) attached to the area. The relinquished area may have 
an enhanced value for the host country since it is an area in which 
the level of uncertainty has been reduced, and the area can be relet, 
unless all the evidence is very discouraging. It has been a noticeable 
feature of the Egyptian agreements that as more information becomes 
available, smaller areas can be let out, thus permitting a greater 
input for sq.km.
Provision for surface rentals at the exploration stage serve 
an objective similar to that of relinquishment, since it becomes more 
expensive for the foreign company to hold exploration areas. How far 
this encourages the company to speedup its exploration effort depends
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to some extent whether these rentals are recoverable or not. If 
they are recoverable then they, like signature bonuses, become an 
advance on revenue and an incentive. Under the Egyptian Mining Law 
No* 66 of 1953^°^ exploration rentals are changed per sq.km. at 
LEIO for the first year, LE10G for the second year, and LE25 for 
subsequent years, although in the Western Desert for the third year 
and onwards the rental is only 25% of the normal rental. There
are also provisions to increase the rental if no rig is operating.
The effectiveness of this method for speeding up exploration is 
doubtful, partly because it may divert company finance from the 
exploration effort, and the idea was dropped in Egypt after 1959.
The Significance of the Definition of Commercial Discovery
Because the exploration stage is separated from subsequent 
stages, defining exactly when the exploration stage is finished becomes 
extremely important. The importance arises because during the 
exploration stage, only one interest takes the decisions and incurs 
the risk, i.e. the foreign company. In the subsequent stages, 
another interest enters the operations and begins to share the 
obligations, i.e. the host country.
Commercial discovery, which signifies the end of the 
exploration stages, means both sides gain advantages and incur 
responsibilities. An accurate definition on "commercial discovery11 
safeguards the interests of both parties, and for that reason is 
of some importance.
On commercial discovery, the host country is committed to 
putting both capital and management into the venture. It must also 
begin to repay its share of the exploration expenses incurred by the 
foreign company* In some agreements, if the foreign company has
- 54 ~
fulfilled its minimum exploration obligations then the host country- 
must also begin to contribute its share of the risk capital needed 
for further exploration. The host country must also prepare itself 
in the operating agency type of agreement to become an offtake of 
crude oil.
The foreign company incurs further expense in providing 
for its share of development costs, at the same time accepting 
the entry of local management into the running of the operation.
The conversion of exploration blocks to development blocks means 
that less of the area has to be relinquished but with no commercial 
discovery the foreign company must ultimately withdraw. Finally, 
the foreign company begins to recoup some of its outlays made before 
commercial discovery, although this may not occur until the production 
stage begins, depending on the financial terms of the agreement.
Three broad approaches to defining commercial discovery 
have been used in joint venture agreements.
The first leaves the question of commercial discovery to 
be agreed on by both parties. This was introduced in the COPE 1959 
agreement and later used in the INA-NRA 1968 agreement. It is how­
ever a distinctly unsatisfactory definition since it fails to 
appreciate that it is possible for one party to gain from a 
declaration of commercial discovery while the other party loses.
For example, by declaring a highly marginal discovery "commercial" 
the foreign company may not be forced to withdraw, while the host 
country may incur a financial outlay which returns fail to justify.
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The second appi^ ach, common to all other agreements except
the Iranian agreements establishes a criterion based on the number
of barrels produced per day. In the later agreements, the technical
conditions affecting production are also enumerated in some detail in
(12)terms of the number of wells, depth of strata etc* The problem
with this type of definition is that there are very wide divergences
in the number of barrels per day specified in the different 
(13)agreements« 1 Admittedly this to some extent will reflect the
differences between producing conditions in the countries concerned,
but one is still left with the feeling that such definitions are
arbitrary and very much a matter of guesswork!*^
The final approach to the definition comes closest to the
heart of the matter, but has been used only in the Iranian agreements.
It puts the definition entirely on a financial basis, and requires
(15)either that the field must produce a specific return, 1 or, as in
the AGIP-NIOC agreement provide a return of Reasonable profitability'
This type of definition has become increasingly sophisticated. The
1971 vintage of Iranian agreements gives greater flexibility and
specifies the discounted cash flow technique as the measuring tool.
The advantage of this approach is that it does away with technical
irrelevancies and asks the most pertinent question: is the field
going to produce an acceptable rate of return?
To some extent, the use of a sole risk clause may make the
definition of a commercial discovery redundant. The sole risk clause
permits either partner to develop a field at its own risk subject to
(17)certain conditions and provisions, 7 This clause enables either
side to op out of the development of any find. The definition of
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commercial discovery is thus made more amendable to the first 
interpretation i.e. definition by negotiation. This is because the 
problem of either side incurring obligations which it does not want or 
which may be against its interests need not arise* However, the sole risk 
clause normally only becomes operative once the venture has been 
formed i.e. a "commercial discovery1' has previously been declared, 
which still leaves open the problem of defining the first discovery 
as commercial or otherwise. What the sole risk clause really does 
is to make the precision of the definition less important since 
once the venture exists, neither party is obliged to commit itself 
to the development of the field, as the result of a declaration of 
commercial discovery.
Production
The Objectives of Joint Venture Agreements in Relation to Production 
The purpose of the joint venture agreements with respect 
to oil production is to provide a framework within which two problems 
can be solved. These problems are how much oil will be lifted, and 
how the oil lifted will be disposed of? In a situation where a 
single company controls oil production these 'problems1 are simply 
solved by reference to the amount of oil which can technically be 
lifted together with the level of demand for oil in the market*
That the lifting of oil is regarded as likely to create 'problems' 
in a joint venture situation suggests that there may be special 
difficulties associated with joint ownership of a supply of crude oil.
This is in fact the case.
- 57 -
Two conditions have to be met if joint ownership of
(18^supply is not to adversely affect offtake; It is the purpose 
of the joint venture agreements to create these conditions.
The first condition is that both parties are willing to 
invest in production capacity to such an extent that all demands 
for crude from both parties are met. While both parties lift oil 
in proportion to their equity interest this is not a problem.
The problem arises when there is a persistent underlifter. The 
obvious solution would be for the overlifter to provide the necessary 
additional capital, but this would create the problem of altering 
the equity share of the two sides* Consequently, the overlifter 
must be able to buy crude from the persistent underlifter at a 
specific price* For both parties to invest in the necessary 
capacity in such a way as to leave the equity interest unchanged, 
the underlifter must receive a price for the crude which will provide 
a return on capital equal to or greater than, a return from any 
alternative form of investment. The joint venture agreements there­
fore had to provide a mechanism to deal with a situation where one
party is likely to persistently demand less crude in proportion to its
(19)equity than the other.
Once such a mechanism had been formulated, the agreement 
then had to create a framework to meet the second condition. This 
is that the price demanded by the underlifter as compensation should 
not be so high as to affect the level, o,f demand for the offtake. This 
condition is complicated by the fact that in a joint venture situation 
the foreign company and the host country require the crude for different
~ 58 ~
purposes# The foreign company has entered the venture to secure
supplies of owned c r u d e i # e *  the foreign company wants the crude
as a refinery input# It will therefore demand crude in relation
to the sources of crude available to the company internationally
(21)to provide an acceptable crude mix to feed its own refineries#
The national oil companies of the host countries on the other hand
(22)will demand the crude as a revenue earner in a direct sense#
The basic difference is that the foreign company, as an integrated
operation, is not directly interested in maximizing revenue at the
production stage of the operation, especially in relation to one
source of crude from possibly many available to the company. The host
country however is interested in maximizing revenue at this stage
as a seller of crude,
Why this difference may cause a problem tends to be obscured
by the assumption used in most analytical discussions that oil is a
(23)homogenious product. i In fact of course there are crudes of 
different gravities etc* A simple example will serve to illustrate 
the problem* Take a venture which produces two crudes, Crude A, 
a light crude with a posted price of $2,26 pb and Crude B a heavy 
crude with a posted price of $1,92 pb,^^ Also assume that the costs 
of production are 20$ pb in each case. In this situation, if the 
host country mshes to maximize revenue at the production stage, which 
is assumed to be the case, then it will push for maximum production 
of crude A# However, the foreign company may have owned sources of a 
crude similar to crude A from a cheaper source, but requires a heavier 
crude to provide the optimum crude input mix to its refineries# The 
foreign company will then push for the maximum production of crude B,
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The joint venture agreement has therefore to provide a 
mechanism which can deal with such a potential clash of interests.
Having outlined the main problems which concern offtake we can now 
turn to a discussion of how the agreements have tried to provide 
solutions.
The Partially Integrated Ventures
Theoretically, the problems discussed above do not apply 
to the situation of a partially integrated venture, since ownership 
and control of the crude is vested in only one owner, namely the 
venture. In this situation, the levels of offtake are determined by 
the Board of the venture with reference to the technical and market 
restraints mentioned earlier. Therefore, the venture will produce 
oil as long as it can profitably sell it. In the case of COPE how­
ever, although COPE can reduce offtake if market conditions are such 
that to sell the oil would incur a loss, to make such a reduction required 
Ministerial approval. J In the AGIP-NIOC 1957 agreement, it is 
simply stated that SIRIP will use all possible efforts to raise to the 
maximum oil output
That the theory may not work in practice is hinted at in a 
clause in the COPE 1959 agreement. This clause forbids the developer 
(COPE) from being influenced in its rate of development by * the
interests he may have in other oilfields in the United Arab Republic 
(27)or abroad1. ' Such a clause seems to anticipate the problems
associated with joint ownership of supply. The explanation for this 
apparent contradiction lies in the two weaknesses inherent in the 
basic concept of a partially integrated venture. Firstly, while the
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venture is envisaged as an independent company, in reality the two 
partners have to be brought into the decision making processes. 
Secondly, while the venture is envisaged as a marketer of crude in 
its own right, it is also anticipated that the foreign partner will 
act as a major buyer of the ventures1 exported crude. These two 
weaknesses will be examined later, but their existence implies that 
the venture is likely to be faced with the problems associated with 
joint ownership of supply. Yet the agreements failed to provide 
any mechanisms to deal with these problems. The effects of this, 
as will be seen later, were to have a considerable impact, at least 
in the case of COPE.
The operating agencies
Since in the case of the operating agencies, joint control
/ Og'J
and ownership of the supply is explicit, J the agreements attempt 
carefully to provide the necessary mechanism.
The typical method laid out in the agreements to determine 
the level of offtake is as follows. For each yearly quarter the 
operating agency determines the optimum production which is based on 
technical criteria. If the equity of the agency is evenly divided, 
then half this potential offtake represents each partners1 entitlement. 
Each side then informs the agency of how much of this entitlement it 
wishes to take up, which is termed the partyrs nomination., A problem 
then arises if one partied nomination is less than its entitlement.
The method of dealing with this varies between the agreements.
In the Egyptian agreements, the potential underlifter can 
allow the other party to overlift the difference between its 
nomination and entitlement. However, this is done on the understanding
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that the initial underlifter can make up its underlift in the future, 
by making the original overlifter become an underlifter at some future 
date# The agreements are careful to ensure that recovery of an under­
lift is not done in such a way as to upset the market obligations of 
the original overlifter
This mechanism overcomes the problems of upsetting the 
equity, and of compensating underlifters* Although either party is 
entitled to leave the difference between its nomination and entitlement 
in the ground^^ If there is an underlifter, there need not be an 
overlifter# The obvious shortcoming of this mechanism is that it
cannot deal with a persistent underlifter. The agreement merely 
(31)states' 7 that the agency can only control offtake if, by doing so,
neither parties1 demand for crude is frustrated* However, there is
(32)a further clause' 7 which states that the foreign company can discuss 
with EGPC tmeanst to increase EGPCTs nomination, but stresses that 
such discussions involve the foreign company is no definite obligation# 
To what extent the sole risk clause provides such a mechanism will 
be examined shortly.
The method of overlifting in the Iranian, Saudi, Iraqi and 
Jordanian agreement is quite different. In these agreements the 
foreign company incurs specific responsibilities towards any difference 
between the entitlement and nomination of the host country* In the 
Iranian and Kuwaiti agreements this involves the foreign company 
buying up the oil at a halfway price (halfway price=unit cost + \ 
unit profits). In the Saudi and Jordanian agreements the foreign 
company agrees to act as a marketing agent for as much of the host
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countryfs entitlement as the host country wishes. While these clauses
provide a mechanism for over and underlifting, the compensation problem
is dealt with in a relatively rigid manner, particularly where the
(33)foreign company must buy at a halfway price.
A potential solution in the agreements to all the problems 
discussed above is the sole risk clause, first introduced in the 
1963 Egyptian agreements.
The sole risk clause was introduced to provide a remedy to 
partnership problems, where using the arbitration clauses of the
(34)
agreements were regarded by both sides as tantamount to a divorce 
The clause works as follows. If either party proposes a course of 
action, for example, to expand the capacity of a field, and the other 
party disagrees with such a course of action, then the proposing 
party is free to undertake the proposal at its sold risk, with the 
joint venture company acting as the agent of the proposer. If the 
sole risk operation, which has been entirely financed by the proposing 
party, is a failure, then the loss is borne by the proposing party 
only. If however the sole risk operation is a success, then after 
a certain time the opposing party has the right to join in the operation, 
but must pay a penal rate to do so#
To take a typical example, the Pan-Am-EGFC 1964 agreement^ 
states that the proposing party shall receive all the petroleum 
from the well until the proposing party has received from each wildcat 
well, an amount equal to its outlay plus 300%. From each development 
well an amount equal to its outlay plus 100%. Finally for any project 
in connection with such drilling or the petroleum resulting from it, 
an amount equal to its outlay plus 75%, When these amounts have been
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recovered, the opposing part has the right to join in on payment 
of 50% of the costs involved, otherwise the operation remains under 
the sole control of the proposer.
From the viewpoint of production, what this clause does, 
is to allow any potential overlifter to pay directly for that over- 
lift without disturbing the equity of the venture. However, one 
point should be noted. If there is a persistent overlifter whose 
demand for crude greatly exceeds that of the underlifter, although 
the equity division of the venture remains intact, the principal of 
joint development is undermined. Ultimately, it is feasible to 
imagine a reversion to the old style concession, albeit in disguised 
form as the participation of the host country in operations dwindles. 
Nevertheless the clause does provide a valuable flexible addition to the 
mechanism for determining offtake as will be seen later in the case 
of Egypt.
Finance
The financial situation which the joint venture agreement 
must deal with is as follows* The foreign company is responsible 
for all exploration expenses prior to commercial discovery. Upon 
commercial discovery, both parties are responsible for the finance 
needed for the development and production of oil, while the foreign 
company must be compensated for its outlays on exploration. Once 
oil is being produced, the *benefitl accruing from the oil must be 
divided between the parties involved. Within this broad outline, 
the agreement must provide the mechanism whereby the following 
problems or situations must be covered: the valuation of the offtake, 
the division of benefits and the acquisition of finance for develop­
ment .
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Valuation of offtake
The reason for the importance of the valuation of the offtake
is that before the ’benefits’ accruing from the production of oil can
be divided between the parties, they must be quantified.
The problem of price
The problem of price in the valuation can be best seen by
reference to the fihancial myth associated with the earlier joint
venture agreements. The following quote provides'a typical example.
’This agreement (ENI-NIOC 1957), shattered the 50-50 pattern by
vesting 50% of the ownership of the operating company in the Iranian
Government, thus providing 75% of profits to Iran, since it also
got half of ENI’s 50%* The error in this statement, apart
from the neglect of any consideration of the inputs provided by the
host government, lies in the implicit assumption that the profits
in a 50-50 pattern agreement are based on the same price as the
profits of a joint venture.
In the case of joint ventures three kinds of price must
be identified. Firstly, the posted price, as used in the ’old style’
concession agreements in which, by using a set of identified criteria,
crudes are given a specific fixed price. Secondly, the realized price
which is the price actually received for the crude on the open market.
The first type of price is essentially a tax reference price on which to base
royalties and income tax, while the second type is essentially a 
(37)market price* The third kind of price referred to in some joint
venture agreements, which creates the confusion, is a ’posted price1 
which is set as a tax reference price, but no clue is given as to the 
criteria on which this ’posted price’ is to be set, The implication
- 65 -
being that such ’posted prices’ are set by negotiation rather than by 
any set of identified criteria as is the case with the concession 
posted price.
The extent of the myth which arises from these different 
prices can be illustrated by the following example. Assume a crude 
with a posted price of $2*50 p/b* Further assume the tax rate in the 
joint venture is 50% of the profits and there is also a 15% fully 
expensed royalty. The total Government take in the situation of a 
joint venture versus a concession is given in table 3*1 below.
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Only in the Hispanoil-KNPC agreements of 1967 are the prices
to be used specified as being formulated in accordance with the
procedure in the Arabian Gulf i*e# genuine posted prices. In the
Iranian agreements, the price is simply to be 1posted’, but with no
reference to the criteria which shall be used in their formulation#
The Egyptian agreements make the question of price more
explicit. For example, the COPE 1959 agreement states ’the amount
of royalty... shall be reckoned on the average price in force during
the period for which royalty is due, in a recognized market where it
is easy to know the world prices for petroleum of a similar kind and 
( 38)grade1. Since in 1959 there were neither recognized markets,
nor world prices for petroleum, the agreement then simply goes on to
formulate a procedure for the inevitable bargaining between the
two parties* In the case of the operating agencies, the procedure is
simpler since it is only a question of determining the profit of the
foreign company, especially as the Egyptian Government has tended to
(39)
take royalties in kind. f For example, in the Pan-Am-EGPC 1964 
agreement, the price used to determine the profits of Pan-Am is the 
average realized price for exports to non-affiliated companies over 
six months, but if EGPC should be getting a higher price for its 
crude over the same period, then the higher price is used to determine 
p r o f i t s . A g a i n ,  anticipating no sales by Pan-Am to a non affiliate, 
scope is given for negotiating a transfer price* In the Transworld 
EGPC 1972 agreement revenue is to be based on a ’posted price1 less 
10# or a realized price, whichever is higher. The criteria for setting 
this Tposted price1 are not specified*
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Accounting procedures and repayment of exploration expenses
While price provides the revenue side of the accounts,
the deductible costs complete the balance sheet. Many of the
agreements since the early sixties set out (normally in annexes)
the general accounting procedures to be followed* These usually
reflect !good oil industry accounting practices1 which outline the
methods for dealing with what constitutes taxable profits, rates
(41)and methods of depreciation etc*
One major accounting problem which the agreements had to 
solve was how the exploration expenses incurred by the foreign 
company were to be shared with the host country in the event of a 
commercial discovery. Four different methods can be used in the 
agreements.
In the partially integrated venture the exploration 
expenditure by the foreign company can be regarded as a loan to the 
company which can be repaid out of the ventures1 future profits, 
with or without interest. Alternatively, the loan can be capitalized 
as part of the venture’s share capital with the national oil company 
providing an equal amount of share capital for use in the development 
and production stages. In the cases of COPE and SIRIP, the former 
method was adapted. The difference in outcome between the method 
used can be seen from example 1 below.
Example 1 ~ Effect of different methods of repaying exploration 
expenses by partially integrated ventures on the distribution of 
benefits
Assumptions The foreign company has spent $20 million on 
exploration. The field which results required $40 million to develop 
and produce oil which is to be depreciated over five years, operating
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costs are ignored* Over five years the field produces $80 million 
worth of oil* The tax rate is 50$ with no royalty, and benefits 
which arise from the different timing of payments are ignored. The 
equity of the venture is evenly divided.
Method 1 Exploration expenses treated as an interest free loan 
to the venture
Both parties loan $20 million each to develop the field 
which is recovered after five years. Assume the share capital of 
the venture to be negligible* The taxable profit is thus $40 million 
Of this, $20 million is repaid to the foreign company to cover 
exploration expenses* Taxable profit is now $20 million, after the 
50$ profit tax each party receives $5 million. This assumes total 
distribution of profits and no ploughback# The cash gains to each 
party are given below*
Host Country $ Million Foreign Company
20 ~ Depreciated loan 20
Tax-10 20-Recovered
exploration
5 - Profit - _5 expense
35 45
Method 2 Exploration expenses treated as part of capital
Since the exploration expenditure is capitalized the 
host country puts up $20 million to equalize the equity. Since 
$40 million are needed for development, each side lends the venture 
$10 million each which is recovered after five years. Taxable profit 
are now $60 million. After the 50$ profit tax, each party receives 
$15 million as profit from the venture. Again no ploughbacfc is 
assumed. The cash gains to each party are given below.
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Host Country 
10
$ Million Foreign Company 
10Depreciated Loan
Tax 30
15 Profit 15
55 25
Less $20
million -20
Capital
input
35
While the above example is simplistic in the extreme, the 
difference can be seen* The foreign company in Method 2 ends up 
with the same 'benefit1 as in method 1 since as well as its $25 
million cash gain, it also holds $20 million worth of shares in the 
company (i*e* totalling $45 million as in method 1)* But, it has 
only been able to repatriate $25 million since the $20 million shares 
represents assets which remain in the country* Since the foreign 
company under the agreement can only dispose of these shares with 
the consent of the host country government, the position of the host 
country under method 2 is stronger, because this strengthens the host 
country's bargaining power*
In the case of the operating agencies, the two methods 
of repaying exploration expenses are as follows* Firstly the foreign 
company is repaid by regarding the exploration expense as a loan to 
be repaid out of future production. Alternatively, the foreign 
company can amortize the loan against the profits attributed to its 
own share of crude offtake. The Iranian agreements favoured the
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former method, and in the 1971 vintage of agreements the foreign 
company could not deduct this repayment from its gross receipts for 
tax purposes* The Egyptian agreements on the other hand favoured 
the latter method*
In these two methods of repayment, the latter method, 
tends to favour the host country because the siae of taxable profit 
is higher as can be seen from example 2*
Example 2 Effect on the distribution of benefits of repaying 
exploration expenses in different ways in an operating agency
Assumptions* The same as in example 1 except assume the 
value of oil produced to be $100 million*
Method 1 The Agency repays out of production
The $20 million exploration expenditure and the $40 million 
development costs are repaid leaving a profit of $40 million. Of this, 
the foreign company receives $20 million on which it pays $10 million 
in tax* The cash gains to each side are given below*
Host Country $ Million Foreign Company
20 -* Depreciated Devp*t - 20
20 - Profit - 10
Tax -10 20--Exploration Expense
50 50
Method 2 The Foreign company offsets exploration expenses against 
its own profits
On recovery of costs the profit is $60 million. Of this,
$30 million accrues to the foreign company* By the deduction of 
exploration expenses, the foreign company has a taxable profit of $10 
million of which the Government takes half. The gains are given below.
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Host Country $ Million Foreign Company 
2020 depreciated Devp’t Costs
30 Profit 5
Tax 5 20 Exploration 
Expenses
55 45
If a 15$ fully expensed royalty is introduced then the 
difference between method 1 and 2 is reduced* In method 1 the 
foreign companies take becomes $46.25 million while in method 2 it 
becomes $1*25 million* However these discrepancies are much less 
than in the earlier example of the partially integrated venture*
The repayment of exploration expenditure well illustrates 
the kinds of difficulties with which the agreements must deal. This 
topic will be examined in the section on financial operations since 
the above discussion underlies much of the financial difficulties 
experienced by COPE.
The mechanisms set out in the agreements vary between a 
partially integrated venture and an operating agency.
In the case of the partially integrated venture, the 
agreements provides the host country income from three sources, the 
income tax and royalties which accrue to the Government, and the 
profits of the venture company which accrue to the host country 
national oil company in the form of dividends*
The division of the benefits* accruing from Crude Oil
Production
ventures
- 73 ~
In Egypt the royalty was 15$ which could be taken in kind 
from the well head, or paid in cash based on the average realized 
export price# In the Cope 1959 and IE0C-EGPC 1963 agreements the 
royalty was to be 20$ on the first half of a development block and 
30$ on the second half* The royalty however was not expensed* In 
the case of Iran, no royalty was included in the partially integrated 
agreements* The other partially integrated venture agreements were 
the Hispanoil-KNPC 1967 agreement with a royalty of 12*5$, and the 
two Saudi Arabian 1967 agreements with a fully expensed royalty of 
12.5$*
In all the partially integrated venture agreements, the . 
income tax rate on the ventures profits were fixed at 50$, The only 
exception was the Saudi Arabia 1967 agreements which gave the Saudi 
Government the right to unilaterally alter the tax rate on the 
ventures. In the Egyptian agreement it was specifically stated that 
the Government should be entitled via royalty, rent and income tax to 
50$ of C0PE1s profits/42^
As to the dividends accruing to the National Oil Companies, 
non of the agreements specified a procedure for the determination of 
the percentage of profits which should be distributed, as it was 
assumed that such a decision could be reached by the Board of the 
Venture. As will be seen, the relatively loose drafting of the 
financial clauses in the partially integrated ventures, at least in 
the case of COPE, was to cause considerable difficulties.
Operating Agency
The income which accrued to the host country from the 
operating agency came from three sources; the national oil company's 
share of the offtake, plus the royalty and income tax which the host 
government received. The royalty being levied on total offtake, the 
the income tax being levied on the profits attributed to the foreign 
companies.
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The royalty arrangements were similar to the partially
integrated ventures in so far as they could be taken in cash or kind.
In Egypt before 1969, the royalty was 15$, and after 1969 the same
figure was used in the newer agreements, but it was to be fully
expensed* An interesting sub clause permitted the Government the
right to reduce the royalty if by so doing a marginally commercial
(43)field could be brought into production.' In the case of Iran,
the 1965 vintage of agreements carried a royalty of 12.5$. The 1971
vintage of agreements introduced slightly more complex royalty
arrangements)expensed on the OPEC formula at 12.5$ of posted prices
until the foreign companies’ share of cumulative production reached
5 million barrels, when the royalty increased to 14$, and later to
16$ if the foreign companies share reached 75 million barrels.
The income tax which the Government received was calculated
on the profits attributed to the foreign companies share of the 
(44)offtake.' As in the partially integrated venture this rate was 
(45)
fixed at 50$. 7 In the case of the pre 1969 Egyptian agreements,
the Government was entitled to only 50$ of the accounting profit 
attributed to the foreign company* If the total amount|| paid to the 
Government on behalf of the foreign company (exploitation rentals, 
customs duties, royalties, income tax) is less than 50$ of the net 
profit for that year, the company must make the payments up to 50$. 
Similarly, if the payments exceed 50$, then the foreign company can credit 
the excess to future payments. In the Iranian agreements, the foreign 
company is also taxed on any crude it overlifts at a halfway price, 
the tax being based on the difference between the halfway price and 
the posted price.
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The mechanism in the agreements whereby the national oil
company secures its share of the offtake have been outlined earlier
in the section on production*
financial bye-products
Apart from the mechanisms outlined above, the agreements
also provided certain financial side benefits to the host country,
notably through bonuses and linkages.
Details concerning the bonuses have been outlined earlier,
in relation to the two kinds of bonus. The signature bonus paid on
the signing of the agreement; and the production bonus which can
either be paid at the start of production, or when certain production
levels are r e a c h e d . H o w  fotr these bonuses are a net gain to the
host country depends on whether they are recoverable from future
production* If they are recoverable, then they merely represent an
advance on revenue, except in the case of the signature bonus if no
(4 7)
commercial discovery is made*
Secondly, there are the linkages which may accrue to the
non oil sector of the economy. Most agreements contain some form of
economic integration clauses. For example the Egyptian agreements all
specify that the venture will use local contractors or goods,
providing that their price is not greater than 10# of competitor's
prices from outside the country. This type of clause is unlikely
to produce any impact greater than that which may occur under an old
style concession, since the major operators tend to use local goods
plus contractors where possible, this for political as well as economic
reasons*^®^ However, some local orders may be forced by the integration
clauses* For example, in 1964, Egypt was to build a drilling ship
(4 9)
for COPE at LE. 1*5 million,' 7 Many of the joint venture agreements
contain clauses stating that when production reaches a certain level, 
then the venture will attempt to go downstream, usually into petro­
chemicals* For example, in the Agip-Petromin 1967 contract, when 
production reaches 200,000 b.d, feasibility studies will be undertaken 
to expand the operations into refining and marketing* However, as 
Saudi Arabia has already shown, such downstream ventures are possible 
without an oil producing joint v e n t u r e O n e  possible linkage 
unique to joint ventures^ is the opening of credit doors to the 
host country, especially if the record of the venture has been ?good,f 
This can come from banks, or even from the foreign company itself*
For example, in 1962 ENI was reported as offering credit for industrial 
projects in Egypt/51^
The financing of the operations
This is the final problem which the agreements must provide 
mechanisms for. In the case of both the partially integrated venture 
and the operating agency, the foreign company initially provides all 
exploration expenditure at its own risk. During this period, when the 
foreign company alone finances the operation^most of the agreements 
provide for the monitoring of these expenses by the host country.
For example, the Pan~Am~EGPC 1964 agreement provides for an advisory 
committee of six (3 from Pan*** Am. and 3 from EGPC) to provide * comment, 
assistance and information* on the exploration budget. At the same 
time exploration expenditure by Pan-Am must be *accepted* on a quarterly
basis by EGPC as being rin line with international prices for goods and
(52)
services of similar quality*,' 7 Oneea commercial discovery has been 
made, then the subsequent financial arrangements laid down in the 
agreements vary between the types of venture.
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Partially Integrated Ventures On commercial discovery, both partners 
to the agreement are to provide the capital necessary to float the 
company. In the case of COPE the initial capital was to be IE 10 
million, and in the case of SIRIP 10 million Rials. This initial 
capital bore no relation to the financial inputs required to develop 
a commercial discovery, but once the company had been formed it was 
allowed to secure finance like any ordinary company. The capital
could be *gradually increased as the operations of the company may
(53)require*' , but only by maintaining the existing division of equity, 
which required the consent of both parties. Alternatively, the 
companies *if there be needs for supplementary funds... shall borrow 
the required funds *1^^ In the case of SIRIP, if the conditions for 
borrowing on the market were 'not favourable* then the two partners 
were obliged to put up the necessary loans.
Operating Agency The financial arrangements in the case of the 
operating agencies were very different. On commercial discovery, 
both partners provide the capital to float the company. However, this 
*capital1 is intended to be the minimum required to provide the agency 
with an initial administration, For example, the capital for the 
Egyptian agencies was to be only IE 20,000. Subsequent financial 
requirements were to be provided in equal proportions by the two 
partners. This was to be the agency's only source of finance since 
it could neither borrow money outside of the two parties, nor could 
it make a profit for self finance. Over the period, various exceptions 
and additions were made to these basic financial terms.
IPAC, although in form an operating agency was entitled
(55)to draw its funds from outside the two partners, 7 and was also 
given a higher initial capital of 7.5 million rials#^5^  It was also
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possible for IP AC to make a profit, but only if one or both parties 
underlifted on its entitlement when IPAC could sell the balance.
The main development in this aspect of the agreements has 
been to provide for a greater role by the foreign company in the provision 
of development finance. In the Iranian 1965 vintage of agreements, 
the foreign company was obliged, if required, to provide NIOCts share 
of the development costs as a loan at 1*5$ per annum, to be repaid in 
16 semi-annual installments. A similar clause appeared in the 
agreements of 1971, but changed the interest rate on the loan to 7$, 
or a rate equal to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York + 1$, which­
ever was highest. The repayments period was also extended to 20 semi­
annual installments. In the case of Egypt, in the Pan-Am-EGPC 1964 
agreement, Pan~Am was to advance $15 million for the development of 
any commercial discovery while EGPC would provide any local currency 
required. The dollar balance owed by EGPC would be repaid to Pan- 
Am in crude oil carrying an interest rate of 15$ for the first year, 
and 7$ for subsequent years until the balance was repaid. In a sheet 
circulated by EGPC in 1972 outlining the general terms for concessions, 
one of the 'preference items1 was 'the facilities offered for 
financing development costs in case of participation by EGPC1. In the 
Pan-Am-EGPC 1969 agreement Pan-Am agreed to put up all the funds for 
development, with EGPC's share to be repaid later out of future production. 
A similar clause was inserted in the Transworld-EGPC 1972 agreement. 
Marketing
The purpose of the sections in the agreements concerned 
with marketing is to provide mechanisms whereby the production can 
be disposed of in a way that is satisfactory to all parties. In this
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situation, the interests of the host government, as distinct from the
national oil companies, must be considered as well as the interests of
(57)the direct parties to the agreement.' 7 
Rights of the Host Government
These rights are normally covered by two aspects* The purchase 
of part of the offtake by the governments at favourable terms, and the 
requirement that domestic demand is satisfied before crude oil can be 
exported*
In the Egyptian agreements which regulate COPE, it is stated 
that the Government is entitled to purchase up to 20$ of COPE1 s off­
take at a price 10# below the realized price for e x p o r t s H o w e v e r ,  
this crude can only be used domestically, which does not allow the
Egyptian Government to ’test the international market* to ensure that
(59)COPE’s realized export price is ’realistic: In addition, COPE
cannot export crude until domestic refinery demand has been met* The 
other Egyptian operating agency agreements also contain identical 
clause s * ^ ^
Similarly, in the case of Iran, the Government, through 
NIOC, is entitled to purchase part of the offtake. Up to 1958 this 
represented an option on 5% of the offtake at a price equal to cost 
plus 140 p.b.* After 1958 the option rose to 10# of the offtake at the 
same price. As with Egypt this was for internal use only, although 
the Iranian agreements made no stipulation that domestic refinery demand 
should be met before export took place.
The other agreements where such Government rights are 
important are in the Hispanoil-KNPC 1967 agreement and the Saudi 
Arabia agreements. In the former case, the Government can buy at 
cost price ’a proportion of crude petroleum required to produce in
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Kuwait products for local consumption*• In addition, the Government
can buy up to 10# of net production at the posted price less 10#,
but only for export to other Arab countries* In the case of Saudi
Arabia, the Government can purchase 10# of the offtake at the posted
price less 10# with no restrictions on use. The Saudi Governments
(61)options on purchase also became more favourable over time, and
the Government has further options on 10# of the offtake at normal 
market terms for its own use or for export to other Arab or Muslim 
countries
Marketing in a partially integrated venture
The method of marketing is left to the Board of the venture
and the agreements concern themselves almost entirely with questions
( 63)of flexibility of price, which have been outlined earlier. What
some agreements do add is the marketing allowances permitted off the 
//■
posted price. Tbr example the Agip-NIOC 1957 agreement allows the
managing director of SIRIP to offer up to 5# off the posted price at 
his own discretion, while reductions of greater than 5# must be approved
by a body described as *a commission of directors*. In the dase of the
Hispanoil KNPC 1957 agreement discounts were allowed *in the light of
the competitive, economic and marketing situation*, but this allowance
was to be under the control of 'the appropriate authorities*.
Marketing in an operating agency
In the case of an operating agency the question of marketing 
the offtake is not the concern of the agreement. This is because once 
the oil reaches the wellhead, each party can then dispose of it as 
desired with no restrictions. The only exception to this is where 
the foreign company has incurred an obligation to market some of all 
of the host countries entitlement. The details concerning this have 
been outlined earlier in relation to production.
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Management
The management or control of the operations is the last 
aspect covered by the agreements to be discussed. If one starts 
from the p r e m i s e  that *the basic problems of joint ventures
f 66)
arise from a mixture of harmonies and conflicts of interest1; * 
then it can be assumed that an important function of the management 
is to reconcile the conflicts. The agreements must therefore create 
the framework for management to achieve this aim. The agreements 
usually only cover three aspects which could be said to come under 
the broad heading of management.
The equity and constitution of the Board
The normal equity distribution is on a 50-50 basis *^8^
Two exceptions can be mentioned. The two main Saudi Arabian agreements 
both endowr the national oil company, Petromin, with less than 50$ 
of the equity. In the Auxerap-Petromin 1965 agreement, Petromin 
only has options on 40$ of the equity, while in the Agip-Petromin 
1967 agreement Petromin has options on 30$ of the equity until 
production reaches 300,000 b.d., when Petromin can take options on 
a further 10$* In both cases Petromin has equal representation on the 
boards* In these Saudi agreements Petromin*s equity share is only 
an option. There is no automatic acquisition of equity as is the 
case in all other venture agreements. The only venture where the 
national oil company has an equity majority is the Hispanoil-KNPC 
1967 agreement which gives KNPC 51$ of the equity* This does not 
give KNPC control of the Board of Directors, since each side provides 
an equal number of directors^8^
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The constitution of the Board has the same broad outline
in all the agreements. The host country provides the Chairman of
the Board, while the foreign company provides the general manager.
The actual size of theboard can vary. For example, SIRIP and WEPCO
have a Board of six, while GUPCO has a Board of eight. In the case
of the Egyptian operating agencies, the companies are specifically
excluded from being subject to the law granting representation to the
(70)workers on the Board of Directors* The Egyptian agency agreements
also carry what could be termed a *good parthership clause1, which
emphasises that decisions of the Boards of the agencies shall be the
(71)result of mutual agreement between the two parties.' 7
Personnel Policies
These relate to the staffing policies to be used by the
venture* In the case of Iran, the first agreement (Agip-NIOC 1957)
stated that technical management will be provided by Agip, while 
(72)
it was agreed' to employ Iranian nationals where possible. The
next Iranian agreement, which created IPAC was slightly more specific,
and stated that after ten years^ more than 51$ of the executive work-
(73)force shall be Iranian nationals* By the 1971 vintage of agreements, 
terms were *more favourable* to Iranian ,participation* with greater 
than 70$ of the executives being Iranian nationals, In addition, 
there is to be a five yearly; switch round in who appoints the 
Chairman and General Manager. The Saudi Arabian agreements provide a 
sptendid example of the pointlessness of the specific employment clauses 
as outlined above# A minimum of 75$ of the labour force must be 
Saudi nationals, but only if they are available to be employed (sic.).
The Egyptian agency agreements provide by far the most sensible approach 
to this problem. The agreements are excluded from coming under the
various laws governing employment regulations# For example, they
are excluded from Law 26 of 1954 on Companies, one of whose clauses
states that a minimum of 15% of the work force of a company shall be
Egyptian, ALL that is stated on the subject of employment is that
the ventures will freplace expatriate staff by qualified nationals as
(75)they are available,tv This formula provides the maximum flexibility.
Procedures for dispute settlement
The final aspect covered by the agreements relates to the
procedure for the solving of d i s p u t e s # T h e s e  procedures relate
to the setting up of conciliation and arbitration procedures in the
event of a dispute either between the parties directly concerned,
or the government and one of the parties. The arbitration procedures
are normally international. An exception to this is Saudi Arabia
which under its Mining Code set up a Board of Concessionary Appeals
to operate within the borders of Saudi Arabia# In the case of Iran*
(77)in its agreements' , a distinction is made in the handling of dispute 
arising from different sources. Accounting and technical differences 
are referred to a single expert, or a body of three, if the parties 
cannot agree on the single expert# Legal differences are put firstly 
through a conciliation procedure consisting of four members, two from 
each side# If this fails then the dispute goes to arbitration of three 
people, two chosen by the partners and one chosen by one of the Swiss 
Business Chambers. Because of the tune limits imposed at the various 
stages relevant to solving a legal dispute, the machinery to reach a 
decision could in theory take up to seven months to set up#
In the case of Egypt, the procedures vary between the 
different agreements, but distinguish between a partner-govemment 
dispute and an inter-party dispute. The difference is that disagreement
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with the government is more likely to reflect disagreement over the
interpretation and enactment of the contract than an inter-party dispute
which is more likely to be outside the scope of the agreement.
In the case of COPE, a dispute between the government and
IEOC is dealt with by the Mining Law of 1953# This sets up a
board of three, two of which are appointed by the Egyptian side.
But if the dispute is one which involves a threat of the cancellation
of the agreement, the matter is referred to the Administrative Court
(79)of the Council of State. There is no official procedure laid
down in the event of the two parties to the agreement failing to
agree. In the case of the operating agencies, if there is a dispute
between the Government and Pan-Am, it would be referred to arbitration under
the laws of civil procedure effective in the UAR. If the dispute was
between the two partners, then the dispute would @0 to international
arbitration. But, it was not made clear under which law the case
would be heard. For example, fthe agreement., shall .. be interpreted..
(by) the principles of law common to the UAH and the United States
of America and, in the absence of such common principles, then in
conformity with the principles of law normally recognized by civilized
n a t i o n s T h i s  vagueness was deliberately included in the agreement
to give maximum flexibility, since it was anticipated that *the need
is for commonsense to prevail rather than strictly legalistic require- 
(81)
ments*. The maximum time allowed to set up the arbitration machinery 
was 45 days compared with seven months in the case of Iran*
Apart from these three aspects of the agreements which could 
be regarded as coming under the umbrella title of ,managementt, 
another feature can be mentioned* Most of the agreements specified
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the use of certain practices relating to such items as well spacing, 
plugging and abandoning wells etc* These clauses usually reflecting 
tgood oil industry practice1 can be regarded as providing some technical 
framework within which management could operate, although on a 
limited basis*
Conclusion
It becomes quite clear from the above outline, that the 
management clauses in the agreements were intended to provide only 
the barest framework within which management was to operate. The 
other sections of the agreements concerned with production finance etc* 
provided additions to the framework, but the overall impression is 
an attempt by the drafters of the agreements to leave question of 
management as open as possible to provide the maximum flexibility.
- 86 -
CHAPTER IV
Bargaining and Conflict in Relation to Joint Ventures
The purpose of this section is to examine briefly (1) the 
reasons why, in the past, oil agreements have tended to be unstable 
and to be a potential source of conflict* Then, in the light of 
these reasons to examine how a joint venture may provide a partial 
solution to this instability and conflict, at the same time possibly 
creating new forms of conflict*
Oil agreements and stability
There can be little doubt that oil agreements have been
both unstable and controversial: } and is forced to the conclusionA
that such characteristics are inherent in the nature of the agreements. 
This section will argue that such characteristics are the result 
of an attempt to cover a dynamic situation with a static instrument 
(i*e* a concession agreement)*
Relative Bargaining Power and Dynamism 
The Nature of Bargaining
(3)
Bargaining is concerned with relationships of power; 7 Power 
itself can come from different sources, from the State, from within 
a social structure, from an organization, economic power etc* The 
exercise of power can be complicated by the fact that more than one 
type of power may be brought to bear at the same time. For example, 
a company may exert economic, political and organizational power on 
a country at the same time* This factor can make it difficult to 
isolate economic power for analysis.
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However, economic power operates in the context of economic
relations, and from this proposition two bases of economic power can be
identified* The first is the economic dependence of one party upon
another. An oil company depends upon oil. If it draws its oil from
(4)
one source, its dependence on that source in the short run is total; 7 
As its sources of oil diversify, so its dependence on each individual 
source lessens. The second element is the ability of one party to 
deny its goods or services to the other party. The significance of these 
tw> elements is that they are both measurable in monetary terms. The 
cost of dependence can obviously be seen, while the cost of denying the 
goods or services can be measured by the net benefits foregone. The 
link between the two hinges on the following - *the sacrifice which 
B makes by retaining the good is obviously nothing more than the dependence 
of B on A, Therefore, economic power is based on the extent to which 
the subject to be overcome is dependent on the powerful subject, and on 
the extent to which the powerful subject is independent of the subject 
to be overcome1
While these dements are measurable, the question as to who 
wields the strongest economic power cannot be answered until certain 
qualifications are considered. Firstly, the power to retain depends 
upon how far the party who is threatened with the denial of the good 
believes in the ability of the holder of the good to retain it. The 
question of retention is veiy much a matter of credibility. Secondly, 
the impression made by the threat of retention depends partly on 
dependence, but also on the degree of 1faint heartedness1 of the subject 
threatened. One would expect however, a high correlation between 
dependence and the level of *faint heartedness1.
- 88 -
In terms of the first oil agreement in a country, one might
(6)expect that the economic power of the foreign companyv would be
much greater in relation to the host country. The foreign company
will have the technology, the skilled manpower, the risk capital and
market outlets. However, over time, these attributes will increasingly
be acquired by the host country. Consequently, in the initial period
the dependence of the host country on the foreign company is high;
over time, as the host country is more able to run aspects of the
industry itself, this dependence is reduced. This change in relative
economic power between the two parties is likely to reflect itself in
(7)a change in the relative bargaining power of the two parties. As 
can be seen, the prime characteristic of this relative bargaining power 
is that it is a dynamic process.
The *Law* of Increasing Terms
The relationship between the foreign company and the host 
country with respect to an oil agreement is one of many such relation­
ships between different countries and companies. As a result the 
relationship which exists in one country is likely to be affected by 
circumstances external to the country.
Part of the mechanism whereby external factors influence
the relative bargaining power can be explained by what might be called
(8)
a ’Law* of increasing terms. 7 This states that the main terms of any 
agreement signed represent the minimum acceptable terms 
on which the next agreement can be negotiated. While *the law* applies 
to all the terms, it applies more strongly to some categories of terms 
than others. Two categories stand out. The financial terms are very 
strongly affected by this principle, also the terms which could be
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described as ‘public relations* terms. These included the employment 
clauses and other clauses which concern, aspects of national sovereignty, 
The reason the tendency operates is due to political competition.
(9)
In this way, it applies not only to the agreements of one country', 
but it will also apply to the agreements of different countries,
particularly where these countries are in a politically competitive
(10) 
area.' '
An excellent example of the working of ‘the Law* is provided
by the speed with which agreement innovations in one Arab country
such as the 50~*50 profit division have spread to other Arab countries,
although certain time lags are involved.
In the light of this principle, it can be seen how the
relative bargaining power of the two parties can be altered even
if there is no alteration in the actual balance of economic power
between the parties. No Government in a politically competitive area
(internally or externally) can afford to appear to be lagging behind
(11)its competitors in securing ‘improved* terms , 'even if there are 
no alterations in the actual situation. The foreign companies are 
well aware of this, and must try to accomodate the host country if 
they are to survive.
Thus, the relationship of relative bargaining power between 
country and company is dynamic in the sense that is likely to change. 
However, the way it will change lies in the future and is therefore 
uncertain. This dynamic and uncertain relationship is governed by 
an agreement which is static.
The Static Agreement
The distribution between the parties of the profit which
accrues from the production of crude oil is a zero sum problem.
i.e. one side can only improve its position at the expense of the
other side, assuming the size of the profit is a constant* Yet
both sides feel entitled to benefit from the profit. The host
(12)
gpvernment as the owner of the oil, the company as a reward for 
involving itself in a high risk operation* In order to solve this 
problem of distribution an agreement is signed before the operations 
begin^to outline the mechanisms of the sharing process.
Two points should be made about this initial agreement which 
affect its impact on the dynamic processes outlined earlier.
firstly, it is set at the start of the operations, secondly
it is set in ignorance of the eventual size of the profit.
The fact that the agreement is signed at the start of the 
operation means that its provisions reflect the relative bargaining 
power of the two parties at that point in time.^^ To take an 
extreme example, assume the foreign company has all the economic power, 
and no other company is bidding for acreage. If it is assumed that 
the Initial agreements reflects the relative bargaining power of the 
two sides, then the foreign company should secure for itself the majority 
of the profit. However, over time as the economic power of the host 
country increases the relative bargaining power will alter* But, and 
this is the problem, the agreement which governs the relationship still 
reflects the bargaining power at the start of operations. Consequently, 
the host country will begin to ‘pressure* the foreign company to bring 
the initial agreement into line with the new situation. The greater
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the difference in relative bargaining positions at the start of the 
process, the greater the scope for the initial agreement to become 
outdated, and the greater the pressure which will be exerted.
The second feature, uncertainty as to the size of profit, 
feeds this inherent instability as follows. The agreement which 
determines the ‘distribution* of profit between the parties is set in 
ignorance of the final size of profits. Consequently, an agreement 
which at the start of the operation gives the foreign company a 
‘reasonable* rate of return on its capital outlay, may in the light 
of events prove to have been1 over generous* to the company. A crude 
illustration will clarify this. Assume the agreement gives the 
foreign company 50% of profits, and the foreign company invests $50 
million to produce oil. If the field found is say of medium size, 
and the profit is $25 million per annum, this represents a rate of 
return to the company of 25% per annum* If however the field is large, 
and profits are $100 million, then the company secures a rate of 
return of 100% per annum. Assuming there is some concept of normal 
profit, then if the Company's rate of return greatly exceeds this, 
because the initial agreement could not forsee the eventual size of 
the profit, then charges of exploitation are likely to be made against
..I, (15>the company*'
Conclusion
Bringing the strands together, it can be seen that the 
conflict between the host country and the company arises because 
the terms of the relationship between the two are set by an agreement. 
This agreement, made in ignorance of an uncertain future, becomes 
outdated as circumstances i.e. relative bargaining power, changes.
Consequently, there is constant pressure to update the agreement*
However, this analysis creates a conceptual problem since its 
conclusion suggests that a ‘dynamic agreement * would solve the 
problem* Conceptually, a 'dynamic agreement1 would be an agreement 
which would provide a mechanism whereby any change in relative 
bargaining power would be instantly reflected by a change in the terms 
of the agreement* But, the idea of relative bargaining power is 
subjective to the two parties, and therefore could not be dealt with 
by an objective agreement*
In reality it is not the agreement which is static or 
dynamic* An agreement is a piece of paper with words on, and the 
words cannot rearrange themselves as if by magic. What is static 
or dynamic is the attitudes of the parties to the agreement. A party 
with the best of the agreement is likely to have a ‘static1 attitude 
to it, i*e* not wish it altered. The party with the worst of the 
agreement will have a dynamic attitude to the agreement, i.e* want 
it changed. In the light of this realization the problem can be 
restated*
The future is uncertain and change is likely to occur*
If conflict is to be avoided, then the rules which govern the
relationship between the parties must be altered* If both sides
are amenable to allow alterations i*e* have a ‘dynamic attitude* to
the agreement then conflict through bargaining will occur, but need not lead
to conflict through action* Conflict through bargaining is the
haggling of the negotiating table, while conflict through action is
represented in the extreme by nationalization or company withdrawal.
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However, if one side has a *statie attitude* as is more likely to 
be the case, then the conflict through bargaining is likely to be 
translated into conflict through action*
It is for these reasons that oil agreements have tended to 
generate conflict through action*
The Contribution of Joint Venture Agreements
The contribution of joint ventures can best be summarized
by reference to an earlier quote which described joint ventures as
(16)a mixture of *harmonies and conflicts1.' 7 In some ways joint 
ventures provides solutions to some of the problems discussed above, 
at the same time they also create new problems.
Joint Ventures as Solutions to Conflict
When conflict arises in the context of an oil agreement, 
it generally manifests its self| in two categories. Firstly, there 
are demands for changes or renegotiations in the details of the 
existing agreements. These details usually relate to the financial 
aspect of improving the financial benefit which accrues to the host
(17)
country* Secondly, 7 there are the demands to alter the whole nature
of the agreement, and to change it from a rentier type of agreement
to one which involves, to one extent or another, participation and
(18)
control by the host country. 7 It is to these two aspects which joint 
ventures can contribute.
financial Benefit. The joint venture agreement differs in several 
important respects from the rentier arrangements, firstly, the host 
country acquires a direct share in the real profit of the operation 
as opposed to a purely fiscal benefit. While in the old style
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(19)concession the host country received 50$ of the *profit* in tax,
the tprofitt was a national accounting profit and since the sixties*
*The income tax has been transformed into an almost pure per-barrel
tax1, ^ ^  and as such can be regarded as a cost of production* In
the joint venture situation, the host country through its national
oil company earns a proportion of the real profits of the operation,
vdiere this profit is represented by the national oil company lifting
its share of the crude, then the sharing of the profit is even more
real, since no accounting procedures are required* Of course the
fiscal problems of taxing the profits of the foreign company still
remain, but on a reduced scale*
In addition, the clause which has appeared in some joint
venture agreements which allows the host government to unilaterally
alter the tax rate on the foreign company achieves two ends* Firstly,
it gives greater flexibility to the initial agreement by accepting
the principle that the financial terms can be altered* Secondly,
a considerable amount of sovereignty is restored to the Governments1
fiscal powers. The significance of such an extension of sovereignty
is that, once accepted by the company, it further reduces the area
(21)
where conflict can be expected* '
However, these features are more a question of psychology
rather than economics. Even though the area of potential conflict
may have been reduced, the fact remains that the per barrel income
which accrues to the host country under a joint venture may well be
(22)
less than under an old style concession. *
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Benefit of Participation Theoretically, the joint venture arrangement
changes the whole basis of oil extraction agreements by converting
(23)
it from a rentier arrangement to one of potential participation.
If a host country has opted for a joint venture agreement;there are
certain implicit assumptions which can be identified. The first is
that the host country is to some extent dependent upon the foreign
company. If the host country were entirely self sufficient in all
the aspects required to find, produce and market oil, there would .
seem to be little point in not pursuing sole development, subject
of course to the constraint of comparative costs* The creation
of a joint venture therefore suggests complementarities between what
(24)
each party has to offer. 7 It further suggests that both parties
realize their interdependence and would be more likely to possess
'dynamic attitudes' with respect to changes in circumstances. This
in turn means that conflict through action is less likely.
The other major contribution of joint ventures to harmony
lies in the political psychology of participation. This works
in two ways. Firstly, the host country can feel it is playing a
significant role in the development of its own country's resources.
(25)
This was a major source of earlier conflict. Secondly, in the
past, relations between governments and companys have sometimes been strained
because the government exerted pressure on the companies, not because
the government felt it had a genuine greivance, but simply for
internal or external political reasons. If a joint venture exists,
then the industry can be projected as a national industry and the
pressure which may arise from political factors is eased. A good
example of this latter point is provided by Egypt where the industry
is projected as a 'national industry1 and the Government felt quite
safe to call upon other Arab countries to use oil as a weapon against
America over the Israeli question despite American involvement in the 
Egyptian industry.
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Jt would seem that the benefits to stability}which comes 
from the host countxy directly participating in the operations,are 
greater than the contribution to stability from the financial aspect*
Joint Ventures as Generators of Conflict
The reason that joint ventures may generate conflict comes 
from two characteristics, joint ownership, and joint control of the 
venture* The distinction between the two is that joint ownership 
concerns the joint provision of the inputs, while joint control 
concerns the disposition of the inputs. It is possible to have the 
former without the latter*
Effects of Joint Ownership The problems which may arise from joint ownership 
derive from the multinational interests of the company and the 
multisectoral interest of the Government. This means that both 
parties have responsibilities for providing inputs for interests 
other than the joint ventures* Consequently, there is no automatic 
reason why both parties should wish to put the same quantity of 
inputs into the venture* Two specific problems will serve to clarify 
this question*
Both company and government will wish to distribute their 
available resources between their different interests on the basis 
of profitability1* However, the criteria on which this 'profi­
tability* is based may well differ* On the one hand the company 
will tend towards a calculation based on the rate of return on 
capital. The Government, while also using this criteria will also 
be obliged to think in terms of social profitability, and of 
profitability which may arise from other sectors due to linkages*
To take a simple example, if a country has a balance of payments 
problem, and fuel imports* aggravate the problem, the country may be 
willing to put more resources into developing oil than would be 
justified by a straight accounting calculation at existing exchange rates.
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Consequently, conflict may arise between the parties if one side
( 26)wishes to expand the operation at a different rate from the partner*
A similar potential problem which concerns the partially 
integrated venture is the partners1 policies over the question 
of dividends or ploughback, with respect to the profits* The foreign 
company because of committments outside the company or because of 
a desire to rapidly recoup the original investment, for example, 
for political reasons, may wish to distribute a far higher proportion 
of the profits than the host country* As a result, the venture 
may be denied an important source of funds for expansion.
The Effects of Joint Control The problems which may arise from 
joint control come from a similar source to the joint ownership 
problems, namely that different motivations may conflict in the day 
to day operations.
Sone of these problems have already been discussed in the 
context of specific fields of interest such as exploration and 
production. In these cases, the agreements have attempted to provide 
solutions where different motives may cause disagreement* Two other 
sources of difficulty which may cause conflict in a general sense, 
should also be mentioned*
Firstly, while one of the supposed benefits of a joint 
venture is that political interference is reduced by virtue of a share 
in control, if politics should be allowed to impinge on operations, 
such political interference could be far more harmful to efficient 
operations.
Secondly, from the viewpoint of the multinational foreign 
company, sharing control could create difficulties with the logistics 
of the foreign company on an international scale* The oil operations
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of the foreign company in any one country are only part of its
international operations* The decisions which are made for operations
in one country must be linked to similar decisions in other countries*
However, the host country can take decisions in relative isolation*
As a result the host country can take any decision on the basis purely
(27)
of the interests of the venture, ' while the foreign company 
taking the same decision must consider wider interests* A good 
example of this problem which also ties in with different profit 
motivation is the problem of demands for different crudes mentioned 
earlier.
In the late sixties the problem of logistics was thought 
to be particularly relevant to a situation of a world surplus of oil 
where a foreign company might wish to cut back production from 
country A because it could get the same crude more cheaply from 
country B* While the surplus situation no longer holds, the 
problem remains but in reverse* In other words the possible desire 
by the host country to conserve the oil may equally interfere with 
the logistics of the international company.
Conclusion
To a large extent, the success or failure of the venture 
depends on how these conflicts are resolved* This in turn depends 
upon how the characteristics of the agreements have operated in 
practice* It is this question which can now be examined.
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CHAPTER V 
The Operations Of Joint Ventures
The purpose of this section is to examine, in the light 
of earlier sections, how joint ventures have operated in practice, 
in relation to various aspects of oil operations. Since only Egypt 
and Iran have actually formed joint venture companies, it is from 
these countries that the information is drawn*^ The aspects to 
be covered are exploration, Production finoenb and management*/ " A
Exploration
As has been outlined earlier, the exploration terms in 
Egypt became more favourable to Egypt over the period in the sense 
that the foreign companies provided for a greater exploration effort 
in a shorter period* These improvements reflected the better bargaining 
position of Egypt as the industry gained momentum, and also appeared 
to work successfully despite the little oil found* Three specific 
aspects of the agreemsnts affected the exploration operations. 
Relinquishment
As can be seen from Figure V*l. page 100 the rate of
relinquishment provided for became faster up to 1969* However, as
success in finding oil became increasingly elusive, the trend was
halted in the Pan-Am-EGPC agreement of 1969, and reversed in the
Transworld agreement of 1972* This provides a good example of
the fear that a too rapid rate of relinquishment would impair
results* The suspicion that relinquishment may have been too fast
to allow thorough investigation is confirmed by the fact that in the
Pan-Am-EGPC 1969 agreement 25% of the area granted to Pan~Am had
(2)earlier been relinquished by the same company. 1
e  1 0 0  *
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One benefit of the earlier relinquishment was that EGPC
had at its disposal a considerable amount of acreage to relet on
which there was geological information. This meant new agreements
could grant smaller areas. Tbr example, in the NOSO-EGPC agreement 
( 3)
of 1970, 7 NOSO received only 100 sq.km. for three years on which
was to be spent on exploration the highest amount per sq.km. yet*
In the summer of 1972 negotiations were in progress with a large
(4)number of foreign companies to relet relinquished acreage.
Some countries have been criticised over their policy
of letting acreage for exploration to too many companies, on too
(5)small a scale, for too short a time. ' The specific criticism is
that by splitting areas into small blocks, the total geological
picture may be lost, thereby leaving the companies with inadequate
data to site wells. But since the national oil company is a common
partner in all countries, this danger can be eliminated. The EGPC
has in fact instituted regular meetings of the exploration departments
of all operating companies with the specific object of pooling
information. In addition, by pursuing such a policy, a considerable
amount of exploration information has been gathered in a relatively
short period.
Exploration Obligations
As can be seen from table 5.1 the minimum exploration effort
in financial terms shows no clear trend, except the obligations for
( 6 )offshore areas are higher. This is simply because of the higher 
cost of offshore drilling* The actual amounts arrived at in the 
agreements are the result of bargaining, the host country attempting
- 1 0 2  -
Table 5*1 Exploration inputs into Egyptian Ventures
Company and Minimum exploration % of the Acreage Granted
agreement obligation which is offshore
$ per sq*km.
Cope 1963 770 8
Pan-Am 1963 232 0
Phillips 1963 104 0
Fan-Am 1964 4,230 100
Pan-Am 1970 625 0
TTranswrld 1972 1,045 a part.
Source: Relevant agreements.
to get the maximum obligations from the foreign company, the 
company trying to incur the minimum obligation. This is not to 
imply that the foreign companies in Egypt do not want to put in the 
financial effort, but they wish to keep the legal obligation to the 
minimum. In the Phillips and Pan-Am agreements of 1963-64, the
minimum outlay incurred by both over a nine year period was $54,5 million.
By 1970 both had overspent this by $13.5 million/7^
A point to note here is that since the ventures had both
been formed, and the minimum obligation met, EGPC had to also invest 
$13.5 million in exploration. Although part of this would be in 
Egyptian currency, it clearly indicates that the host country is not 
entirely free from the provision of risk capital for exploration*
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Commercial discovery
Table 5*2 Exploration Tims Lag In Egypt
Field Operator Number of weeks between oil 
shows and date of commercial 
discovery
Morgan GUPCO 68
Alamein WEPOO 11
Imbarka WEPCO 5
Abu Qir Offshore WEPCO 70
Abu A1 Ghanadiq GUPOO 91
Source: The number of weeks shown is liable to some
error since the information was obtained by 
taking the time between the report by MEES 
of an oil show and the report of a declaration 
of commercial discovery. Thus there is the 
reporting lag to be considered. But this can 
be assumed to be similar in all cases and so the 
figures can be looked at as reasonable 
approximations«
As can be seen from table 5.2, the gap between oil shows and
the declaration of commercial discovery was reduced sharply until 
Imbarka, after which it increased again.
The reason for the initial decline was that both sides were
keen to declare commercial discovery as rapidly as possible. The 
problem came with the Imbarka discovery by Phillips* It fulfilled 
the requirement of commercial discovery (500 b.d. over a thirty day 
test period), and was imnediately declared cornercial. However, 
subsequent development drilling failed to find another producing 
well, and it became apparent that the discovery was merely a freak 
pocket, As a result of this, EGPC had incurred heavy financial obli-
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gations, and on subsequent discoveries requested more time for
evaluation before declaring a commercial discovery* The commercial
discovery definition was also extended in later agreements to require
(8)at least two producing wells on a structure*
Despite Egypts unfortunate experience over Imbarka, the 
technical definition of commercial discovery was still used in the 
agreements* While this was improved and made more complex, it still 
misses the point that the well or field, rather than produce a 
quantity of oil, should produce an acceptable financial return* 
Production and Disposition of Crude Oil
The development of the offtake
In Egypt, the first venture to lift oil was COPE in 1957
(9)
from Belayim# The offtake plans were based on a five year rolling 
plan, with adjustments being made annually*
Since COPE was the marketer of crude oil, partnership 
problems over offtake did not arise since the crude was lifted with the 
object of maximizing the profits of the company. Who bought the crude 
is uncertain in exact quantitive terms, certainly ENI must have bought 
some, but at what terms is unclear, although it is claimed that ENI 
paid the same price as anyone else*^^ Expansion in output came 
from expanding the Belayim field, thus when the Israelis took over 
Belayim in 1967, C0PE*s production ceased* Despite the 1959 and 1963 
agreements, further finds of crude were not made.
GUPCO started production from the El Morgan field (32° API 
low sulphur content) in April 1967* Almost immediately there was an 
offtake problem* The Israeli attack of June 1967 by taking Belayim, 
reduced the amount of crude available for domestic requirements*
- 105 -
Under the terms of the agreement Egypt was entitled to requisition
the entire production of El Morgan, but refrained from doing so in
(11)order to keep good relations with Pan-An. In November 1967 and 
again in March 1969, as a result of further Israeli attacks, the 
refinery capacity at Suez was damaged* This meant the planned 
expansion in offtake from El Morgan was threatened since Egypt lacked 
the refinery capacity to use the crude oil* In these situations 
both sides accommodated each other by an agreement to underlift or 
overlift as the situation required* This period presents a good 
example whereby problems over offtake can only be overcome if both 
sides are prepared to be flexible and accommodating* Clearly, the 
solution lies with management rather than with creating legalistic 
mechanisms* Not until the beginning of 1972 was the situation 
normalized with both sides taking their equity entitlement. Apart 
from one year (1969/70) the Government elected to take the royalty 
in crude oil rather than cash*
The last venture to be formed, WEPCO, began with production 
from the Alamain field (34*5° API low sulphur content). From the 
start both sides took their equity entitlement. The level of off­
take for the venture is given in Table 5.3 page 107.
The development of venture offtake in Iran follows a similar 
pattern of gradual expansion as indicated by Table 2.2. page 
These developments in Egypt and Iran appear to have 
occurred with none of the production problems anticipated in the 
earlier section on the characteristics of the agreements. While this 
may be due in part to the mechanisms provided by the agreements, 
there is a more realistic explanation. As can be seen from the
production tables, in neither case has the level of venture 
production been high* Fbr example in Iran in 1970, total venture 
production accounted for less than 8$ of total Iranian output* 
Consequently fears that the national oil companies could not dispose 
of their share of the offtake, or that conflict would arise between 
the production of different crudes, have been unjustified to date 
simply because production has been too low to be significant*
The operation of the sole risk clause
In the case of Egypt, the clause had only been invoked
(12)once, although on other occasions it has been Tthreatened*.'
The case were it was invoked concerned the Abu Qirgas discovery by 
Phillips in 1969* Phillips felt that given the nature of the find, 
plus the international marketing situation, exploitation of the 
discovery would not be a commercial proposition. On the other hand, 
EGPC felt that if the gas field was developed, the gas could be used 
on the domestic market thus freeing fuel oil for export, at a time 
when fuel oil was gaining improved terms in the international market. 
This situation provides a good example of a situation where the two 
parties, acting on good economic criteria, reach different conclusions, 
both equally valid* By invoking the sole risk clause, a solution 
satisfactory to both parties was reached without any problems over 
the equity balance or paying a compensation price to Phillips as 
an underlifter. Nor is the decision final since Phillips can buy in 
at a future date, albeit at a penal rate of entry.
The benefit of the sole risk clause as a solution to 
partnership problems can be seen by reference to a recent dispute
(I
in Iran. The dispute concerns IPAC1s Fereid^an field were the cost
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of lifting the oil was likely to be well above average* Before 
proceeding, Pan-Am tried to secure tax relief to compensate for the 
higher lifting cost* In such a situation a sole risk clause would 
enable NIOC to carry on with the development of Fereidaan with or 
without Pan-Am,
The Disposition of the Crude
A major difficulty in describing the disposition of the 
crude produced is the lack of information on the quantity and price 
of the crude. This comes about partly for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality, but more important until recently, it is also due 
to a question of political prestige over what appears to be the poor 
price received by the national oil companies until 1972,
In many ways EgyptTs experience with respect to the dispo­
sition of the crude has been unusual since its prime objective, at 
least initially, was to provide domestic crude for the large and 
growing domestic market. This demand represented a growing drain on 
the Egyptian balance of payments. In 1955 crude oil and oil product 
imports cost Egypt LE 16 million, by 1965 this was LE 27.1 million 
representing 1% of total imports and 19% of the visible trade deficit. 
Between 1965-70 the average cost of one imported ton of crude oil cif 
was IE 6.56, the average revenue for a ton of crude oil exported fob 
was IE 4,20, a difference of IE 2.36, The average cost in the same 
period of one ton of imported oil products cif was IE 8.07, of one 
ton of exported products fob IE 5,46, a difference of IE 2.61.^3^
As can be seen from column 5 in table 5.4 page 109, the domestic demand 
for crude oil reached a peak in 1966. After 1966, demand declined 
due to increasing substitution by cheap, electricity from Aswan, and 
the development of natural gas. This decline in demand meant that an
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increasing amount of crude oil became available for export. This 
trend to export crude was supported by the destruction of much of
(14)
Egypt *s refining capacity after 1967.' 9
1960-1970
Million Barrels 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
1) Domestic production of 
crude 22.8 45*6 44.1 39.5 62*2 89.6
2) Foreign company offtake - - - 1.76 17.74 35,33
3) Exports of crude 6.4 11.68 10.09 3.65 5.47 11.46
4) Imports of crude 15.33 29.2 28.47 18.25 9.12 7.33
5) Crude domestically 
used (l-2)+(4-3) 31.73 63*12 62,48 52,34 58.11 50.14
6) Products trade 
balance +4*4 -15.7 -11.7 —8.0 +1.7 +8,0
7) Petroleum based fuel 
used domestically 36.13 46.42 50*78 46.34 59*81 58.14
aafc Excludes oil exported by the foreign companies.
X Given in simple weight terms, calorific equivalents 
ignored.
Sources* Table 5.3 page 107 Rofrs 1
GUPCO + WEPCO Annual Reports: Row 2 
Economic Review, Central Bank of Egypt: - 
Rows 3,4,6
Before production began from El Morgan, the bulk of 
domestically produced crude had been refined locally. Tbr example, 
much of C0PE!s Belayim production had been sent to the refinery at 
Suez, and when production was started from Alamein, EGPCTs share was 
also refined locally. What crude oil had been exported had tended tc 
be the heavier crudes which were frequently sold on a barter basis.
1970
119.2
47.96
26.13
7.66
52.71
+15.3
68.01
With the development of El Morgan, for the first time Egypt had a 
light crude of fairly low sulphur content in sufficient quantities 
to be exported for cash# Egypt appears to have had little difficulty 
in selling her share, and in mid 1971 it was announced^15) that 
after the Tripoli agreement, contracts had been signed to export El 
Morgan crude over the following eighteen months at a price 50# pb 
above the earlier prices#
In the case of Iran, the information is equally scanty*
It is almost impossible to discover the quantities of venture crude 
taken by NIOC, let alone what percentage of this has been exported# 
Much of the crude exported by NIOC is on a barter basis, making 
price estimation difficult# Where cash sales have been made, up until 
1972 NIOC did not appear to get a veiy good price. For example, 
the IPAC oil gping to the Madras refinery, which represents 40 million 
barrels over twenty years, is priced at $1#35 pb implying a discount 
of about 20$ off posted price #^"^
Conclusion
It appears from the above that there have been few problems 
with respect to offtake and disposition of crude. While this may 
in part be the result of well written agreements, a more important 
reason is the small amount of crude being lifted, and the even smaller 
amount which reaches the open market.
Finance
The financial developments which occured in the Egyptian 
ventures between 1957-1972 provide many examples of the problems 
discussed above in the section on the financial characteristics of 
the agreement.
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The Financial Developments of COPE
The financial development of COPE was hampered from the
(17)
start by the looseness with which the 1957 agreement was written. 3 
The problems began with two sections of the agreement, the repayment 
of exploration expenses and the size of the share capital.
By the 1957 agreement, the exploration expenses already 
incurred by HOC were to be regarded as an interest bearing loan 
to be amortized out of COPE's profit. Consequently, this meant 
that the size of the taxable profits was considerably reduced, this
(18)
reduced the revenue which accrued to Egypt through the profits tax. *
The GPA objected to this when the implications were realized after
3E0C presented a bill for exploration of $20 million. In order to limit 
the effects, the GPA began a systematic check on all the items which 
made up the total, since there had been no monitoring of exploration 
expenses between 1952-57. Originally, the acreage had been operated 
on C00PTs behalf by Socal and Bank Hoffman for the first two years.
This meant that many of the bills presented by IEOC had originally 
belonged* to Socal and Bank Hoffman. This made it fairly easy for 
EGPC to object to some of the bills since IEOC was not in possession of
all the details, and so found difficulty in justifying some of the
expenses. The dispute grew until both sides agreed to put the problem
(19)
before an arbitratorv who eventually reduced the claim to $10 
million.
When COPE was formed, the initial share capital was IE 10 
million. While this could be increased as required, the consent of 
both parties was needed to do so* Up to 1966, IEOC refused to do so.
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At first the GPA attempted to persuade IEOC to capitalize the 
exploration expenses, but since this meant COPE (and therefore 
IEOC) would pay more tax IEOC refused. After the reduction of the 
outstanding exploration expenditure by arbitration, the question of 
capitalization of these expenditures lapsed.
However, the question of the relatively low share capital was raised 
again in the early sixties in relation to the gearing ratio,
The initial share capital of IE 10 million did not take operations 
very far# As a result, because of IEOCTs refusal to increase the
share capital, COPE had to borrow money to finance the operations
(21) 1 thereby continually increasing the gearing ratio. COPE was
borrowing a high proportion of this owed capital from the Egyptian
banking sector which became part of the public sector after 1960.
This meant that IEOC was putting very little into COPE compared to the
Egyptian side*
Added to the resentment caused by this imbalance of input
sources, resentment from the Egyptian side was also caused over the
question of dividend versus ploughback* IEOC wishdd for a policy of
the maximum possible distribution of the profits, which it then
repatriated# On the other hand, the Egyptian side wished to reinvest
the maximum back into COPE. In this argument IEOC tended to win,
and in 1961 and 1963 nearly 90$ of the net profits were distributed.
IE0Cts actions with respect to these disputes, and therefore
ENITs, amounted to a desire to extract the maximum possible from
COPE with the minimum commitment of resources* This is in keeping
with the policy of a company which has spread its limited resources
over too wide an area, and simply could not afford to commit above
a minimal level of resources* That ENI has acted in this way is
(22)confirmed by others#
A further problem which occured in this period concerns
the price of the crude oil, and is of interest since it illustrates
a basic weakness in the partially integrated venture# It wuld be
expected that COPE, in order to maximize profits, would try to obtain
the highest possible price as the marketer of the crude oil. However,
the foreign partner to the venture is often a major buyer of oil from
the venture. As a result the foreign company faces a conflict between
buying the crude cheaply, thus acquiring oil, or paying a higher price
and benefiting from the increased profit of the venture. In the case
of ENI, IE0C*s interests in the accounting profits of COPE has
already been shown to be low. Coupled with the fact that fENI always
(23)
had heeded oil, and needed it badly1 'it is apparent that ENI felt 
its interests to lie in securing cheap crude oil. Consequently, 
a certain amount of friction existed since IEOC,s loyalties tended 
to push for a lower price for the crude oil. Naturally, the Egyptian 
side wanted to maximize the price of the crude, and at one stage the 
Government objected to the use of the realized price as a base upon 
which to calculate royaltieSjOn the grounds that the price was not 
Sufficiently realistic*. Eventually a compromise was negotiated.
COPE!s financial development was further blighted during its
enmeshment in the public sector. Under the Tsocialistt laws of
1961, companyfs were obliged to distribute 25$ of profits to the
workers* IEOC complained bitterly about this measure, and a com-
(24)
promise was reached in Presidential Decree 179. 1 This granted
IEOC a minimum 20$ of the net profits so long as IEOC held title 
to 50$ of C0PEls share capital. Because this guarantee meant 20$ of net 
profits plus Government payments, if production was so small that 
no accounting profit was made, then the Government could only receive 
80$ of the royalty.
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A further aggravation was caused over the control of the
foreign exchange resources when COPE was taken into the public
sector in 1962, Before 1962, 33800*8 position in COPE had been fairly
strong since it had a considerable say over how the foreign exchange
(25)
was used* 7 When COPE was nationalized, all the foreign exchange 
entered the national reserves available to all public sectors* 
Consequently, COPE, and therefore IEOC lost control of its foreign 
exchange. This considerably weakened IEOC,*s bargaining position in 
COPE.
As a result of all these disagreements in COPE, financial 
( 26 )relations deteriorated! In an effort to solve all outstanding
financial disputes, an agreement was negotiated and signed in 1966.
By this agreement, the capital of COPE was increased by LE 6 million,
both sides contributing half, IEOC provided part of its share from
the profits of previous years, some of which were Ifrozenl during
(27)
the dispute. ENI approved C0PE*s accounts since 1962, ' and IEOC
agreed to postpone its share of C0PE*s profits for two years if
( 28)output fell below S million cubic metres per annum! } finally ENI 
agreed to loan EGPC $8 million repayable over five years at 2% 
interest per annum. How far this agreement provided a solution to 
C0PE*s problems is not dear since its operating fields were lost in 
June 1967 when the company effectively ceased operations.
Since 1967, Egypt appears to have won the final round in 
the financial battle. Under the 1socialist laws1 which govern 
COPE, the staff of COPE could not be made redundant. Consequently 
since 1967 COPE must have been running at a considerable loss*^^
As COPE would be unable to raise a loan, both sides must meet the 
losses. The implication of this is that IEOC has had to foot half 
the wages bill since 1967 with no prospect of a return.
The financial history of COPE provides a good example of
how an attempt by one partner to follow its own interests without
compromise can lead to the possible failure of the venture. It also
illustrates how the initial agreement can set the tone for the whole
operation. However, Egypt, in terms of experience, gained a great
deal from COPE, as a result, the other ventures were designed with
the problems of COPE in mind. Without doubt, the financial problems
of COPE were to a large extent responsible for the introduction of the
(31)operating agency agreement; 7 not only in Egypt in 1963, but through­
out the Middle East.
The financial development of the Egyptian operating agencies
After the problems with COPE, the objectives of the financial 
aspects of the operating agency agreements were twofold, firstly, 
to keep the agreement as simple as possible, secondly to ensure 
that the responsibility for finance rested on the two partners 
rather than the ventures.
GUPCO was the first agency to be formed in 1966 when the 
special clause regarding Pan-AmTs obligation to provide development 
finance was renegotiated, reducing the rate of interest on the 
development loan to 3.5% instead of 7%. By the end of 1966, it 
became obvious that the $15 million supplied by Pan-Am to develop 
the field (El Morgan) would not be sufficient, and that a further 
$27 million would be required. Pan-Am agreed to arrange the necessary 
loans for EGPC who borrowed $7 million from the United States Bankerls 
Trust Company, and $6.5 million from the Chase Manhattan Bank. Also 
Pan-Am agreed to buy oil from EGPC to cover the amortization of these 
loans which have duly been repaid, EGPC and Pan-Am have formed 
two other operating companies, FAPCO and NIPCO, but while both have
separate charters, the two agencies have the same offices and staff
as GUPCO in order to save on administrative expenses.
As of June 30th 1971, Pan-Am had spent $70#9 million on
exploration, while GUPCO had made a joint capital investment of $123.5
(32)million of which 24.4$ had been in Egyptian currency. Of this
total capital investment, $7 million had been for joint exploration 
which implies that EGPC has committed $1*25 million of foreign
/ M »| \ / « J \
exchange as risk capital for exploration. Dr, M* Amin^ points
out that without the help of the foreign partner in developing 
El Morgan, there could have been a delay of 5-6 years for the 
Egyptian Government to raise the necessary finance alone, a sum of 
$62 million spent over three years, thus delaying production by 
2-3 years.
The history of WEPCO provides a similar e:jq?erience* The
Alamein field was to cost $12 million to develop, of this $4*5
million was provided by EGPC in Egyptian currency, the remaining
$1*5 million of EGPC’s contribution was to come from foreign exchange
credit provided by Phillips. In 1971, Phillips* resources on an
international level were being put into Nigeria and the North Sea on 
(35)a large scale# As a result, the resources available to Phillips 
for exploration were becoming very stretched* In order to assist 
Phillips1 obligations in the Western Desert concession, Phillips, 
with the consent of EGPC, permitted Hispanoil a 20$ interest in 
Phillips share of WEPCO to provide assistance with the risk capital. 
This provides a good example of a situation where the foreign company 
may prefer to invest in other areas of its international operations 
because expected returns are greater, although in this case it could 
be achieved without affecting the Egyptian operators.
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The financial benefits which have accrued to the host country
An important question to be asked in relation to joint 
ventures is how their financial benefits to the host country has 
compared with other forms of agreement? And how far such data 
and experience should influence the policy makers in their choice 
of agreement*
In partial answer to this question it is possible to build 
a model to make such a comparison. Three attempts at this can be
(37)
mentioned* T.R* Stauffer compared the ERAP—NIOC 1966 agreement 
with an old style concession agreement, and found the latter to be
more profitable to the host country, subject to certain assumptions
(38) (39 j
about the amount and cost of oilv ' Dr, K* Shair 7 produced a
paper which compared the Hispanoil KNPC 1967 agreement with the
Auxirap-Petromin 1965 agreement and the ERAP-NIOC 1966 agreement*
In this comparison the Hispanoil agreement was found to be *better*^^
than the other two agreements, unless a large quantity of low cost
oil was found, in which case the ERAP agreement was rbetter*.
(41)Finally the most sophisticated model was produced by R.S. Macia. 7 
This compared a joint venture agreement, with an old style concession, 
with the joint venture emerging as the 1 better1 of the two*
The differences in the conclusions of these models arise 
from the fact that the conditions of production, cost etc, vary 
between the models. For example the three start from different 
posted prices ranging from $1,40 p.b* to $2,274 p*b* while the 
assumed realized price range between 14$™20$ below the posted price.
The purpose is to compare conditions under which on^ r  the other 
agreement works out best. Since in an actual situation such
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conditions are not known, these models are of limited value as a
tool to decide upon which type of agreement to opt for. For example,
if it is known that where large quantities of low' cost oil are found,
the contract agreement provides the maximum benefit; it still has to be
assumed by those who decide which agreement to use, what the expected
production conditions will be. In view of the uncertainty which
surrounds exploration, such assumptions concerning production
conditions are likely to be arbitrary. In this situation, unless
one type of agreement emerges as better for all or even most production
conditions, then such model bulding provides no clue as to which/\
agreement provides the maximum benefit, unless production conditions 
are already known. As a result, they are of little use as a tool for the 
policy maker.
The only way to assess an agreements1 effects on the benefits
which accrue to the host country is to apply data from a specific
company after a suitable time period has elapsed. This is then an
(42)
accounting reality rather than a model. 1 From this emerges a 
further problem related to profit versus profitability.
Under the old style concession, the concern of the 
Government was their share of the profit* Thus the criterion of 
Success* was how far the country succeeded in capturing the ’profit* 
attributed to crude oil. This was basically a fiscal problem.
Similarly, in the case of a contract agreement the criteria was also 
fiscal, coupled with the hire price for the services of the foreign 
company. In these situations, the criteria were relatively simple, 
an agreement which captured 60# of the profit* was ’better* than one 
which captured only 40# of the tprofit*. The situation for a joint 
venture is quite different.
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The fiscal element still remains in connection with the 
profits attributed to the foreign company, but, more important 
is the fact that the host country is investing resources into the 
venture. The implication of this is that it is no longer sufficient 
to consider the share of the ’profit1 which includes the host 
country's offtake and the fiscal element. Because resources are 
committed to the venture, the more important criterion is whether 
the return on the resources compares favourably, or otherwise, with 
the returns available from committing the resources to other uses.
As a result, the returns from a joint venture must not be considered 
in isolation from alternative uses of the resources.
Having considered some of the problems of evaluation we 
can now turn to an examination of the direct financial benefits which 
have accrued to Egypt.
One estimate of Egypt's return on the operating agency was
(43)given by Dr. M. Amin in 1971. ' In this, expenditure by the two
operating agencies since 1963-64 was put at $350 million of which 
the foreign companies supplied $250 million. Egypt's share of the 
offtake was valued at $240 million. Over the six year period this 
represents a simple rate of return of 34.3# per annum.
However this figure must also be considered in the light
of what may have occured without the presence of the foreign company. 
(44)Dr. M* Amin; ' discussing the development of El Morgan, pointed out 
that over the development period of 2-3 years, $62 million had been 
invested* Without the help of the foreign company, it could have 
taken the Government 5-6 years to raise the necessary capital; a 
delay of 2-3 years. If the total return on the field over its life
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after costs is assumed to be $1,000 million, and a rate of return 
on investment of 10# is assumed. This represents to Egypt a 
potential loss in income of $200-300 million#
Unfortunately there is insufficient data on the financial 
state of the joint ventures# This is partly due to security factors, 
but is also because of the Egyptian habit of aggregating the joint 
venture details with the whole oil industry. Because of this lack 
of available data, no definitive conclusion can be reached as to the 
benefits to Egypt of the joint venture arrangements.
Management
The purpose of this chapter on management is to examine 
the management problems involved in the operation of a joint venture, 
and what attempts have been made to overcome them. In studying these 
problems, exclusive attention will be given to the problems which 
arise from joint ownership and control. It is not intended to examine 
the general problems which face managements who operate in economically 
underdeveloped areas.
There has been an increasing interest in joint ventures as 
a subject of study, to a certain extent as an adjunct to the more 
general interest in the multinational corporation. Despite this 
interest, very little has been done in the academic field to examine 
joint venture management problems, beyond an examination of generalities!^ 
Even within industry itself, this aspect appears to have attracted 
very limited attention until recently, possibly due to the 'comfor­
table operating margins1 which result from such ventures
— 121 —
The material used will be drawn entirely from Egyptian 
experience* The example provides a major advantage since the 
Egyptian objective was to participate to the maximum in the ventures. 
This avoids a situation where joint ownership is not accompanied by 
joint control i.e. one of the partners acting as a sleeping partner. 
Where there is a sleeping partner, the problems which result from 
joint control are minimized. It is these problems which are of 
interest.
The Management Structure of the Venture
Figure V.2 illustrates the projected organization of COPE
(47)based on a study done in 1971v f in anticipation of a resumption of 
operations, and is little different from the organization before 
June 1967. The diagram could equally well apply for the most part 
to GUPCO or WEPCO.
The levels which are of interest are the Board and the chief 
execution, since it is here where the problems which arise from joint 
ownership and control will be most in evidence.
The Board of Directors
When an examination is made of the nature of the Boards of 
the three ventures, it becomes apparent that the theoretical 
organization chart can hide very important and real practical 
differences between the companies. The Board of COPE was intended 
to function in a similar fashion to a normal Board i.e. as the body 
which would run the Company. It was intended to act independently 
of both parents:, with the strategy of the Company being formulated 
by the Directors. It should be remembered that because of COPE's 
nature as an integrated venture it was in a position to secure
Source: 
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finance independently of the parents$ either by borrowing, or by means 
of its sale of crude oil. As a result, in theory, once the Company 
had been floated, then it could be left to its own devices to operate 
on the basis of decisions taken by the Board, In reality, this created 
the seeds of a problem since neither partner was prepared to allow 
the Company to be run purely through its appointed directions.
At the start of the Company, the Board consisted of four 
representatives from IEQC and three Egyptian representatives, 
reflecting IEOC1 s majority equity holding* In November, 1961 Egypt 
acquired 1% of the equity making the equity division equal, while 
the composition of the Board was reversed to include three from IEOC 
and 4 from the Egyptian side* However, to reflect the equality of the 
equity holding, it was decided that the Board required a majority of 
five to pass any resolution* A further change occurred when COPE was 
taken into the public sector. Under Law 60 of 1963, the workers of COPE 
were entitled to vote for four members of the Board* To create a Board 
of manageable size it was decided to reduce the EGPC nominated directors 
from four to two* Once again to reflect the equality of equity, it 
was decided that any resolution required a majority of seven. The 
significance of t&is addition to the Board was to add a further 
interest group to the Board the effects of which will be described 
shortly*
As for the interaction of the Directors from the two sides, 
as described earlier, their function was, independently of the parents, 
to formulate the general framework of policy to be carried out by the 
executive section of the organizational pyramid. Had all gone smoothly, 
this arrangement might have worked, but due largely to the differences 
over finance, this did not happen, and the status of the Board and its
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role tended to become uncertain^as a result of the interaction of the
parents which will be discussed later#
The situation was further complicated after COPE became
part of the Egyptian public sector. Under the arrangements which
governed the running of public enterprises in Egypt, if the Board of
an enterprise failed to agree on an issue, the issue then went for a
decision to the General Assembly, The General Assembly consisted of
representatives of the public enterprises together with the Minister
of Industry# Consequently, if the Board of COPE failed to achieve a
majority of seven, as happened over financial matters, the objections
of IEOC could simply be overruled by the General Assembly on which
IEOC had no representation whatsoever# In effect, this, for the period
from 1962-1965 partially neutralized the Board of COPE as the policy
making organ# This situation was reflected in Agip's refusal to accept
the accounts of COPE. In this period, the lines of control and
communication became increasingly confused at the tip of the pyramid#
By 1966 when the financial disagreements had been theoretically
settled, the main source of dispute was removed. However, before this
had happened, the third interest group in the shape of the four Directors
elected by the workers began to impinge on the operations of the Board.
There was an increasing pressure from these directors on the Board
to take what was regarded by the appointed directors from both sides as a
'short term view1 of Company policy. This was largely due to an effort
on the part of the elected directors to ensure reelection by attempting
(48)to pursue 'popular1 policies. At the end of 1965, the Chairman of
the Board informed the Minister that he could no longer operate with
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the existing Board, which was duly dissolved. A 1 temporary* arrangement
was instituted whereby the functions of the Board were replaced by the
Chairman (appointed by EGPC) and the General Manager (appointed by IEOC)#
This development indicates that it was realized by the
partners^that the functions of the Board;within the objectives outlined
earlier^  had become untenable. Support for this interpretation comes
from the fact that the t^emporary* arrangement was still in force in
(49)June 1967.' 7 There had been earlier signs that such a realization
was beginning to dawn. For example, Article XX111 of the IEQC-EGPC 
1963 agreement declared that major decisionsof the Board had to 
have the unanimous consent of both parties. As well as being a tacit 
admission that the role of the General Assembly served only to aggravate 
differences rather than secure agreementj it was also the first 
suggestion that the Board of COPE was no longer to be viewed as an 
independent body.
While the Board consisted of only two men, decisions had 
to be taken with much greater direct collaboration between the two 
partners* The theoretical independence of COPE from the two partners 
had been realized to be impractical.
The experience of COPE proved invaluable when the role and 
functions of the Board of GUPOO and WEPOO were being formulated. From 
the start, it was apparent that the role of the Boards in the operating 
agencies were to be very different from that of COPE. These differences 
were dictated partly by the form of the operating agency, and partly 
as the result,of a deliberate policy decision by the two partners.
The operating agency, unlike the partially integrated venture, is totally 
dependent on the parents, not only in securing finance, but also in
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determining the sise and distribution of offtake* This necessitates 
the Directors from both parties being in constant communication with 
the parents. This dependence and communication was also stressed in 
the agreements, as reflected by the insertion of a mutual agreement
(51)
clause* The Directors were to act as a link between the agency
and the two partners, and the function of the Board was to formulate 
the annual budget and work pro gramme in conjunction with the parents, 
leaving the executive section to operate within this essentially 
financial framework*
Decisions were taken on the basis of a simple majority, but 
so far as the major strategic decisions are concerned, i.e* budget 
and work programme, the vote is a formality since the decision has 
already been reached by a process of cooperation between the parents 
to be described later* The Directors are of course independent, and 
can vote as they wish, but as a result of this cooperation they would 
be voting on a compromise resolution already worked out to a large 
extent by the parents* The situation concerning what may be described 
as tactical decisions is rather different. Within the strategy outlined 
and generally agreed upon there is inevitably room for manoeuvre, 
particularly in relation to certain technical matters.
The Chief Executive
From Figure V.l, the peculiarity in structure of a joint 
venture, and the potential source of many problems, becomes imnediately 
obvious; namely the existence of two chief executives. This situation 
is inevitable since in virtually all joint venture agreements, while 
the Chairman of the Board is chosen by the host country, and the General 
Manager is chosen by the foreign company, both are given equal status 
as Managing Directors.
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Initially in COPE, the situation was even more complicated
since Petrofina of Belgium held 40$ of the equity of IEOC. There
were in fact two General Managers with equal status as Managing
Directors together with the Chairman of the Board who was also a
Managing Director* As things developed, purely by coincidence, the
Belgian was technically orientated, the Italian orientated towards
f 52)finance and administration , and the two Managers were able to
divide the functions accordingly.
Obviously, where status is duplicated in this way it is
necessary to delineate the fields of power and responsibility
falling to each Managing Director, In the early period, when three
managing directors were involved, the following formula for decision
taking was arrived at* For contracts of less than IE 100,000, the
relevant General Manager and the relevant Egyptian director signed.
For contracts greater than this amount, the relevant General Manager
( 53)and the Chairman of the Board were required to sign*v / When Petrofina1 s
interest in IEOC was bought out by Agip in April 1961, the situation
(54)was reviewed as follows. Certain functions were allotted separately to
the two Managing Directors* For example, the Chaiiman was to represent 
the Company before the Courts, to call Board meetings and preside over 
them* The General Manager could purchase equipment, discuss, sign 
and terminate all rental contracts, all having a maximum value of 
LE 5,000* Despite this delineation, a large and important series of 
powers were to be exercised jointly. For example, to discuss and 
sign contracts for buying goods and selling oil above a value of 
LE 5,000, appoint and dismiss staff and negotiate all financial 
arrangements.
The potential difficulties in the above situation come from
(55)
two sources* The problems of a collegial decision making point' 
at the highest level of day to day decision taking, and the reaction 
of the Divisional Heads involved in the specific decisions. While 
tcollegiality favours greater thoroughness in the weighing of
/ Kg )
administrative decisions' , it *almost inevitably involves
( 57)obstacles to precise clear, and above all rapid decisions1;
Once the Board has outlined the strategy, the responsibility of the 
Managing Director is to coordinate the activities of the executive 
in carrying out the tactics needed to achieve the strategy. In the 
event of a disagreement or uncertainty at the level of Divisional 
Heads, the Managing Director must take the decision. Major tactical 
decisions which may alter the strategy are generally referred to the 
Board. Otherwise, the Managing Director must take the responsibility, 
and is answerable to the Board for decisions taken. This situation 
for COPE implied that day to day decisions required the agreement 
of the two chief executives; not only in the taking of the decisions, 
but also in their execution. The agreement was needed because these 
decisions could not be expected to be taken or executed by the Board. 
Firstly, because this would simply duplicate and amplify collegial 
indecision* Secondly, because the Italian Directors were non-executive 
operating from Italy, it was simply not practical to call too many 
unscheduled Board meetings.
This lack of clarity at a major decision taking point in 
the structure was aggravated by the reaction of the Divisional Heads 
involved in the relevant decision* While the five Divisional Heads
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were of mixed nationalities, there was an inevitable process where­
by the internal interaction between the Heads and the Two Managing 
Directors developed along lines of nationality, both at a formal 
and an infomal level. As a result the coimiunications involved in 
reaching a decision tended in COPE to be on a basis of nationality 
rather than on a basis of maximum effectiveness, the two not necessa­
rily coinciding. The difficulties associated with collegiality 
described in the case of COPE led to an effort to overcome them 
when the organizations of the operating agencies were being 
formulated and developed*
The following outline draws on the experience of WEPCO, 
but could equally well apply to GUPCO. It was decided that to avoid 
the collegial problems of COPE, only one chief executive would be 
appointed, the General Manager appointed by the foreign company.
The General Manager was invested with a considerable amount of power* 
In effect, once, the annual budget and work programme was agreed 
upon, he was responsible for all coordination and decision taking, 
and was allowed to operate without consulting the Board, unless 
events developed which meant a considerable alteration to the agreed 
strategy•
After a short time operating under this arrangement, it
was felt that such an arrangement gave too much power to the foreign
(58)partner in the venture; ' Consequently, in 1968 a change was made 
in the organization which contributed to a unique solution to many 
of the management problems associated with joint ventures, Figure 
V*3 illustrates the formal structure of the new arrangement. The 
executive section of the pyramid renained the same with one General
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Manager, The change was the introduction of a buffer layer between 
the General Manager and the Board which, consisted of the General 
Manager and the Chairman of the Board, This layer was to serve 
several purposes. Its main function was as a decision taking centre 
for day to day decisions, which allowed the Egyptian side to take 
a more active role. The General Manager and the Chaiman,would
Figure V.3 The formal structure of the new organization for
the operating agencies
The Board
Buffer Layer - General Manager and Chairman
Barrier Between the Buffer Layer & Executive Section
Executive Section General Manager (Chief Executive)
\
Finance General 
Services
Operations Exploration Administration
Source! WEPCO Annual Report 
1968-1969*
jointly make the relevant decision, but these decisions were executed
below the barrier by the General Manager as chief of the executive
part of the structure. If the buffer layer was unable to reach
agreement, then the question was put before the Board for a fuling.
Officially, the buffer executive barrier could not allow
coiranunication and discussion between the Divisional Heads and the
Chairman of the Board. For example, the Chairman could ^ only receive
information which related to the operation of the
executive section through the General Manager. The only time the
Chairman was allowed to pass officially through the frontier into the
executive level, was to attend the twice monthly meeting of the
(59)Coordinating Committee' whose function was to map out the develop­
ment and execution of the work programme. This was simply regarded 
as an expedient to speed the decision taking process. Without it, 
the Committee could make no decision until the General Manager had, 
as it were, floated to the buffer level to consult, and then floated 
down again with the decision.
This created a decision making point to deal with day to 
day operations, a function which any Board would find impossible 
for the reasons described earlier in relation to COPE.^^ It also 
created a decision making point which insulated the executive structure 
from the tempration to use the Chairman as a counter point to the 
General Manager, in securing a decision for one of the Divisional Heads. 
To make the difference from COPE more explicit, while the buffer layer of 
the operating agencies apparently served the same function as the dual
Managing Director level of COPE, The former could not, in theory 
( 61)aggravate dualism' ; among Divisional Heads because the layer was
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not connected officially to the executive part of the structure.
The latter, because it was central to the executive, could and did 
aggravate dualism. Two dangers become apparent in the operation of 
the buffer layer* The first problem, which to some extent applies to the 
dual Managing Director layer of CORE, concerns the interaction between 
the Chairman and the General Manager. If they fail to agree, then the 
decision must be referred to the Board, It is obvious that if this 
happens too often, then the decision is delayed until the Board can 
deliberate upon it. Since these decisions concern day to day operations, 
the efficiency of the company must suffer accordingly. The successful 
cooperation of the two is a necessary condition for the success of 
the venture.
The second problem arises if the barrier, which is only a 
line drawn on paper, is ignored by those below or above it. Of course 
in a real situation there is bound to be unofficial comnunications 
across this frontier. The people involved will probably have gone 
through the industry together sharing a common background, and often 
may belong to the same clubs etc, thereby meeting at a social level. 
However, such infoimal comnunication is not, per se, bad in so far as it 
keeps the Chairman in contact with developments in the executive. It 
becomes dangerous only if these unofficial channels replace the 
official channels.
To create a structure to operate efficiently under formal1 
conditions is a difficult enough task. Too add the problem of 
'jointness1 within the structure creates a much greater problem. The 
buffer layer described above seems to be able to fulfill the organi­
zational need, but its successful operation depends on the quality 
of the personnel who operate within the framework.
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Management Personnel of the Ventures 
Employment Policy
The policy adopted by the Egyptian ventures was to secure 
the best available manpower, irrespective of nationality, subject 
to a general aim of maximizing the employment of Egyptians. Any post 
filled by an non Egyptian had to make provision for an Egyptian 
assistant who would gain experience and eventually take over from the 
non-Egyptian. While the agreements made no provision to minimize the 
employment of foreigners, the Government could theoretically control 
the situation through its control of w>rk permits* In reality, 
this was merely a formality, and no foreign employee who was required> 
was refused a permit.
The outcome of this policy has been a fairly rapid decline 
in the nuiriber of foreigners employed in the ventures. Apart from any 
considerations of Egyptian policy, the foreign companies have been
O P
satisfied to allow the increasing employment^  Egyptians, partly because it 
is cheaper to employ an Egyptian than an expatriate.
GUPOO is typical of the three ventures, and table 5.5 shows 
the changing employment situation.
Table 5.5 The Employees of GUPCO by Nationality
1966/67 3 1968/69 1969/70 1970/1;
Nationals 355 377 440 453 497
Expatriates 28 33 40 37 30
Total 383 410 480 490 527
% of expats. 7.3 8.0 8.3 5.7
Source: GUPOO Annual Reports.
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In 1970, the total labour force employed by the operating
agencies^including staff on eontract^ was as follows. GUPCO employed
1,642 to produce 82 million barrels from one field, while WEPCO
( 62 )employed 761 to produce 14 million barrels from one field; In the 
projected number for COPE, 2,231 were to be employed to produce oil 
from the Belayim field which in its last year of operation in Egyptian 
hands produced a little over 30 million barrels. This discrepancy 
in size requires some explanation, since the only additional function 
carried out by COPE was the marketing of the oil which accounts for 
only ten employees* Part of the explanation lies in the use of the 
Egyptian public sector to alleviate white collar unemployment by 
overstaffing,
As important as the size of the Egyptian element, distribution 
of this element throughout the grades is equally important* At the 
start of the ventures, the Divisional Heads were drawn from the foreign 
company. Within a very short time, the Egyptian assistants to these 
Divisional Heads took over from the foreign staff. For example, in 
WEPCO, out of the six senior positions in 1969/70 excluding the Chairman 
and General Manager, whose nationality is fixed by the agreement, 
four were Americans. By 1972, all six posts were occupied by Egyptians. 
Compare this with a similar Iranian venture, IMINOCO. In 1969/70 out 
of the five senior positions, four were non Iranian, by 1972 the 
situation was unchanged.
In the case of the operating agencies, the employee grading 
system was left to each individual agency to determine. However,
COPE, as part of the public sector came under the Laws which governed 
public employment. As a result its employee grading system was determined
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by Law 3546 of 1963. This instituted the twelve grades enumerated in
Figure V.Xpage I XX , Promotion up the grades was dependent not only
on merit, but also on the number of employees in each grade. Since
staff turnover was low, promotion up the grades, and the consequent
increase in salary, was often hampered by the fact that the next grade
already had its complement allowed by law. Consequently, promising staff
often had to be held back from posts of greater responsibility. In
( 66)1971 this problem was realized, and the system altered , } by the 
creation of only four very broad grades. This provided greater 
flexibility in promotion, since the salary scales of each new grade 
were much wider than in the old grades.
The Problem of Dualism
Dualism in the management of the venture arises because of 
the existence within the management structure of managers whose loyalty 
is divided between the venture and one of the parent companies. In this 
situation, the manager may pursue the interests and objectives of the 
parent company rather than those of the venture. As described earlier, 
these need not necessarily coincide. This dualistie situation can 
arise either with the direct encouragement of the parent company, or 
as a reaction of the manager in response to an ambiguous role.
Dualism begins largely because on the formation of the
( 67 )venture, the senior management is drawn from the parent company. ;
Two examples will serve to illustrate this. In the early days of WEPCO,
some of the Egyptian staff tended to rthink EGPC too much, and WEPCO 
C68)too l i t t l e . A s  a result, there was a tendency for some of the 
Egyptian staff to try to by-pass the American General Manager and to
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enter the buffer layer in an effort to circumvent the official 
communication channels. At the same time the General Manager of 
WEPCO was also head of Phillips in Egypt. Because of this duality 
of roles he constantly tried to 5ehange hats', depending on whose 
interests he was representing at the time. In the case of WEPCO, 
as there were no evident policy disagreements, this dualism did not 
cause any difficulties however, the potential danger existed.
Over time, the higher management positions can be filled 
from the lower echelons of the venture by the promotion. Hence 
the dualism caused by the nanagers* immediate transfer from parent
/ cq \
to venture is diminished, J However, the expectations of the staff 
with respect to their original parent companies and vice versa can 
perpetuate dualism in the following way*
The Divisional Heads of the venture are responsible in theory 
only to the Board of the venture, and their promotion prospects within 
the company are also determined by the Board. But, for both the 
Egyptian and foreign employees, their promotion and betterment prospects 
extend beyond the venture into the Parent company. This is especially 
true of the Egyptians whose international job mobility is more limited 
than that of the foreign staff, who can more easily gain promotion by changing 
companies. Where the Divisional Head is a Director on the Board, as 
many are, then he is forced to consider his relations with the parent 
company to an even greater extent, since as a Director he is accountable 
directly to the parent company. In this situation the manager may well 
take a decision in the ligjht of where he believes his interests lie.
To clarify this further, in the Egyptian agencies one of 
the greatest sources of dispute concerns the siting of drilling rigs.
One might expect that when the differences of opinion arose on such
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a technical question, these differences would follow no obvious pattern* 
Yet frequently the division appeared to follow lines of nationality.
In fact in two cases, one in GUPCO and one in WEPCO, the Egyptian 
side had threatened to invoke the sole risk clause over the question 
of where to site a rig.^0^
In such a situation where the two senior people from the 
two partners are known to disagree over a technical matter, it is 
likely that the technical staff will believe it to be in their own 
interests to agree with their own man, and divide along national lines*
Of course, this does not always happen.
Such conflicts of loyalties must affect the decision process, 
especially if the parents expect their Representatives* to Iguardt 
their interests. From this, the objectives of the parents towards the 
venture can be seen to be vital. If the parents are in conflict, this 
must reflect itself on the attitudes of the staff of the venture. Within 
every company there are likely to be disputes and disagreements*
What is special in a joint venture is the polarisation of any disputes 
into two national groups.
The problem of dualism can occur at levels below that of the 
chief executive level described earlier if the nationalities of the 
Divisional Heads differ. At this level it can manifest itself in a 
lack of coimmnication and coordination between essentially inter­
dependent divisions. To reduce conflict at this point the Divisional 
Heads may have to be drawn from one nationality* This is what has 
happened in the Egyptian operating agencies, but its success requires 
a supply of suitability qualified personnel. Where all Divisional 
Heads are of one nationality there may then be conflict if the General
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Manager is another nationality, as in Egypt, Such conflict is less 
dangerous because the individuals are not of the same status in the 
heirarchy, and a chain of command is involved, which is not the case 
between Divisional Heads*
Cultui'al Differences
Dualism may also arise from differences in the cultural 
background of the managers, particularly when one group comes from 
a ’developed* environment, and thither from and Undeveloped1 
environment. This cultural dualism is thought by many writers in the
(71)
field to reflect differences in work and managerial philosophy*
That cultural differences do exist is obvious, but they
may be exagerated, especially in relation to senior managers, many 
.<A
of who’may have been trained in Western Business Schools*
In a study by A.K* Rifai entitled *Ihe Impact of the Egyptian 
Environment on the Managerial Function of American Oil Companies in
(72)
Egypt1 the question of cultural dualism is examined* Table 5*6 
below outlines the fields where such differences exist and their 
magnitude# The effects of these differences are hard to assess, but 
Rifai shows differences in areas of procedure and policy adopted by the 
American and Egyptian managers. The results are reproduced in Table 
5*7. The problem is assuming the casual link between the two sets 
of data •
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Table 5.7 Similarities of procedure and policy used in Egypt
as compared with the USA
% Very similar %. Somewhat similar % Different % Noresponse
Day to day decisions 39 43 7 11
Planning 32 54 11 6
Organization 27 40 26 5
Motivating 13 42 44 1
Controlling 14 58 20 7
Production 18 42 13 26
Marketing 4 23 15 58
Procurement 4 31 39 26
Finance 8 37 34 20
Personnel 7 48 37 8
The total nunfcer of respondents was 84. Where the 
four columns do not total 100%, the error is due to 
rounding.
Source: Rifai op*cit. Table 17 p* 240#
The only evidence to date on the effect of cultural differences
(73)on joint venture management comes from Franko. ' He examined American
participation in joint ventures in many countries, and ranked the host 
countries according to cultural differences with the USA* He then 
correlated this with the ranking of the instability^7^  of the countries* 
joint ventures. The result was a significant negative correlation, 
thus suggesting that the greater the cultural similarity of the two 
countries, the greater the instability of the ventures!
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The Influence of the Parents on the Management of the Ventures
In the management structure, an examination was made of the 
channels through which senior management operated the ventures. These 
senior managers are accountable to the parent companies. The purpose 
of this section is to examine what influence these parents have, and 
how it has been used.
The Sources of influence available to the parents
The most direct source of influence available to the parent 
companies lies in their appointment of the Directors which make up the 
Board. Their appointed representatives can then be •influenced1 by 
direct instructions from their parent Boards or through the mechanism 
of influence described under dualism* Neither parent can give direct 
instructions at any level in the venture below the Board, but influence 
can be exerted again through the mechanism of dualism. Also, it is 
possible for either parent to *get at1 a Divisional Head through its 
influence on the Board of the venture.
In the case of COPE, the partially integrated venture, neither 
parent had any other form of direct influence, before nationalization. 
The operating agency parents however did have a direct veto, over and 
above their representatives on the Board, on the annual budget and work 
programme. Once these had been set, the parents could have no further 
control over the operations, other than through their Directors, 
provided there was no major alteration to the budget or work programme.
A source of control available only to the foreign company
lay in its control over foreign exchange supplies. In the case of
(75)
IEOC, this lasted until 1962.' The operating agencies were virtually
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(76 )entirely dependent on the foreign company, either directly, ' or
indirectly through the foreign company arranging loans from other 
(77 )institutions* Since the supplies of foreign exchange were essential
to the operation, the foreign company was placed in a strong position 
with respect to influence in the venture.
A further source of influence attributed soley to the 
foreign company in joint ventures derives from the company1 s control 
of the technology*To what extent this provides influence in the 
venture, depends upon the level of sophistication of the host country 
representatives. In the case of Egypt, beyond a small element of 
esoteric technicalities, the technology is equally available to both 
sides. For this reason, the foreign companies which have operated 
in Egypt, have had only a slight advantage over the Egyptians in this 
respect.
The influence which can be attributed only to the national
oil company derives largely from the role of the Government. In Egypt,
the Government is always very much a part of the initial agreement.
The Minister of Industry and Power must, by Law 86 of 1956 be a signatory
to the agreement, and the agreement does not become effective until
confirmed by a Law. In addition, the agreement grants the Government
wide power with respect to inspection of sites, accounts etc., and also
(79)
over disposition of offtake. In the case of COPE, after nationali­
zation the Government as head of the public sector had a considerable 
potential influence through its control both of planning and foreign 
exchange•
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The use of parental influence in Egyptian ventures
The Egyptian Directors have not been given voting'instructions1 
by EGPC, but allowed to vote on the basis of their own judgement* 
Nevertheless, their accountability to the EGPC Board remains, which 
must influence their judgement to some extent since the Egyptian 
Directors, are Taware1 of the views of the EGPC on different issues.
No information is available on what chain of command is involved, if any, 
between the foreign company's parent Board and its representatives*
As the senior management levels of the ventures are occupied 
by Egyptians, so the foreign directors have tended to become non­
executive. This has two implications for parental influence, firstly, 
the foreign companies have tended to exert less influence over daily 
operations as their numbers in the executive managerial sections have 
declined. Although the head of the executive sections, i*e. the 
General Manager, is appointed by the foreign company, his first 
responsibility is to the Board of the venture, not the Board of the 
foreign parent. Secondly, as non-executive Directors, the foreign Board 
members will tend to be briefed by the parent company rather than the 
venture. In this situation the Director is more likely to think in 
terms of the parent's interests than that of the venture. When the 
two coincide, as in GUPCO and WEPOO, there is little difficulty. If 
there is conflict, as in COPE, this will tend to accentuate the 
polarisation of views on the Board. This in turn may make a compromise 
solution more difficult to achieve as in the case of COPE's financial 
problems •
The effective use of parental influence is also a function 
of the communication channels between the parent and venture, and 
between the parents themselves# In the case of COPE, these channels were 
limited. There was no provision for official inter-parental conuiuni- 
cation beyond COPE's Board, while the only official parental source 
of information about the venture was the Annual Report and the minutes 
of Board meetings. These limited official channels reflected the 
expectation that the parents would be passive, and not exert influence 
beyond the appointment of the Directors. When the parents did in fact 
try to exert influence there were no official channels for 
comnunication between the parents* Such channels may have assisted a 
solution to the conflict which arose in the first place from the 
interference of the parents. The only conmunication was through 
informal channels. The disadvantage of informal channels is that the 
two parties had access to different sources of information, which 
made inter-parental discussion more difficult. Not until direct 
negotiations opened between the parents was a solution to the conflict 
found in 1966•
To counter the above situation, emphasis on official 
comnunication between the participants was made in the agreements 
which formed the operating agencies. The direct parental negotiations 
were particularly relevant to the formation of the budget and work 
programme. To facilitate these negotiations, both ventures were 
expected to send a considerable volume of information to the parents.
WEpCO, for example, sends weekly reports to each parent which appraises
( 82)them of the situation. Of course, unofficial conmunication also exists, 
but as a supplement to the official channels rather than as an alter­
native.
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The influence exerted by the Government in Egypt has tended
to be minimal. In practice, the responsibility for the influence
which the Government could weild has been handed to EGPC. The role
of EGPC as both partner and Government agent is regarded by the
/ 33 )
foreign partner as a considerable advantage* firstly,it means
that the decisions are made by oilmen who are aware of the economics 
and technology of the problems. Secondly, it speeds decision taking 
in a situation where Ministerial approval is required by the agreement. 
When the Government is involved, the decision is taken by the Minister 
who acts on the advice of the EGPC. While his is still the final 
decision, he must give gpod reasons for ignoring the advice of EGPC.
In practice, there have been very few occasion when the Minister lias 
ignored the advice of the EGPC, and these usually involved social 
rather than purely financial accounting criteria.
A field where the Government has exerted influence over 
the ventures is procurement, this to minimize the outlays of foreign 
exchange. The Government for example, put pressure on the ventures to 
utilize some Russian drilling equipment bought in a Barter deal.
Despite the initial reluctance of the foreign partner, the ventures 
eventually agreed to try them with satisfactory results.
The notable exception to the Government not using its 
potential influence was the nationalization of COPE. As a consequence, 
in the event of a dispute, control of COPE passed to the General
C 85)Assemble on which IEOC had no voice. However, even in this
situation IEOC retained an element of influence by virtue of its ability 
to withdraw from the venture, either partially or totally* In
reaction to TEOCTs partial withdrawal, the Egyptian Government eventually
allowed IEOC to exercise direct influence over COPE in the ways 
which had been used before nationalization. This was openly agreed 
in the IEOC-EGPC 1963 agreement.The operating agencies were 
specifically excluded from the Laws which applied to the public 
sector, simply because no foreign company was prepared to enter a 
venture in which the Egyptian influence was likely to be much stronger 
than their own.
In the case of Egypt, nationalism appears to have had very 
little influence on the operations of the companies. R.K. Rifai found 
that the American managers who responded to the questionnaire felt 
the Egyptian nationalism had very little effect on their formal 
relations with Egyptian colleagues, either individually or institutionally. 
This feeling was stronger the higher the respondent level in the 
management structure. At a time when the Egyptian Government was 
calling on the Arab world to use oil as a weapon against the United 
States in the fight against Israel, a senior American Manager expressed 
to me no fear that this would affect the venture which his company 
helped to run. He felt the Egyptian Government would not act in a way 
that would hurt their own interests as much as those of the American 
company. Pressure from outside Egypt occurs occasionally upon the 
Government to be ’less soft to the foreign companies1, but with 
little effect
The role of the Parents in Disputes
Initially the role of the parents in a dispute tends to be 
as the sources of different objectives which create conflict within 
the venture. The most obvious example of this to date is the different 
financial objectives of the two partners of COPE outlined earlier.
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The only differences which have occurred directly between
the parents in the operating agencies concerns whether or not a project
(89)is commercial. The technical disputes tended to be confined
within the venture. Only twice have the parents themselves both 
become involved in such a technical dispute, both over the siting of 
wild cats. The role of the parents in such disputes has been to act 
as mediators to provide a solution. If no compromise is forthcoming, 
then the sole risk clause can be operated.
If neither party can influence the other to reach a 
compromise, then the final influence which can be exerted by the 
foreign company is withdrawal from the venture. This withdrawal 
need not be immediate but can be partial. Several examples from COPE 
between 1960-66 will serve to illustrate what is meant by partial
withdrawal. The IE00-EGPC 1963 agreement was in fact initialled in
(90)November 1961, but IEOC kept postponing final signature in an 
effort to influence the outcome of the financial and nationalization 
disputes between 1961-62, Similarly, before the 1966 fihancial 
agreement, IEOC held up a decision to drill eight further development 
wells on the Belayim field until the agreement was signed. Also, 
between 1962-65, IEOC refused to accept COPE1s accounts. All these 
methods amounted to an attempt by IEOC to put pressure on EGPC to 
accept TE0Cfs objectives by simulating the beginning of a withdrawal 
by IEOC from COPe / 91^
As to which parent exerted the most influence in the 
ventures, no dear victor emerges. While the extent of influence 
fluctuated between the parents on balance, the influence was approximately 
equal. In the case of COPE, this is supported by the fact tha the
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disputes lasted so long• Had either partner been able to exert a much
greater influence over this opposite number, most of the issues would
have been decided much sooner, one way or the other.
Conclusion
The two sides to the joint venture bring certain skills 
and resources to operate the venture. These skills and resources 
complement each other. However, the key to the successful operation 
of the venture lies in the fact that these complementarities cannot 
resolve all conflict* There remains areas of conflict which must be 
resolved by management. The nature of the initial agreement, and the 
formal management structure are the means by which the area of 
conflict can be reduced, how these means are used is a function almost
entirely of the quality of the management. Egyptian experience suggests
that the more 1 sophisticated1 and competent the management is from 
both sides, the greater the chance of a resolution of these areas of 
conflict. If one side to the agreement dominates the venture, so 
long as the other side seeks influence over the venture, then the areas 
of conflict will not be resolved and may grow wider.
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CHAPTER VI 
participation1 and Joint VentureP^
In 1972, a general agreement was drawn up between five of 
the major oil producing countries and ten oil companies^which provided 
the guidelines whereby the former acquired •participation’ in the 
concession operated by the eight affiliated companies owned by the majors. 
This was achieved by granting the host governments a share in the equity 
of these production affiliates, thereby converting these major 
concession operators into equity joint ventures in the sense defined 
at the beginning of this study.
The anticipated creation of these tparticipationT ventures 
caused considerable discussions, both in oil and academic circles 
from 1967 onwards* These discussions concentrated on both the 
viability of such ventures, and their possible effects on the world 
oil industry. However, the discussions suffered from the very 
limited evidence available on which any conclusions could be based.
In many ways the proposed’participation’ ventures are 
similar to the joint ventures which have formed the subject of this 
study. For this reason, much light can be thrown upon the ’participation’ 
discussion by reference to this evidence* Therefore the purpose of 
this concluding chapter is firstly, to outline the developments 
which led up to the 1972 agreement. Secondly, to examine carefully 
the differences between the equity joint ventures already studied, 
and the proposed ’participation’ venture. Finally, to examine the 
main aspects of the debate which took place from 1967 to the present, 
and to use the evidence of the equity joint ventures to clarify 
this debate.
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*Parti cipa tion1
Developments befon?1967
/s
While between 1967-1973 Participation* became a central
issue in oil circles, participation in a general sense was by no
means a novel idea in 1967.
In the D*Arcy concession of 1901, the Ottoman Government
had the right to receive £20,000 worth of the equity of any company 
(2)set up* Similarly, Article 8 of the San Remo Agreement of 1920
between Great Britain and France provided that if a private company
was set up to exploit oil in Mesopotamia then 1 *... the native
Government or other native interests should be allowed, if they so
desire, to participate up to a maximum of 20$ of the share capital
of the said company*. However when the concession between the Iraqi
Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company (the forerunner of the
IPC) was negotiated and signed in 1924-25, Article 8 was not included.
Instead, a clause which allowed Iraqi interests 20$ of any new share issue
(3)was included. By article 32 of the concession granted to Standard 
Oil California in 1933 by Saudi Arabia, Saudi 'inhabitants* were 
*allowed* to subscribe to 20$ of any stocks issued to the public.
Despite all these clauses, by 1960 no host government had been able 
to secure any share of the ’equity* of any of the major operating 
companies, usually on the grounds that these companies were not public 
companies, and therefore did not issue shares to the public.
This exclusion of the host country from any direct 
participation in the internal decision making processes of the operating 
companies was a cause for increasing dj^atisfaction. The general
di^atis fact ion with the 'old style* concession has already been
(4)outlined. 7 Miile many of the disputes with respect to financial 
arrangements, relinquishment etc. were subject to negotiated settle­
ment, on the question of the Managerial freedom* of the companies
(5)there was little progress. 1
For newly let acreage the solution to this impasse was
relatively simple# The *old style* concession was simply replaced
by newer forms of agreement which granted participation in one form
or another to the host governments. However, the fact that nothing
was done to accomodate host country demands in the major concessions,
which after all dominated oil production^caused increasing frustration.
This frustration was by no means confined to the oil producing countries
of the Middle East, but was reflected in many countries where a national
resource of some importance to the economy was being developed by
foreign companies# This general frustration was reflected in a
series of United Nations resolutions on the question of 'permanent
sovereignty* over national resources.
The first resolution was passed in 1952, and followed by
a series, each of which emphasized the rights of the nation state
(6)over its own resources. In December 1962, a Resolution recognized 
the right of a country to dispose of its natural wealth in accordance 
with its national interests. However, as a compromise it also required 
the state to pay compensation in the event that such a 'disposition* 
would mean the displacement of a foreign company.
In 1966, Resolution 2158 was even more explicit on host 
country rights. Host countries were tadvisedt, by exercising their
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permanent sovereignty, to secure the maximum exploitation of natural
resources and to achieve this by the accelerated acquisition by
developing nations of full control over production operations,
managing and marketing. Host countries were urged 'to secure and
increase their share in the administration of enterprises which are
(7)
fully and partly operated by foreign capital. Nationalization
was not in itself desirable except in so far as it may provide the
means to maximize the exploitation of the national resource* These UN
resolutions provided both form and respectability to the growing
discontent in Middle East oil producing countries.
The foreign companies' refusal to allow the host governments
any direct role in the operating companies,led to increasing demands
from elements within the host countries for the nationalization of
the foreign companies. While these demands gained mass popular support,
those responsible for policy in the host countries were far from
enthusiastic over such a course of action. The split between the
pro and anti nationalization groups widened and the bitterness which marked
the division was well illustrated at the 6th Arab Petroleum Congress 
(8)in March 1967. 7 Ap this congress the anti-nationalization group,
led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, came under bitter attack with accusations
of company bribery and CIA involvement. The anti-nationalization group
found themselves at a considerable disadvantage^  since apart from their
(9)vague endorsenent of recent joint venture agreements, 7 they had no 
specific alternative strategy to offer.
It was this lack of an alternative strategy to nationalization, 
together with the ideas of permanent sovereignty as espoused in the UN 
resolutions, which did much to generate the idea of 'participation'.
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The Development of the ideology of Participation1
Before the development of the ideology of participation*
is outlined, some explanation is required of why nationalization found
little favour with the policy makers* Many reasons can he outlined,
but two dominate the field, the spectre of Mossadegh and the state
of the world oil market.
In 1951, Iran had nationalized Anglo-Iranian. Such was the
power of the majors that they were able to prevent Iran from selling
all but a small amount of the potential production. While the dispute
dragged on, Iran's oil revenues fell to almost nill and fcy the tine of
the settlement in 1954 the economic cost to Iran had been considerable.
In addition, the political cost to Mossadegh was high since he was
eventually 1 removed* from power by a coupl‘d  This example of
nationalization and its consequences must have presented a grim reminder
to the policy makers of the possible outcome if they too nationalized.
Admittedly, by the middle sixties the power of the majors
had begun to be eroded* A process which was accelerated towards the
end of the sixties chiefly by the entrance of newcomers* Also, two
countries, Egypt and Syria had nationalized foreign oil interests with
no drastic after effects, but the two countries were special cases,
(11)In Egypt, the interests of the companies had been very small, *
(12)while in Syria the oil had not even been produced. f Despite these
two exceptions the majors appeared both willing and able to severely
hamper any attempt at nationalization when it mattered* However,
(13)even had a host country successfully nationalized, 7 there still 
remained the problem of the state of the world oil market.
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In 1957, the posted prices of crude oil were raised all over
(14)the world* y Since these increases also meant that host government 
revenues increased, such a move by the companies would only make sense 
if these increased prices would actually be received in the arms length 
market or reflected in higher product prices. In this sense posted 
prices in mid 1957 were real prices. However, very quickly the increase 
was realized to have been a mistake. These higher prices were either 
widely discounted or were being poorly translated to product prices.
As a result in 1959 posted prices were reduced. Host country dis­
pleasure with this move was increased when posted prices were reduced 
even further in 1960, This meant a reduction in average per barrel 
revenue for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran of nearly 80 between 
1958-1960; in total revenue terns, this meant a loss for example to 
Iran of $3.3 million on production for 1960.
As a result, the major producers set up the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC) in September 1960; with *a
(15)view to coordinating and unifying the policies of the members,
for the purpose of attempting to limit competition which would further 
(l6 )weaken prices. Ihrther reduction in posted prices were resisted,
and these remained constant until 1970. This meant that posted prices 
ceased to be real prices, but became instead tax reference prices.
For the decade of the sixties, attention on prices centered on 
the realized price structure for arms length crude. Initially, the 
arms length market was small, 1 million barrels per day in 1957.
As new buyers and sellers entered the industry its importance increased 
and by 1968 the size of the arms length market was some 4 million b.d.,
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which was about 7% of the world market. Attempts to quantify the
(17)
price structure in this market are complex and fraught with pitfalls;
The general trends appear as follov/^ .Tbhe decade began with a slight
increase between 1961-62^after which prices fell until 1965* There
was a slight improvement in 1966^  after which -die decline continued to
the end of the decade* One of Adelman!s estimates of the average
realized price for Persian Gulf crude based on a netback from product
priceSjPuts the 1960 price at $1*50 p*b* and the 1967 price at $1*23 
(18)p,b, Adelmanls general conclusion on prices between 1957-1969
is that *the trend of prices was down* but the rate of decline was
(19)
mild and variation great,tv f
This weakening of the arms length market price structure 
had serious implications for the nationalization issue. If a country 
nationalized its oil, then it was into this weakening structure that 
it was plunging. A major cause of the weakening price structure was 
the increased independence in the buying and selling of crude oil, 
not only was the size of the arms length market increasing, the number 
of participants in the market was also increasing. If a major producer 
entered the maiket, then it would be a reasonable assumption that this 
would only serve to aggravate the weakness. The experience of the 
national oil companies of the producing countries in the later sixties 
only confirmed this fear. In fact towards the end of the decade there 
was increasing speculation that the arms length activities of the 
national oil companies was in danger of conflicting with 0PECts 
policies on price stabilization,^2^
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In this situation it is easy to appreciate why the policy
makers of the major producers were less than enthusiastic at the
prospect of nationalization. In effect, they were being asked to
leave the warm and cosy house of stability represented by posted
prices, for the cold and harsh wilderness of competition. While
it is true that in theory such competition could be controlled by
collective agreement, the failure of 0PECTs attempts to introduce
prorationing in the middle sixties was indicative of the probable
(21)outcome of any such attempt.
Although the policy makers did not wish to support the
growing demands for nationalization, an alternative strategy was
becoming a political necessity* This alternative was found in the idea
of 'participation1. The main ideologue of 'participation1 was Sheik
Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Oil, and it is his
statements on the subject which provide the main reasons for, and
nature of, participation.
The first tentative outline was given in April 1967, one month
(22)after the sixth Arab Petroleum Congress; Yamani stressed that Saudi 
Arabian oil policy was guided not only by national interest, but also 
by the 'legal obligation' set by the existing concession agreements and 
the 'international reputation* of Saudi Arabia for respecting such 
agreements. The main object of the policy within these constraints 
was to seek the integration of Petromin into downstream oil operations, 
possibly by having 'some sort of partnership with the oil companies
t
currently operating in Saudi Arabia,
- 157 ~
This integration was to have several aspects. Firstly, 
it was to be regarded as a means for Petromin to develop rather than 
as an end in itself. Secondly, the foreign company would be able to 
obtain some oil for its own market, while allowing Petromin some 
privileges for it future market. Finally it was intended that ’ a 
Saudi oil company* would own marketing facilities abroad.
The outline was both vague and tentative. For example on the 
question of partnership Yamani expressed the hope ’that some sort 
of joint venture with Arameo, or some of its parent firms, will be 
realized some day.1 However, on one issue, prices, Yamani was both 
concerned and specific. He stated that Saudi Arabia had been in a 
position to conclude at least six concession agreements, but had 
chosen to sign only one. The reason was^that unless a company had a 
potential market, to provide that company with oil would only encourage 
*harmful competition.*
On the 3rd of June 1968, the ’some sort of partnership*
(23)
was translated into a specific argument; f Yamani argued that while 
Saudi Arabia’s policy was based on respect for existing agreements, 
these agreements must change as circumstances changed. In view of 
these changed circumstances, ’partnership (by the companies) with the 
host government is a must, any delay will be paid for by the companies 
concerned. ’ He then explained that the objective was a 50-50
partnership which was to extend downstream as well. The ultimate 
objective was ’control over all oil operations’ although the time 
horizon was left rather vaguely between ten to twenty five years.
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The most specific and comprehensive outline of participation'
was given by Yamani in the paper 'Participation Versus Nationalization?
( 25)A better Means to Survive1 given in the spring of 1969* 7 Yamani
argued that the central problem was that of price* Although realised
prices had been declining, posted prices had been kept stable.
(26)Furthermore, the interests of the majors lay in maintaining 
crude oil prices for two reasons* Firstly, because of the power of 
OPEC, the majors could not reduce posted prices, so any further 
discounts must be met out of their own profits* Secondly, under the 
existing set up, the majors made the bulk of their profits at the 
producing end of the industry* As a result, the majors were unlikely to 
bring about a deterioration of the prices of crude oil as this would 
harm their profits*
Given these circumstances, Yamani went on to examine what 
would happen in the event of nationalization* If the upstream activities 
of the majors were nationalized, then the majors would have no further 
interest in maintaining crude prices* In fact their interests would 
be the reverse, since as they were offtakers of crude oil they would 
seek thecbheapest possible crude* Given the surplus capacity of oil, 
the producers would then become involved in a competitive production 
race which would bring the price of crude oil down drastically. On 
these grounds, Yamani ruled out nationalization as a feasible policy, 
which left the alternative of participation*.
He argued that the majors had been able so far to maintain 
the existing price structure because of their power in the market. 
However, this power was being undermined by the rise of the independents 
and the rise of national oil companies of both the producer and consumer
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(27)countries. An alliance of the majors and the national oil 
companies would strengthen the ability of the majors to maintain 
prices, at the same time it would allow the national oil companies 
to grow in the market through tnormal channels1, This would not 
only provide the national oil companies with the benefit of the 
major's experience in downstream operations, but would also halt 
price competition between the national oil companies which could 
undermine the arms length crude market.
For these reasons, 1participation' would have to be down­
stream as well as upstream, since if it was only upstream, then the host 
country as a non integrated operator would be selling crude on the 
arms length market, thereby further weakening the price structure.
What was wanted was ’a package deal comprising participation upstream 
and downstream, both together, to be introduced in a very gradual 
business like fashion1, with the main aim being to safeguard the 
price structure.
Three elements to upstream participation were envisaged. Part 
of the offtake would be marketed jointly with the majors through 
downstream joint ventures, part would be marketed on a commission basis 
by the foreign companies, and part would be marketed by the national 
oil company. As for participation downstream, this was to be achieved 
initially by entry to new joint ventures on a project by project 
basis* Once the relationship had been established, then the national 
oil companies could enter the majors' existing downstream operations, 
'Participation' was to provide several elements. It was to 
provide sovereignty over resources since the host government would 
be able to operate increasing internal control over operations. It
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would also provide experience for the host country, particularly 
in the downstream end of the business* finally, it would provide 
both increased income from downstream operations, plus a more stable 
income from upstream operations. All of these elements were to be 
provided in a situation where the all important price structure was to 
be protected from erosion.
From ideology to agreement
As the ideology of participation1 was unfolded, so it 
gained support from other major oil producers. Very early on t^he 
pronationalization camp received a considerable set back. After 
the June war of 1967 conditions appeared to favour nationalization 
more than at any other time, especially as both the United States 
and Britain had been directly implicated in the war. Yet, at the 
Khartoum summit meeting in August 1967 it was decided neither to 
nationalize nor to cut off oil supplies. An observer of the 
conference quite accurately stated that as a result 'nationalization 
prospects had receded*'
Meanwhile, support for the idea of 'participation1 grew*
For example, in May of 1968 after the ratification of the KNPC- 
Hispanoil agreement by the Kuwait National Assembly, groups within the 
assembly began to call for a Conversion' of the existing Kuwaiti 
concession. The first formal joint move came in July 1968 when the 
16th OPEC conference passed Resolution XVI.90 which endorsed the 
policy of 'reasonable1 participation for the host governments in 
existing concessions, This was justified by reference to UN Resolution 
2518, and by the claim of the change in circumstances which had occurred 
since the concession had been signed.
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In October 1968 Kuwait joined Saudi Arabia in an Official1
demand for 1 participation1 • This was given by Mr* A.R, Atiqi, the
Kuwaiti Minister of Oil in an address to the US-Arab Chamber of 
( 29 )Commerce• He argued that the 'old style1 concession offered no
significant opportunity for the government to take part in the
‘management and utilization of the country*s natural resources**
’Participation* would not only present an opportunity to share the
management of the operations, but would also enable these operations
to be more fully integrated into the local economy. The other major oil
producer's in the area also expressed an interest in securing
participation.*30*
In July 1971, the 24th OPEC conference passed a further
Resolution, XXIV.135 which called upon all member states to 'take
immediate steps towards the effective implementation of the principle
of participation* • This was followed in September 1971 by Resolution
XXV*139 which called on members to 'establish negotiations...(to
achieve) ..* effective participation.' However, while negotiations
began in May of 1972, the united front put up by the OPEC members
had weakened. At the end of 1971 Iran began separate negotiations
with the Consortium with a view to initiate a new agreement, and in
June of 1972, it was officially announced that Iran had no interest
in 'participation.' The reasons put forward were that Iran had
nationalised the oil in 1951, and the Consortium was simply a
contracting company for NIOC, thus 'participation was irrelevant.'
Also in June of 1972 Iraq nationalized the IPG, and while Iraq joined 
(31)the negotiations; interest was limited and Iraq did not sign 
the final agreement. This weakening was a reflection of the change
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in circumstances which had occurred in the industry after 1970, 
and which led to the eventual collapse of the agreement which was 
negotiated.
The form of the negotiations was as follows, A general
agreement was to be negotiated between the producers as a group,
and the companies, also as a group* This agreement was intended to
outline the general principles involved* Once this had been established,
each country was then to negotiate with its own companies, to reach
an implementation agreement* The general agreement was initialled
on the 5th October 1972* It was signed by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi
on the 20th December 1972, by Qatar on the 4th January 1973 and by
(33)Kuwait on the 8th January.
As demands for participation1 grew, the companies initial
(34)reaction was, predictably enough, hostile; f However, as demands
intensified, and participation1 was stressed as an alternative to
nationalization, the companies bowed to the inevitable and accepted
the principle, while attempting to salvage the maximum benefit from 
(35)it, ' The key issues in the negotiation were two, the price at 
which the host country would buy into the operations i*e* the 
compensation to be paid^and the arrangements for the disposition 
of offtake*
The buy in price was to lie between two extremes* The host 
countries wanted to pay the minimum and wished to pay compensation 
on the above the ground assets based on straight book value. Since 
many of these assets had been on the books for some time, depreciation 
had considerably reduced their book value* On the other hand the 
companies wished to receive the maximum compensation, and wanted 
the payment to be based on the expected profits which would have 
accrued to the companies from their below the ground assets i*e. the 
oill in place.
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The disposal of offtake presented several problems. Firstly, 
how the host country could acquire its share of crude oil without 
seriously dislocating the companies1 existing market commitments• 
Secondly, there was the question of the disposal of the host countries' 
share of offtake. Particularly how much was to be sold by the host 
country, and what role the companies were to play in the disposal 
of the remainder.
These problems of offtake were made more complex since 
the demand for downstream participation weakened^and virtually 
disappeared by the time negotiations began* This meant the host 
countries would have ownership of very large amounts of crude oil, 
with no direct integrated channels to feed it into i.e. they would 
become crude sellers on a iarge sale. Since this appears to undermine 
the whole concept of participation1 some explanation is required.
There were the practical difficulties of negotiating 
downstream participation1 • The solution of the upstream participation 
problems were complex and uncertain, and neither party was walling 
to embark on even more complex negotiations until the upstream 
negotiations had been successfully concluded. Even for 1 participation1 
in the downstream operations within the host country, the final 
agreement merely gave the host country the right to open discussions 
with the companies.
The main reason for the change was the fact that after 1970, 
the main fear vhich had prompted the idea of 'participation, namely 
the weakening price structure began to recede very rapidly, 1969-70 
saw an unexpected increase in the demand for oil pro ducts. This
resulted, according to Adelman in higher produet+realiaed crude prices 
and profits for refined products which went largely to the integrated
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companies who were also producing oil* As a result, the producing 
countries felt that they were entitled to a larger tax revenue.
Libya began negotiations in January 1970, and because of the 
companies refusal to meet the demands, began to enforce production 
cutbacks on the companies. By August 1970 production was nearly 
one third less than the end of 1969. This artificial shortage put 
further pressure upon the rising prices, and was in turn aggravated 
by the Accidental* closure of Tapline. Finally in October 1970 
the companies agreed to the Libyan demands* The Persian Gulf 
producers followed suit with the result that posted prices began 
a series of *leapfrogging1 increases* This culminated in the Teheran 
agreement and the Tripoli agreement in February and April of 1971 
respectively. In the Gulf this raised government take by 300 p.b* 
rising to 500 p.b. in 1975. For Lybia, it meant an average increase 
of 640 p.b. rising to 780 by 1975*
Whatever the causes, This trend of increasing posted prices 
continued. Table 6.1 below gives the rise in the price of several 
crudes, This trend was continued after August 1973, and was also 
reflected in increased product and realized crude prices.
Table 6.1 $ increase in posted prices August 31st 1970-August 1973
Saudi Arabia - light 70$
medium 85$
heavy 88$
Kuwait 69$
Abu Dhabi- Marine 68$
Murban 68$
Source: PIW 3rd September 1973.
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Inevitably^these increases were reflected in the arms 
length market, and the prices rose accordingly.
The implications of this for the demands for downstream
participation were twofold. Firstly, the host countries did not
have to go downstream since the companies were quite willing to
buy back the crude oil owned by the host countries. This became
even truer When the supply situation was aggravated by both Lybia
and Kuwait requiring a cutback in production for purposes of 
(37)
conservation,' ' In fact as the participation negotiations proceeded, 
much of the emphasis switched away from talk of partnership, control 
of resources, benefits of experience etc, and turned instead to 
* participation1 as a means for directly increasing host government 
revenue,
Secondly, the arms length market was not the cold forbidding 
place it had once been. As the price trend moved upwards, so selling 
at arms length appeared more attractive. In early 1973 the realized 
price of Abu Dhabi crude exceeded the posted price. Given this 
situation, it is not difficult to see why a demand, which arose from 
fear of competitive price reductions, i.e. downstream participation^ 
became less insistent and for the present was postponed completely.
The terms of the agreement can be divided into four sections, 
ownership shares and control, financial commitment, offtake, prices j^ 38  ^
Ownership shares and control
Each Gulf State was to have an initial 25$ share of the 
operating companies as from 1st January 1973, This figure was 5$ 
higher than the figure generally believed to have been demanded at
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first by the host countries* The timetable for the acquisition 
of further shares is given in Table 6*2 below. It should be noted
Table 6.2 Increments and Percentage Levels of Participation
Increment
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
$ Increment
5
5
5
5
6
$ Levels of 
Participation
30$
35$
40$
45$
51$
Earliest date of 
acquisition of $ 
Increment
1 January 1978 
' 1979
" 1980
'* 1981
» 1982
Source: Annex 2-General Agreement.
the percentage increments were only options which the Gulf States
were entitled to take up if they wished. The agreement then went
on to outline precisely what the host country was getting a share 
(39)of; 7 The Gulf State was to have an interest in the Concessions'
(40)crude oil concession rights, in the crude oil produced, 7 and in
(41)the crude oil production facilities; tangible or intangible, 
situated within the statels jurisdiction. The size of the interest 
depended upon the percentage participation level taken up by the 
state•
The General Agreement was based on the assumption that the 
undivided interest form of concession ownership and operation between 
the State and company would be adopted. However, if the corporate 
form was adopted, then the principles of the agreement were to be 
adapted to this form in implementing the agreement
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Article six stipulated that each State, as a participant in
a concession, shall have the right1to take an active part with the
company... in management'. However, rmajor management decisions*
were to require the approval of 'an agreed number of the parties
concerned1 which was to be set out in the implementing agreements.
These major decisions were those concerned with the sale or disposition
of assets, capital and operating expenditures, exploration and
development programs, selection of key personnel and employee
compensation and benefit plans.
If the corporate form was adopted, then the implementing
agreement was to make provision to protect all shareholders* interests
in respect of dividend and ploughbacks policy 'whatever their percentage
(43)holdings of the total shares may be.
It is important to note that the agreement in no way
altered the legal status of the existing concession holder with
(44)respect to his concession; 7 In fact several clauses strengthened 
the companies' legal position* For example, .Article nine confirms 
that the existing concessions 'Shall remain in full force and effect 
in accordance with their terms*• Also, Article six requires that 
any change of the concession terms requires the consent of both 
parties*
Overall, terms which concerned matters of control and 
management were left deliberately vague. The reason being that 
it was felt more appropriate that no general rules should be laid 
down, but that parties should reach agreements most appropriate to the 
situation of the individual country.
financial Commitment
The buy in price to be paid by the Gulf States was eventually
agreed to be a compromise between the two extremes outlined earlier.
Compensation was to be based on the book value of production facilities
and exploration and intangible development* However, this book value
was to be updated to take into account the increasing price level
throughout the period in which the companies assets were acquired.
This ’up dating1 was to be achieved by a calculation outlined in
Article four of the agreement, and the price multiplier was given in
Annex 5* Unfortunately, no details have been forthcoming on exactly
how this multiplier was calculated, and at least one study has claimed
(45)that the price index exaggerates the rate of inflation.
The estimated cost to the host country of the initial 25$ 
participation is given in table 6*3 below*
Table 6*3 The Cost of The Acquisition of the First 25$
of Participation
(46)
Countries (1) Total ($ra) (2) Per barrel of productive capacity ($)
Saudi Arabia 500 351
Kuwait 150 200
Abu Dhabi 162 580
Qatar 71 592
Source: MEES 20th October.
Pan Arab Consultants op*cit. p, 134-135.
This compensation can be paid in a liimp sum, or in three annual 
installments, 30$ immediately, and 35$ in each of the two successive 
years. The outstanding sums would carry a rate of interest equal to 
the rat«& at which US dollar deposits for six months are offered in the 
interbank deposit market in London^plus 1$*
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In addition to compensation, the Gulf States are also 
conmitted to bear their share of the costs associated with the 
production and delivery of crude oil in respect of each concession. 
These costs include capital requirements, including advances for 
working funds, based on the percentage interest of the Gulf State 
in the concession. Also included are all other costs including 
depreciation and overheads but these costs are to be based on the 
Gulf States share of total lifting* This share includes bridging, 
phase in and forward avails crude and any quantities for which the 
over lift price is paid.^^
Offtake arrangements
The arrangements for offtake embodied in the agreement go to 
some lengths to allow for a transition period. Two categories of 
crude are identified, *bridging crude* and Tphase in crude1*
*Bridging crude* is crude to which the host country is entitled, 
as part of its 25$ share of offtake, but which the companies have 
need to fulfill their existing market commitments. In the first 
year in which the agreement operates, up to 75$ of the host countries1 
25$ share of offtake is to be sold to the companies as bridging 
crude, if the companies require it. In the second year up to half of 
the governments* share was to go to the companies as bridging crude, 
and in the third year 25$. By the fourth year it is assumed thaA the 
•ompanies should be able to meet their market commitments from 
their own share of offtake*
'Phase in 1crude is crude to which the host country is 
entitled from its share of offtake, but which the host country may
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have difficulty in disposing of until their marketing network 
has developed. This tPhase in* crude was to be bought by the 
companies. Up to 15$ of the governments* entitlements in the first 
year could be sold to the companies as ‘phase in ‘crude, 30$ in 
the second year, 50$ in the third year and 70$ in the fourth year.
After the fourth year, the percentage of the ‘phase in‘ crude was to 
be reduced reaching only 10$ of government entitlement by the tenth 
year, The governments were obliged to give the companies four years 
advance notice of the amounts of ‘phase in crude* which they wished 
the companies to take.
Ownership and disposition of the government*s 25$ share of
offtake are given in table 6.4 below. Despite these transition
arrangements, this still left the host countries with a considerable
quantity of crude oil for which they would be responsible. Assuming
that Aramco1 s output in 1973 would be some 7 million b.d, then the
Saudi government would have to sell some 175,000 b.d. on its own account
(i.e. 10$ of 25$). If it is further assumed that production were 
. (48)to increase at 20$ per annum; * by 1976, Petromin would have to 
dispose of nearly 1 million b.d.
In addition to the arrangements for the transition period, 
the agreement also outline the mechanism for the disposal of non 
transition offtake (i.e. crude oil other than bridging or phase in 
crude). Each party has a 'basic right' to a share of the offtake.
This share is determined by the respective levels of participation of 
both parties, thus if all participation options are taken up, by 
1st January 1982, the host country1s'basic right* would be 51$ of 
offtake.
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Table 6*4 Disposition of host countries entitlement of 
crude oil production - %
Bridging Phase in Government Disposition
1973 75 15 10
1974 50 30 20
1975 25 50 25
1976 - 70 30
Source: Data given in pages ff>9-7o
Each year, both parties ftable1 (i.e. make known)the 
offtake requirements for three years ahead. Planned capacity is then 
set at a level, if possible to meet these total tabled requirements* 
If the total tabled requirements exceed capacity, then the production 
level is set at the maximum technically possible, and the tabled 
requirements of each party are reduced* Cuts are imposed initially 
on the party which has tabled a requirement above its !basic right.1
In this situation, within planned capacity, it is perfectly 
in order to have an overlifter (i.e. the party takes more than its 
basic right) as long as there is an underlifter (i.e. a party which 
takes less than its basic right) • If either party wants to expand 
future capacity, and the other party does not, this can be allowed 
for by a system of 1 forward avails 1 which is outlined in Annex 3 
section D* This simply means that capacity is expanded to meet the 
requirements, and the party wishing the extra oil takes it, paying 
a special 1forward avails1 price.
The distinction between overlifting and forward avails is 
somewhat obscure and complex in the agreement, and the present 
renegotiations of the agreement will almost certainly simplify 
the procedure.
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Price Levels
There were four prices to be determined, each price related
to the type of crude lifted i.e. Bridging, Phase in, Forward avails,
Overlift, Each of these prices was to be the subject of separate
negotiations as part of the negotiations of the implementing
(49)agreements. However, it appears that the intentions of the 
negotiators were that bridging crude was to be priced at approximately 
realized market levels^while phase in was to be priced a little 
below realized market levels. For the overlift price, and the 
forward avails price (called in the agreement contract price), the 
general pinciples for thfcfr calculation were given in Annex 3 
Sections G+H of the agreement.
By January 1973, the bridging andphase in prices were 
agreed upon between the individual parties and the details are given 
in Table 6.5. below.
Table 6.5 Bridging and Phase-in price, January 
1973 ($ p.b.)
Crude API Bridging Phase ■
Arabian light 34 2.053 1.970
Arabian Medium 31 1.926 1.844
Arabian Heavy 27 1.807 1,677
Kuwait 31 1.940 1.872
Qatar Marine 36 2.106 2.017
Qatar 40 2,163 2,086
AbuDhabi Number 39 2*241 2.197
Source: PIW Vol. XII No. 36 September 3, 1973,
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It should be noted that Kuwait got slightly higher buy 
back prices in return for a guarantee that the majority of the 25% 
of Kuwait's share would be turned back for marketing through the 
existing companies channels(for the three years which followed the 
agreement*,^0'* The significance of this was that it helped solve 
a considerable problem for BP and Gulf who could not increase their 
production because of the 3 million b.d, production ceiling imposed 
by the Kuwaiti government.
Conclusion
Overall, the agreement was extremely complex and rigid, at 
a time when changes in the industry were accelerating. The rigidity 
applied especially to the provisions for the various prices. To a 
great extent these inflexibilities contributed to the rapid collapse 
of the agreement,which can now be examined*
After the General Agreement
Reaction to the announcement of the agreement was mixed*
(51)While some criticism grew; 7 the negotiators * strongly defend both
the agreement and the idea of participation1 • Yamani continued
to compare participation1 with nationalization, and to emphasize
( 52 )the dangers of the latter. For example; J t\e argued that an excellent
example of the problems he had previously outlined was Iraqi experience
with Kirkuk, where from a potential production of 12 million b.d.
Iraq had been able to market only a third. He also continued to
emphasize the eventual importance of downstream participation in
order to Thelp the oil industry remain on a sound footing and maintain
(53)the present structure.1 7
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In similar vein the Kuwait Oil Minister A.R. Atiqi also
(54)
defended the general agreement, stressing the benefits of
'control* and maintaining that the 'basic objective of participation
(55)
is not a financial one.* '
Yet, despite these and similar statements, d^satisfaction
with the agreement was growing, and was also being expressed by the
actual negotiators. The cracks in the previously expressed solidarity
began to appear^  first in Kuwaitfunder pressure from elements in the
National Assembly, In June 1973, Kuwait formerly indicated that the
General Agreement was not satisfactory and wanted a revision of the 
/ 5ft j
terms. In December of 1973, Saudi Arabia followed suit, and
Yarnani stated that Saudi Arabia also wanted a revision of the terms, 
emphasizing in particular that Saudi Arabia wanted more than the 
originally agreed 51%, and wanted it before 1982. By the end of 
1973, less than one year after signature, the General Agreement which 
had presaged so much was in pieces, and the whole concept of 'part-
(57)ieipation* was being drowned in rumours of pending nationalization* *
This rapid and drastic reversal requires an explanation. Four reasons
can be identified; the strei^ thening of the price structure, the
'success1 of some countries in nationalizing their oil industry, the
operation of the 'Law1 of increasing terms, and the 1973 October war.
The upward trend in prices, begun in 1970, continued and
accelerated. Towards the end of 1972 there was a sharp tightening
of crude supplies as there was a long in the development of new
capacity in the Middle East and as planned increases elsewhere 
(58)failed to appear; 7 In addition, European demand began to recover 
from an earlier slump and U.S. imports of oil also increased. Demand 
in W* Europe was 8% above the same period in 1971, while U.S. imports 
were 30% above the 1971 period,
The first implication of these increasing price levels was
that the prices for bridging and phase in crude oil agreed in January
1973^^ had been left behind by increases in other oil prices*
In May 1973 it was announced that Saudi Arabia had been able to sell
all its participation crude for 1973 at a price an average 500 p*b.
( ft! )
above the agreed bridging price; ' In August 1973, M* Joukhdar,
/ i* O \
a former Deputy Governor of Petromin, claimed that the buy back 
prices negotiated in January where now entirely out of line with the 
market, and cited the example of Arabian Light crude whose market 
price was 500 p*b* above the bridging price and 630 p,b, above the 
phase in price.
In August 1973, the buy back prices were renegotiated to a 
higher level as given in table 6.6 below* These increases simply 
reflected the general upward trend in both posted and realized 
prices. However, as prices continued their upward spiral, it 
was certain that before long, these newly negotiated buy back prices 
would also find themselves out of line with the market!*^
In addition to outdating the buy back prices, the general 
increases further weakened the fears of the arms length market.
The prime raison d'etre for 'participation* was rapidly being 
undermined.
While this fear was receding, the fear that any nationalization 
attempt would be severely curtailed by opposition from the majors 
also declined, 1972-1973 saw a series of nationalization by Algeria, 
Iraq and Libya, Algeria began the process in early 1971, and was 
followed by Iraq who finally nationalized the IPG in August 1972,
- 176 -
Table 6*6 Revised prices for bridging and phase in crude nego-
tiated in August 1973 ($ p.b.)
B r i d g i n g P h a s e - i n
APL January August 
1973 1973
Increase January
1973
August
1973
Inc re as
Arabian Light 34 2,053 2*388 0*335 1,970 2.259 0,289
Arabian Med# 31 1#926 2, 246 0,320 1*844 2.319 0.275
Arabian Heavy 27 1.807 2,109 0.302 1,667 1.937 0*260
Kuwait 31 1,940 2*259 0*319 1.872 2.147 0.275
Qatar Marine 36 2,106 2.444 0*338 2.017 3.308 0.291
Qatar 40 2.163 2,512 0,349 2,086 2.386 0.300
Abu Dhabi 39 2,241 2.583 0.342 2.197 2.491 0,294
Source: P3W Vol. XII No. 36 ( September 3, 1973)
Libya also began piecemeal nationalization of the foreign companies.
In the case of both Algeria and Iraq, settlements with the foreign 
companies have been readied on very favourable terms to the host
/ cc\
countries. ' Even in the case of Libya where settlement has not 
yet been reached in all cases, the Libyans claim to have been able to 
sell their crude with the minimum of hindrance.
It appeared by 1973 that the two great fears of nationalization, 
prices and company reaction had receded.
The increasing prices coupled with the relatively successful 
nationalization both undermined the concept of rparticipation.1 The 
General Agreement itself was further undermined as a result of the 
Tlawl of increasing terms, with Libya acting as the main sources of 
pressure. Libya had also been seeking participation1 in its operating
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companies, with the following objectives. Firstly, to promote
the expansion of exploration operations on the grounds that the 
companies were content to deplete resources. Secondly, to have 
'a say* in the decision making of the operating companies, both 
at a technical and managerial level. Finally, to secure access 
to quantities of the crude oil produced* However, Libyan participation* 
was to differ from the Gulf 1 participation1 in two ways* Libya 
insisted that compensation should be based upon net book value, and 
also demanded immediate access to crude oil supplies on a considerable 
scale.
In August 1973,^^ a participation1 agreement was
announced with Occidental, followed by a similar agreement with the
Oasis G r o u p * L i b y a  was to obtain an immediate 51$ participation
in the upstream operations of the companies in return for compensation
based upon the net book value of the above the ground assets.
( 70)Also, the buy back prices were extremely high. Around the same
time, Iran announced that it would compensate the consortium forthe
Iranian takeover of the Abadan refinery also on the basis of the
(71)net book value*
These developments made the terms of the Gulf General 
Agreement appear very unfavourable, and provided ammunition for those 
against both the General Agreement, and xparticipation1 in general, 
to apply pressure for a change*
The disatisfaction with *participation1 as a strategy i*e* 
apart from the disatisfaction with the agreement terms, reached a 
peak with the outbreak of hostilities between the Arabs and Israeli
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in October 1973. The war had two major effects. Firstly, because 
of the Arab oil weapon oil supplies became very short. Shortly 
after the outbreak of hostilities, the Arab oil producers announced 
that they would cut back production by 5$ per month with September 
1973 as a base. This would continue until Israel withdrew from occupied
(72)
territory and the rights of the Palestinians were restored. ' In
(73)the first month the actual cutback averaged 20$. The consequence
was an inevitable spectacular increase in prices. At an auction of 
Iranian oil, Iranian light was selling for an unheard of $17.04 per 
barrel
In addition to the price effects, the October war generated a 
very strong demand for nationalization, especially of American and 
Dutch interests. Iraq in fact took this course of action. All 
these factors make the future outlook for 1participation* in the 
sense outlined by Yarnani after 1967 bleak to say the least. 
Participation1 and Joint Ventures Compared
In order to be able to use the information gathered on joint 
ventures to assist in an analysis of the participation debate * and 
the implication of *participation', some enumeration of the simi­
larities and differences between joint ventures and 1participation* 
ventures is required.
Similarities
The similarities of the participation ventures* and joint 
ventures arises initially from the fact that both create companies 
with joint ownership. *Participation' does not mean merely sharing 
in the profits of the venture, nor is it only a participation in
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certain aspects of management. Under participation1 the host 
government acquires part of the full ownership rights of the 
operating company. These ownership rights can take one of two 
forms. The undivided interest f<wm,which corresponds closely 
to the operating agency form of joint venture,since the undivided 
interest form of operating company is a non profit making agency 
which draws its finance and instructions from the parents. The 
corporate form of operating company closely resembles the partially 
integrated company w^hich acts independently of its parents (at 
least in theory) as a producer and seller of crude oil for profit.
The owners then receive the dividends.
In both forms of participation the role of the parent
companies is the same as their corresponding roles would be in the two
forms of joint venture. In the undivided interest/operating
agency they are directly responsible for providing the financial
inputs, talcing their share of the oil offtake, and for the planning
of future offtake, capacity etc* In the corporate/partially
integrated venture the parents role is less direct and clearcut,
(75)
but is carried out by means of its appointees on the board. *
The question then arises, if both participation and joint 
ventures have the comnon characteristic of joint ownership, does 
the difference in participation1 share (i.e. 25-51$ in nine year) 
from joint venture share (normally 50$ immediately) affect this 
similarity? In principle, the answer must be that it does not.
In both cases ownership rights and responsibilities are divided.
If the division is different, the relative sizes of input and off­
take/dividends share differs, but the basic principle of a share in
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the ownership rights remains unchanged. Where the differences in 
percentage division may make for an important difference between 
participation and joint ventures,is in the use to which the share in 
ownership rights is put i.e. in the matter of joint control.
Joint control also provides, in principle, strong 
similarities between the two types of venture. In both cases the 
parties to the venture have a potential share in the decisions 
which affect the operating company. These decisions range from the 
size and disposition of offtake, now and in the future, to the nature 
of the financial policy to be pursued. Also, in both cases, the 
parties to the agreement have the right to appoint the senior staff 
who make these decisions, directly or indirectly! directly in the 
case of the corporate/partially integrated venture, indirectly in the 
undivided interest/operating agency type of venture.
In the case of joint control, the differences in the 
division of equity alone between participation and joint venture 
may make for differences, but this is not necessarily the case.
Be facto control may indeed stem from a de jure control through 
ownership of the majority of the equity, but there are other sources 
of de facto control. These other factors can arise from knowledge 
of technology, experience in certain aspects of the operations, 
supply of a key element in the operation such as foreign exchange. 
While the General Agreement specifies the division of equity shares, 
there is no statement as to how far these equity shares will reflect 
voting rights. It may well emerge that a power of veto is given
to the minority shareholder,as is the case in all joint ventures
( 77)which do not have an even division of equity.v 7
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Thus the similarities between participation ventures and 
joint ventures arise from the existence in both cases of actual 
joint ownership and actual or potential joint control.
Differences
Despite the similarities between participation ventures 
and joint ventures, there are also important differences. These 
differences arise from two broad characteristics of the participation 
ventures. Firstly, there is the fact that the host country in a 
participation venture enters an operating company which has been 
in existence for some time. In joint ventures, the host country 
joins the foreign company and forms a new company. Secondly, the 
scale of operations of the participation venture is MQistly larger
' I
than the scale of any joint venture at present in existence.
The fact that in participation the host country enters an 
existing operations creates several points of difference from the 
joint venture.
The host governments are entering partnerships with the oil 
companies}who for a long time have been regarded by much of public 
opinion in the Middle East as examples of Western Imperialism. Even 
amongst some host government policy makers the majors have been, 
and are, regarded either with mistrust or bitterness or both. The 
literature on the industry from the Arab side is littered with 
ephithets such as ‘monopolists', 'exploiters' etc. To cite just 
one extreme example, in a pamphlet put out by INOC on 'Direct and 
National Exploitation of Iraqi Crude Oil*, in April 1972, the purpose 
of liotw 80 of 1961 was given as 'the liberation of national resources 
from malicious exploitation practiced by monopoly companies' (Sic).
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Such a view of one1 s future partner is hardly likely to help in
/ 78 )
the generation of a condition of mutual trust. Indeed, it
was this lack of a past history which made so many of the independents
(79)attractive to the host governments which entered joint ventures. '
In addition, because the host country buys into an existing 
operation, a price of entry has to be negotiated. This price has 
two extreme s. If the host country can obtain participation
without payment then all profits above its pre-participation revenues 
are net gains (and net losses to the companies). If its entiy 
price equalled the present value of the future stream of profits then 
it would gain nothing (and the companies would lose nothing), 
assuming the present value calculation to be correct. Thus for 
the host country to gain from entry, the entry price would have to 
be such that the expected rate of return after taxes on the investment 
(i.e. entry price) exceeded the rate of return that could be expected 
from alternative uses of the capital before tax. From the companies 
point of view the compensation it receives should be a sum which 
when invested would yield a return^ at least equal to the expected 
income from the operations.
This situation reflects a classic bargaining situation insofar 
as the two extremes of a zero sum problem can be identified leaving 
its solution (i.e. the actual price within the two outer limits) 
to the outcome of negotiations. For the reasons discussed earlier 
in the chapter on bargaining and conflict, the eventually agreed 
price may become outdated, i.e. what may seem a satisfactory agreement 
to one side at one point in time, may, with a change in circumstances,
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seem less satisfactory at another point in time* For this reason,
any negotiated entry price may be a later source of conflict. The
agreed updated book value compensation negotiated in the general
( 81)agreement has already proved to be a source of such a conflict*1 
In the case of joint ventures, since there is no entry price 
because the ventures are newly created, such a potential source of 
conflict does not exist. The r price’of entry into a joint venture 
is the share of exploration and development costs commensurate with 
the reward i,e. share of offtake. As a result both parties to the 
agreement pay proportionately the same entry Tprice1 dependent on the 
division of the equity. A possible exception to this would be the 
signature bonus paid by the foreign company but in most cases this 
is recoverable.
The final implication of the entry of a host government 
into an already operating company lies in the existing market 
committments of the foreign owner. A major reason for host governments entry 
into the company is to secure oil supplies\ yet, it is possible that 
the existing offtake is already needed by the original owners to fulfill 
its marketing obligations and needs. This has two implications.
Firstly, there has to be some arrangements made for the transition 
period^  secondly, a price has to be negotiated between the new 
owner of the crude i.e. the host government, and the user of the 
crude, the foreign companies. Since these arrangements, like the 
buy in price, are the subject of a negotiation, it is possible for 
them to become outdated as in fact has occurred for example with the 
prices of bridging and phase-in c r u d e . T h e s e  prices were agreed 
upon in January 1973 and were badly out of date by August 1973.
These additional sources of conflict are not present in the joint 
venture situation because the possession of the crude is clear cut 
and no similar transition period is required*
That the scales of operation of the participation venture 
and joint venture are different needs little elaboration* In 1971, 
the two biggest joint ventures, GUPCO and LAPCO, lifted 100 million 
and 49 million barrels respectively* In the same year Aramco and 
KOC lifted 1,635 million and 1,078 million barrels respectively. 
However, in addition to the difference in absolute size of the 
operating companies, there is also a considerable difference in the 
size of foreign parent companies. Most of the foreign companies 
involved in operating joint ventures are independents^ while all 
the foreign companies in the proposed participation ventures are 
majors. S«me idea of the difference in scale is given in Table 
6*7 below.
Table 6*7 Relative Sizes of Offtake of Crude Oil and Liquid Gas, 
and Owned Refining Capacity of Selected Companies 1971 (b.d.)
Indep endent s Ma j or s
Phillips Standard of Indiana Average Figures for
the Seven Majors
Offtake 356,000 769,000 3,940,000
Refining 605,000 990,000 3,160,000
Source; Relevant Company Reports 1971.
General differences between the participation ventures and 
joint ventures arise because of these differencesof scale.
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The logistics problem faced by a foreign company outlined 
earlier increases both with the scale of the operation, and the 
size of the company involved. For example, in the Middle East and 
Africa in 1971^BP drew# its crude from nine different companies in 
seven countries* Its smallest interest (Qatar Petroleum) lifted 
204,000 b.d. of which BP owned 24% while its largest (Iranian 
Consortium) lifted 4,080,000 b.d, of which BP owned 4 0 $ . In a 
similar way, the importance of the oil sector to the host countries 
increases with the scale of the operation^as it represents an 
increasingly important element of the national income. For the 
companies, an increase in the size of the operation implies a 
greater problem for a company trying to balance its diverse interests 
between different sources of supply. This suggests that the companies 
will be less able to relinquish control over these different supply 
sources than is the case with the smaller companies. For the host 
country, there is likely to be a strong direct relationship between 
the size of the oil sector and the importance of control of the oil
sector, The bigger the operation, the more likely it is that both
parties will seek to exercise control,
The size and quality of the staff input also differs between 
the two types of venture because of the scale difference* It is a 
reasonable assumption, other tilings being equal that there is a 
direct relationship between the size of the operation and the number 
and quality of the senior staff required i,e* the bigger the operation 
the ’better1 the senior management will need to be and the more 
will be needed* ' This means that if the host country is going
to seek control of the operating company by means of its appointees,
then the host country most provide more staff, of a higher quality,
for a participation venturejthan would be the case with a joint 
venture. As will be seen shortly t^his situation carries very 
serious implications for participation on the Arabian Peninsula.
Because the scale of the participation ventures is so much 
bigger than the joint venture, the host country problem of the 
disposition of its share of crude offtake is correspondingly larger* 
In 1971, from GUPCO Egypt had to find markets for 50 million barrels 
of crude. In the first year of participation Saudi Arabia would 
have to market 64 million barrels, rising to 330 million barrels 
within three years, After this ’transition period1 the rate of 
increase would accelerate considerably. Since the host countries 
possess little or no downstream facilities, the bulk of this crude 
oil would find its way into the arms length market. As will be seen 
shortly^ this factor provided a major source of the debate on the 
viability of participation ventures?because of its implications 
for world oil markets*
The final differences between the two types of venture which 
arises from the scale of the operation^concerns the size of the host 
country^ -financial input. The participation venture requires the host 
country to commit fqr more of its financial resources to the venture 
than would be the case for a joint venture. The financial input is 
required for three elements; the buy in price, further investment in 
operating costs, capacity etc. and finally investment in downstream 
facilities. In joint ventures only investment in upstream operations 
is n e e d e d . A l s o  in joint ventures because of the smaller 
absolute size of the operation, the size of the host country 
financial input is correspondingjhjsmaller.
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These factors provide an outline of the major differences 
between the two types of venture. Their impact and significance 
will be detailed when the participation debate is examined, since 
many of these differences provided ammunition for the debates*
By way of a conclusion on the similarities and differences 
I would suggest the following. In principle, the two ventures 
once operating, are very similar, but in practice the outcome may 
be quite different. In some cases the joint venture experience will 
be relevant to the participation debate, in others the practical 
differences (notably scale) will make joint venture experience 
irrelevant,
The effects and implications of ’participation*
As the idea of ’participation1 began to unfold after 1967,
the possible significance of its application was a source of
considerable discussion in oil and academic circles* The purpose
of this final section is to evaluate the more important aspects
of this debate,in the light of both joint venture experience, and the
present situation in the oil industry, as distinct from the situation
when the discussion was at its peak 1968-1972*
The effects and implications of ’participation1 can be
grouped under three main headings* Firstly, the major operating
companies in the area,were to have the host government as a partner
(8?)in the equity joint venture; Secondly, the host governments were 
committed to the provision of considerable resources as inputs to the 
companies. Finally, the host governments were to become the owners 
of considerable quantities of crude oil, and as owners,were to be 
responsible for its disposal.
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Before an examination of these effects two problems should be 
noticed and borne in mind throughout the subsequent analysis• The 
first problem is the use of the conditions in the industry at 
present^as part of the analysis* Since the October war of 1973 
between the Arabs and Israelisithe ’present situation’ is as clear 
as mud. The rate of change of circumstances has been so rapid as 
to make the identification of trends a hazardous exercise. The 
second problem is the limitations on the use of joint venture 
experience in relation to the participation ventures* The differences 
between the two types of venture have already been outlined* There 
is in addition the more general difficulties of the transfer of the 
experience of one country to another.
Despite all this the exercise is still worth doing, if 
only to illustrate the type of questions which need to be asked.
Better answers to these questions may come at a greater distance 
in time when the dust has settled.
Host Governments as partners in the major operating companies
Since the major operating companies were joint ventures 
before the advent of participation^what are the difficulties of 
having the host government as one more partner? In the debate, 
the significance of the host government as a partner was thought 
to lay in the fact that the host governments ’ interests would be 
likely to conflict with those of the existing partners* These 
sources of conflict were thought likely to arise from two 
characteristics of the host governments; their political nature 
and their non integrated nature.
The fact that the host governments would be non-integrated
partners to the joint venture^was thought to have considerable
implications for the factors which would determine the offtake
of the venture. The most succinet analysis behind this idea was
( 88)given by Professor Penrose in 1968. } The initial assumption
is that the host countries seeks to maximise revenues. An increase 
in revenues could come from one of three sources* The government 
could take its share of oil and sell it on the arms length market^  
at a price which would yield a profit greater than the tax revenue} 
after the government investment has been accounted for. Given the 
general situation of prices in the arms length market at this time, 
such a course of action was unlikely. The second method for 
expanding revenues would be for the companies to increase their 
per barrel payments to the host government. Their ability to do this 
depends on the state of competition in the product market. Any 
increase in such a payment would have to be met out of company 
profitsjOr by an increase in product prices. Since in this period 
company profits were declining^largely due to price competition in 
the product markets^  such a course of action was as unlikely as the 
first alternative!*^ This left the final means of increasing 
revenue ^which would be for the host government, as partners in the 
operating company, to push the company to increase offtake at 
existing tax rates. The implications which would arise from this j 
derive from the fact that supply of crude oil would increase ^vith 
no reference to the level of demand for crude oil. For crude deficit 
companies^these increased supplies would be welcomed up to the point 
where all their needs for owned crude were satisfied* However, for 
balanced or surplus crude companies, pressure to increase offtake 
would be pressures to increase market sales, either of crude oil or 
products.
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Professor Penrose points out that because the oil companies 
take their supplies from a number of different sources, many of which 
could produce more oil at existing prices, they have had to operate 
a kind of pro rationing. ’The reconciliation of numerous conflicting 
inherests-including the desire of the producing countries for increased 
output and the differing requirements of the individual companies- 
while at the same time attempting to keep the rate of aggregate 
supply in line with the rate of aggregate demand, has for a long 
time posed difficult and delicate problems for the international 
companies as a group*’ If the host governments become partners 
with full ownership rights, and proceed to demand and obtain increased 
offtake, thtis would make the ’difficult and delicate problems1 
almost insoluble for the companies. This would be likely to lead
(91)
to an erosion of the companies’ profitability.
Given the present situation, and joint venture experience, 
what is the validity of the above analysis? Unfortunately, joint 
venture experience is of limited assistance. In Egypt, the host 
government initially wanted crude for its own integrated operations^ 
and thus planned offtake on the same basis^  as an integrated company 
i.e. in relation to product demand. When offtake reached a level 
Avhich satisfied Egypt's internal demand, the foreign companies were all 
considerable crude deficit companies and welcomed any increase in 
offtake. In any case production was small enough for Egypt to market 
her share with little difficulty!*^ Iran approximated most closely 
to the situation envisaged above, i.e. non-integrated partner 
pressing for increased offtake. But in this case, a combination of 
low venture production and crude deficit foreign partners eliminated 
any conflict of interest. The foreign companies were more than 
willing to maximize production and to overlift.
As to the present situation, there has been an important
change of circumstances. After 1970, the host countries have been
able to secure increased per barrel revenue as a result of rising
(93)product prices, and the exercise of collective bargaining power.' '
Thus the host country has been able to increase revenue without an
increase in offtake. Indeedjin at least two cases, Libya, and Kuwait,
the host governments have placed production ceilings on offtake for
(94)conservation purposes. Furthermore, they were able to do this
without participation, but as sovereign governments. At first sight
this new situation would appear to render Professor Penrose's
analysis obsolete in the face of changing circumstances i.e. the
host government is no longer likely to seek an increase in offtake
which may damage the position of the companies. However, this
would be a short sighted view. The fact remains that while the
host governments remain non-integrated, they regard crude oil as a
source of income in a way which has a completely different basis
from that of the foreign company. Thus for the host country crude oil
is a direct source of revenue, while for the company, crude oil is a
(95)source of products.' 7 On these grounds the potential conflict of 
interest between the partners remains, although its exact nature 
may have altered i.e. instead of increasing offtake some host 
governments have reduced offtake; both create difficulties for the 
companies. This will be returned to when the implications of the 
host government as a crude seller are sought, for the moment it is 
sufficient to assume that the conflict remains, and therefore requires 
a solution.
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The second source of confLict thought to be important 
in the participation debate)was the political nature of the host 
government* The companies fears were that the host governments 
would introduce political considerations into purely business 
operations^with a resulting decline in efficiency* Such ’interference' 
could take one of two forms. Firstly, the government may seek to 
use the operating company as a means of gaining ground over its 
political opponents within the country. Secondly, the government 
may feel forced to interfere1 in the operations of the company 
because the government has been put under pressure by the ’Law' 
of increasing terms* Thus the government may seek to alter the 
companies’ frame of reference or in some .other way effect the 
companies1 operationsHowever, the point to note about these 
fears on the part of the companies is that ’’interference' is not 
exclusive to participation* As sovereign governments, the host 
country gpvernments are able to ’interfere' in this way^  participation 
or no. Indeed for reasons which will be mentioned shortly, 
’participation’ may in fact lessen the likelihood of such interference* 
There is however one very good reason why the host government; 
as a partner^  may generate conflict within the venture^  in a way which 
a private sector partner would not. Some mention has already been 
made of the foreign companies’ logistics problem of balancing 
conflicting sources of crude etc. In the same way, governments have 
a similar logistics problem^  both between different sectors in the 
economy and different criteria and objectives. In other words, a 
host government partner may require the venture to take a course of 
action against the interests of the venture, but in the general 
interests of the country.
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Three possible sources of such a divergence of interest
can be categorised. KLrstly, the interests of the venture may
have to be sacrificed for the benefit of a more strategic sector
of the econony. Thus^  in the case of the Egyptian ventures, the
Government insisted on the use of Russian drilling equipment^  only
because they represented less of a strain on the balance of payments
than other nationalities’ equipment^  since the equipment had been
received as part of a barter agreement* In this case^no problem
(97)of efficiency resulted; but the point remains that the action 
was taken for the benefit of a sector other than the oil sector.
A similar example is the local purchasing clauses in most joint 
venture agreements^which may provide demand for other sectors of 
the econony^at the expense of equipping the oil venture with poor 
equipment.
A second source of potential conflict is in the criterion
used in taking decions. The venture companies* objective can be
said to involve some criteria^based on profit maximization over
same period of time, or maximizing growth, or offtake. The point
being that the objective is essentially based on self interest
criteria* The responsibility of government however, is to consider
alternative criteria in addition to the self-interest criteria of
one firm or sector. A good example of such a situation was the
Egyptian government’s decision to force the oil marketing companies
(98)
to sell products at the same price in lower as in upper Egypt.
The final source of potential conflict from a government
partner arises from different time horizons* It is a reasonable
assumption that, given political stability, the foreign company
(99)
will seek to maximize the return on its investment ' within the 
lifetime of the agreement* If there is political instability, 
then the time horizon of the company will be correspondingly shorter. 
For the host government however^there are two alternatives* If 
the country has a high turnover in governments then the time 
horizon may be very short indeed. If a president is telectedT for 
five years then the present value of the income of the sixth year is 
likely to be nil* Alternatively, a government may expect a long 
and happy life and therefore extend its time horizons accordingly.
The most obvious source of conflict to arise from such a 
situation is with respect to revenues* Thus a government with at 
present more income than expenditure, may wish for a much slower rate 
of resource exploitation than the foreign company. The implications 
of this will be examined further when the host country as a crude 
seller is considered* There are a number of other ways in which 
different time horizons can cause conflict. A company may be quite 
content to flare the gas produced from oil operations while it is 
not profitable to use it in an alternative way i*e* marketing or 
reinjection. The host government however^may insist on its 
conservation for future use at a present cost to the venture*
While the country is likely to eventually gain from such an action, 
the foreign company is likely to lose. The cost of reinjection 
can be regarded as an investment on which the foreign company is 
not likely to see any return.
- 195 -
At first sight, the experience of joint ventures in the matter 
of host government partnership is encouraging for the participation 
venture. In the case of Egypt, after the experience with COPE, the 
ventures were deliberately insulated from the public sector, and 
’political interference’ was minimal.^^ However, the problem 
is the extent to which Egyptian experience can be transferred to 
other countries# To an extent the likelihood of such a transfer 
will depend on the political stability of the regime. If the regime 
is secure, then it will have less need to ’score’ over political 
opponents and will be more able to resist pressure which may arise 
from outside through the mechanism of the 'law’ of increasing terms.
Egyptian experience also provides several reasons why 
’political interference' nay in fact be less under ’participation' 
than under an ’old style1 concession. As a part owner of the 
company, the government should have access to more information about 
the operating company. With more information the government will 
be in a much better position to evaluate the economic costs or 
benefits of any political action taken. Egyptian experience also 
suggests that the Egyptian representatives appointed to the ventures, 
themselves act as an insulating layer between venture and government. 
For example, it was the Egyptian technocrats wh&i& dissuaded the 
government from making any change in the terms of the EGPC-Pan-Am 
1964 agreement on the creation of GUPCO.^"^^
Finally, once the government becomes a partner, the venture 
company can be projected to the public as a national company. As 
such, it ceases to be regarded as a foreign element in the economy
to some extent, and so loses value as a whipping boy for political 
purposes. An example of this was during and after the October 1973 
war when, to the best of the authors knowledge, Egypt continued 
to supply oil to the two American Oil Companies.
However, while this invalidates much of the concern over 
the political nature of a host government partner, the potential 
conflicts which arise from the government’s wider responsibilities 
to other sectors and objectives remain#
In addition to the sources of conflict anticipated in 
the ’participation debate1, i*e# offtake and political interference, 
joint venture experience suggests the existence of other potential 
sources of conflict, notably in the matter of the venture's financial 
policy* Given that these different forms of conflict may exist, 
how far does joint venture experience indicate the probability of 
a satisfactory solution?
Where the two partners have a common aim, then disputes over 
the means to the achievement of this common aim can generally be 
solved by compromise. This emerges quite clearly from the experiences 
of the operating agencies in Egypt. Equally clearly is the fact 
that if the partners begin with essentially different aims, as in 
the case of COPE, solution to a conflict is far less likely, partly 
because the conflict is as likely to be over basic objectives as it is 
to be concerned with means to objectives. The result, as can be 
seen from COPE’s experience, is a creeping paralysis over the 
company’s operations# Relatively minor issue become pawns in the 
wider dispute, compromises take on the form of defeats or victories. 
Since many of the conflicts discussed in the context of ’participation’
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ventures arise from essentially different objectives, notably 
over offtake, ""Ehis would suggest that solutions to the conflicts 
are unlikely to take the form of a compromise* In this situation} 
both parties to the venture, to project their basic interests, must 
seek de facto control of the venture. The solution to conflict is 
then imposed by one party on the other*
The fact that the most obvious way to seek a de facto control 
of the venture lies in the staffing policy of the venture#^*^ has 
very serious implications for ’participation ventures' on the 
AraMan Peninsula.
The staffing policy of the venture can achieve this nwms) 
by one of the partners filling all or most of the senior management 
positions with its own appointees. In this way the decision takers 
within the venture will take their decisions in favour of their 
parent !*^^ and the parent will also be in a position to secure 
more information. In addition, since most of the senior managers 
will come from one parent, problems of dualism one reduced 
accordingly!*^^
At this point it is central to the understanding of the 
implications of this ’packing1 of the management structurefto 
distinguish between technicians and managers. The distinction 
which matters here is the ’training1 period* Good technicians 
can be produced in 6-7 years, with allowance for a course of study 
and a period of e x p e r i e n c e S i n c e  good managers are generally 
good technicians with considerable managerial experience, the time 
taken to produce a good manager can be at least doubled. On the 
Arabian Peninsula, good managers are a very very scarce resource.
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This is even more true when it is remembered that because of the 
scale of participation ventures, a large number of good quality- 
senior managers are required. The fact of the matter is^ that the 
countries of the Peninsula simply do not have sufficient quality 
managers with which to pack the venture's management structure, 
nor are they likely to have them within the next ten years at least.
This presents the host countries with an insoluble dilemma*
If they seek to secure their objectives vis a vis the participation
ventures by packing the senior levels of the management structure
with their own appointees, too many inexperienced managers will be
promoted too soon# Such a situation is likely to mean incompetent
managers at a very high level in the venture with corresponding
implications for efficiency* The alternative is to introduce their
appointees to the venture graduallyj as and when their experience
fits them for the posts, thereby minimizing the dangers of inefficiency#
However^ two consequences follow from this# While the transition is
taking place i«e* expatriate nominees of the foreign company are
replaced by host country nominees, the venture may suffer from
dualisnijWith adverse effects on efficiency* Also, the host country
risks the foreign companies securing de facto control through their
’packing* of the management structure# This in turn implies that host
(107)country interests may suffer accordingly; 7 It would appear to 
present a situation in which the host country may lose, irrespective of the 
course of action chosen.
In the case of the joint ventures, such problems did not 
occur* In Egypt, since the partner’s basic objectives coincided, 
de facto control was much less important# Also, Egypt had a surplus
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of good quality managers, and so was able to effectively ’pack* the 
management structure* In Iran, the Iranians were content to let the 
foreign partners provide the management, partly because objectives 
often coincided, and partly because the joint ventures were marginal 
to the whole oil sector*
By way of conclusion, it would appear that the conversion 
of the major operating companies to joint ventures with a host 
government partner^  does not have a, very promising future* To some 
extent this appears to have been realised by the host governments 
in the newly negotiated participation agreemen t * T h i s  gives 
the host country 60% of the equity immediately and full ownership 
in less than six years* 'Participation* would appear to have lost 
the battle with nationalization*
Host Country Resource Commitment
This aspect of the participation debate revolved around the 
nationality and advisability of the host countries' demand for a 
share in the operating companies* This demand would commit them to 
resource inputs on a very large scale^  in an activity which someone 
else i*e* the foreign companies, were very willing to carry out on 
their behalf.
The argument thatjbecause the host countries sought control 
at a possible economic cost they were being irrational^can be rapidly 
dealt with. Such an accusation could only be acceptable if it is 
assumed that the only rational motivation is profit maximization.
The economists' 'rational economic man' of the nineteenth century 
who was burdened with such an assumption^died long ago from an acute 
attack of revealed preference* If the host countries reveal a
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preference to share control of oil operations, even at a financial 
cost, that is their perogative.
As to the advisability of such a course of action, one 
needs some criteria by which to judge the likely result of a share 
in control with the objectives sought by the host country. If the 
objective in seeking control is to satisfy notions of national dignity, 
independence etc, the criteria are difficult* But it is possible 
to conceive of a trade off table between ’dignity units’ and financial 
cost, though the practical difficulties in the computation of such 
a table are formidable.
If the objective is to seek greater financial benefit, then 
the criteria are more manageable. It is then a question of comparing 
the revenues,less cost,from participation^dth the possible tax 
revenues if the old style concession c o n t i n u e s A l s o  the rate 
of return on the input to ’participation’^ must be compared to the 
possible rate of return from alternative uses for the participation 
inputs. Such calculations however, are complicated by several 
intangible elements which may be difficult to translate into 
accounting concepts. By ’participation’ the host country managers 
should gain valuable experience through a ’learning by doing* process. 
However, implicit in such a process is an initial cost which may have 
to be borne in order to receive future benefits# In addition, a 
financial ’loss’ by ’participation’ in oil may be offset by the host 
country using its power of control to integrate oil operations 
more into the domestic economy. For example by insistence on more 
local purchases, other sectors of the economy may benefit.
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A further general objective of the host country may be 
the diversification of the economy away from such a heavy dependence 
on oil. The criteria to be applied in this case would be to evaluate 
whether^  by the input of resources into oil, the development of other 
sectors of the economy nay suffer from a shortage of these inputs.
For the Arabian Peninsula the key resource is management. Given 
the heavy management input required by ’participation', it is likely 
that other sectors will be starved of managerial input with corresponding 
harmful effects on the diversification effort.
Unfortunately, the whole exercise is further complicated 
by another factor. It is unusual for a government to have one clear 
cut objective. Normally a government ha,s numerous objectives, and the 
ranking in importance of these objectives may well change over 
relatively short periods of time. This makes any accurate evaluation 
on advisability almost impossible unless the government unequivically 
states its objectives.
Joint venture experience adds very little illumination 
to the problem. In the two countries to operate joint ventures,
Egypt and Iran, resource committment in the ventures was relatively 
minor compared to the inputs into participation* Also it is possible 
that foreign company willingness to carry out operations on behalf 
of the host government, especially in Egypt, may have been somewhat 
lukewarm. However, one benefit which clearly emerges from host 
government participation in joint ventures is the benefits to 
management from ’learning by doing’. In the long term such a benefit 
may well outweigh initial financial losses.
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The Host Country as a Crude Oil Seller
Much of the discussions on the effects of participation 
centered upon the fact that as a result of host country participation, 
the host countries would become sellers of considerable quantities of 
crude oil!'*'"^  This was felt to have important implications for the 
world oil markets*
Before 1970, the analysis was based on the assumption of a 
potential surplus of crude oil over demand at existing prices, 
together with an increase in competition in both the crude oil and 
product markets* Given this situation, it was thought that posted 
prices were unlikely to rise* In fact it was only as a result of the 
pressure from OPEC that posted prices had not been reduced since 
1961, On the other hand^  since early 1960^ European product prices had 
been declining under pressure from the growth of the small independents 
The implications of this situation were,that if the host country 
sought to increase its per barrel revenue by increased posted prices, 
the increase would have to be met out of company pro fit s, which were 
already declining as a result of price 'competition for products.
Since the companies were liable to strongly resist any such
move, the alternative course of action^ forthe host country to increase
revenue^would be to push for an increase in offtake. Throughout
the sixties, host country pressure on the operating companies to
(112)expand output was intense* If the companies had agreed to
expand output in all cases there would have been two results. Either 
the companies would have to dispose of the crude through their own 
integrated channels, or by selling the crude in the arms length market*
(111)
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Either course of action would have meant further pressure for
competitive price reductions in the product markets.
However, the companies were able to resist these pressures
with reasonable success, and to keep crude offtake in line with
Eastern Hemisphere demand at prevailing prices* Joint action by
the companies to achieve this balance was not necessaiy since
!the overlapping of joint ventures permitted the limitation of
(113)Persian Gulf o u t p u t , 7 i#e# the involvement of the majors in the
joint ventures gave each company a reasonable idea of what its
competitor's plans were with respect to offtake.
The implication of participation was that the majors
would lose this ability to limit supply in order to maintain the
price structure of products and arms length crude. The host govern-
ments, who had no interest in maintaining product price structure,
would push for increased offtake to increase revenue. By virtue
of the control granted to the host country from participation, they
would probably succeed#
The gap which existed between the market price of crude
(114)oil and the supply price arose because of barriers to competition
within the industry# After 1957 these barriers began to break down*^1^  
As a result,the gap narrowed as market prices fell. If the host 
countries succeeded in increasing offtake, the barriers to competition 
would crumble and the market price of crude would reduce accordingly.
Thus ran the argument on the effects of participation.
That such a course of action seemed probable was reasonable 
in the period before 1970. The behavior of the host country national 
oil companies indicated that 'when and as-™ (they).., have large 
amounts of oil to sell there will be more competition and price
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cutting The only course of action to avoid reduced prices
from strong competitionjWOuld be for the host countries to prorate
production^with much the same results as the limitations voluntarily
imposed on themselves by the companies* Such a course of action was
thought unlikely for two reasons. QPEC*s efforts to introduce such
a programme in 1965-66 and 1966-67 failed to achieve its objectives,
and the actual output patterns diverged considerably from the planned 
(117)patterns* Also when the host countries sell crude oil outside
the realms of posted prices and income tax^ there is no way for the
(118)other members of the cartel to detect cheating. J Consequently 
the temptation to undercut rival producers is strong, especially as 
any price greater than cost represents profit.
These factors taken together^  convinced many people that 
participation of the host governments would tend to flood the arms 
length market with crude oil^thereby drastically reducing price^ as 
competing host countries sought to increase their oil revenues. In 
fact it will be recalled that much of the ideology of participation 
as expanded by Yamani^was based on just these assumptions, hence the 
need for downstream participation to tie the host country to product 
demand.
Unfortunately joint venture experience fails to cast any 
light on the subject because of the small level of output of all the 
joint ventures. All the joint ventures have been producing at maximum 
capacity due to the oil 1hunger* of all the partners. However, on 
the face of it the analysis outlined above appears to have provided 
a very logical analysis of the likely outcome of participation. But, 
after 1970, the context of the situation began to alter in such a way 
as to necessitate a complete rethink of the likely effect of the 
host country as a crude seller* The change in the situation and its
(119)reasons have been outlined earlier; f and it is only necessary 
to take the conclusion as a starting poin^i.e* the host countries 
from 1970? by a combination of limiting supply and threatening to 
cut off supply^succeeded in raising the posted price* This was the 
course of action to increase revenue which before 1970 was thought 
unlikely* Thusj it is no longer necessary for the host country to 
expand output in order to increase revenues. The question then 
ariseSjhow far does this changed situation invalidate the earlier 
analysis?
To answer the question it is necessary to evaluate how 
the host governments, with control over crude supply from participation, 
will act in order to obtain increased revenues^"^ The purpose of 
the subsequent analysis is not so much to furnish an answer to the 
question, but mainly to outline the factors which the host country 
must consider.
The host countries can pursue three courses of action which 
will influence the supply of crude to the arms length markets, which 
in turn will cause changes in price and revenue. Under participation } 
the host country will sell its crude oil in the arms length market j 
thereby increasing the supply of crude in this market* However, the 
crude disposed of in this way has been taken from the integrated 
channels of the companies who originally owned the operating companies. 
Thus^if the companies wish to replace this loss of owned crude, they 
must do so by resource to the arms length market.
If the host country maintain the output of the operating 
company at its pre participation level, then, assuming no change in 
demand, the increased supply of crude oil on the arms length market
will be matched by a corresponding increase in demand from the 
companies (who seek to replace the loss of owned crude through 
participation). Thus the price of oil will remain constant at its 
pre participation level. .Alternatively the host country could 
restrict output to less than the pre participation level. In this 
case, while supply to the arms length market would rise, demand from the 
companies in the arns length market would rise fas ter} which would 
lead to an increase in price, finally, the host country could 
increase output beyond pre participation levels, causing the increase 
in supply of crude oil to the arms length market to rise faster 
than the increase in demand from the companies. In this case crude 
oil prices would fall.
What considerations mil determine which course of action 
will be pursued by the host countries, given present conditions
i.e. end of 1973? Take as a starting point the assumption that the 
host countries seek to increase total revenue. The first course 
of action, reduce offtake further to increase price, is unlikely for 
several reasons, firstly, there is ample evidence that the present 
level of crude prices is likely to cause considerable world problems.
In terns of balance of payments in January 1974 OECD estimated that 
to meet the increased price of oil Japan would have to spend some 
$15,000 million if it maintained its pre October 1973 consumption 
levels, France would have, as a result of the increase, a deficit 
of $2,500 million. The implications of this would be a drastic 
reduction of oil consumption by the industrialised countries with 
harmful consequences for growth. The effect on the developing countries 
is anticipated to be even more disastrous, while there have been 
gloomy predictions on the effect of present prices on the whole inter­
national monetary system. In this context further price increases 
are unlikely^ 2 ^
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Secondly, the ability of the host countries to effectively 
run such a cartel is doubtful over any length of time. The greater 
the divergence between the supply price of crude and the market 
price of crude, the greater the temptation for individual countries 
to ‘cheat1 on the cartel by secret price cutting to expand offtake.
It is difficult to see what mechanism OPEC could use to detect the 
source of such ‘cheating1 let alone have some control over it.
Thus to increase revenues, the host countries must seek 
to reduce price in order to increase offtake, thus increasing total 
revenue. For a reduction in price to increase total revenue a^ssumes 
elastic price demand for crude oil greater than one. There are 
difficulties in an assessment of the price elasticity of demand for 
crude oil?since the figure is *a composite of the moderate gasoline 
elasticity, the very great fuel elasticity, and the intermediate 
one for middle distillate 1 Nevertheless the general consensus
suggests that demand is fairly price i n e l a s t i c . i n  this case a 
reduction in price would reduce total revenue. However, this is the 
aggregate analysis. Demand for an individual country‘s crude oil is 
likely to be highly price elastic in relation to its competitors. Thus^  
if only one crude producing country reduced prices, its total off­
take would increase and with it, total revenue. Since this would 
reduce demand for offtake for competing producing countries' they 
would be likely to meet any price reduction.
In other words;the individual country's demand curve is the 
classic kinked demand curve faced by the oligopolists in the case 
of non collusion, Thus^if the host countries sought increased 
revenue by increased offtake^then the analysis which was relevant
before 1970, is still relevantji.e* Host country control of crude 
supplies would lead to price competition^  which would radically 
reduce arms length crude prices* It would appear that little has 
changed, but this would ignore a key change since 1970*
To understand this key changeneed to go back and 
question the starting assumption that host countries will seek 
to increase immediate revenues* If it could be established that 
the host countries were not interested in the pursuit of this 
objectivejthen the host country could match supply with demand at 
existing prices, content with their existing revenue levels* Since 
the temptation to Tcheatt is removed>then the stability of the 
price levels need not be upset by supply changes designed to obtain 
more revenues*
This is precisely the change which has occurred since 1970* 
The important factor is time preferences for revenues* If the host 
country ‘loses1 potential revenue now, it is not a loss but merely 
a postponment, assuming for the moment that the future price of oil 
does not falli"^^ Projection of revenues, given the present state 
of uncertainty, is an extremely difficult exercise. Nevertheless, 
one estimated is given below in table 6.8.
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Table 6*8 Projection of Government Revenues
1974 - 1983
1974
($ million) 
1977 1980 1983
Kuwait 6,207.2 7,543*0 8,526.0 9,631.0
Saudi Arabia 17,868.8 28,550.3 38,566.0 54,262.7
Abu Dhabi 3,204*6 9,131*2 12,003.4 17,389.1
Qatar 1,358.3 1,800*4 2,366.2 3,045*fc
Iraq 5,373*2 10,084*6 12,972.5 16,434*9
Libya 6,703.3 8,888.6 10,015*2 11,282*9
Total 40,715,4 65,998.1 84,449 *3 112,046.2
Source: Table 16 Ibrahim Saed El-Din Abdalla, Expected
Oil Revenues and Surplus Funds of Six Arab Oil 
Producing Countries* Seminar on Investment 
Policies of Arab Oil Producing Countries.(126)
In an effort to provide some sort of context for these 
figures, table 6*9 below gives several indicators for three Arab 
countries in 1968. The purpose of the table is not so much to 
provide a delicate analytical tool, but more of a heavy blunt 
instrument. What it amounts to is that there is no easy way of 
measuring the potential surplus of funds expept to say that for all 
oil producing countries, in the Middle East it will be ’large
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Table 6«9 Indicators of the Expenditure of three Arab Countries
in 1968
($ million)
1 2 3 4
Government Final Gross Fixed Oil Revenues Projected 
Consumption Exp- Capital Revenues
enditure Formation 1974
Saudi Arabia 653 593 907 17,869
Kuwait 402 440 712 6,207
Iraq 326 431 500 5,373
Source; 1 and 2, U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts 
1970 Vol. 1.
3. Petroleum Press Service September 1971
4, Table 6*8
It follows, that given a surplus of funds over expenditure
there is no reason to assume that the producing countries will seek
. 4? (128) In this situation there is noto increase revenues further*
reason why the producing countries should cause price instability 
by alterations in the present offtake levels^beyond minor miscal­
culations with respect for allowance of the growth in demand.
It would appear then that the effects of the host country 
as a crude seller as a result of participation^need have no drastic 
effects on the price structure of crude oil in world markets.
However, it is important to remember that the above 
analysis assumes that the price of oil is expected not to fall.
If a fall in price is anticipated, then the whole situation alters.
If the price of oil falls^then revenue* foregone now is lost for­
ever, unless the price rises again at some future time* Consequently,
if it is anticipated by the producing countries that the price may 
fall, they are likely to maximize production now. in order to take 
advantage of the present high price* Since this implies a 
•onsiderable increase in supply, the anticipated fall in price has 
provided a mechanism whereby the tanticipationt becomes self 
fulfilling* In this case the analysis based on competative price 
reductions due to oversupply at existing prices becomes a likely 
possibility*
A further possible consequence of the host country as a 
crude seller after participation1 lies in the effects of barter 
arrangement on the world oil market*
As a result of 1 participation1 the host countries find 
themselves in the position of having to dispose of very large 
quantities of crude oil* This creates problems for the host countrieSj 
apart from those which relate to the effect upon price already 
discussed* Firstly, there is the difficulty of which currency the 
host countries should ask for in payment. Before participation 
there was doubt about the use of the United States dollar as the 
payment currency. In January 1972 agreement was reached at Geneva 
between the host countries and the companies over the compensation 
to be paid for the devaluation of the dollar, since the majority of 
government tax revenues were received in dollars. Even with such an 
agreement, the present instability in the international monetary 
system makes any currency an uncertain proposition, particularly 
for long term contracts.
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From a more general point of view, given the increased
price of oil, the requirements of currency to pay for the oil could
put incredible pressure on the availability of international
liquidity for other trading requirements. Before the price rise
at the end of 1973, the International Monetary Fund estimated the
Arab surpluse at $12,500 million. The OECD estimated that after
the end of 1973 price rise, oil importers would have to find an extra
$50,000 million to meet the price increases at existing demand levels.
This would put the total surplus around $62,500 million* At the end
of 1973jtotal world reserves of gold, foreign exchange and special
(129)drawing rights was $186,445 million.' y Such situation obviously 
has very serious implications for the international monetary system 
and world trade.
A partial solution to these problems lies in the use of 
barter deals of oil for industrial goods, technology, arms etc.
Quite obviously, if all the oil could be sold on a barter basis, 
this would eliminate the problems which arise from the use of a currency 
intermediary* Assuming barter deals were acceptable as a means of 
the disposal of crudejthe quantity of oil sold on such a basis is 
largely a function of the ability of the producing countries to absorb 
the physical goods and services offered. Given the limitation
on absorption capacity which exists for the Middle East producers, 
a considerable quantity of crude oil would still have to be sold 
outside of the barter arrangements, but some relief to the problems 
could be forthcoming.
With respect to the absorption problem, a rather sinister 
means to expand the capacity can be found by the encouragement of an 
arms race in the area concerned. Military hardwear has the dubious 
merits of being phenomenally capital intensive, together with
a high rate of obsolecence, either through technological change or
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(132)usage, On these grounds, the potential absorptive capacity
of an economy can be radically expanded if the country desires 
modern fighting forces* If the countries are grouped around 
a contended area, vis the Per si an/Arabian Gulf, then demand for 
military goods will grow at an exponential rate*
A further benefit to the host country from barter deals 
concerns the problem of f imported inflation1. As the price of 
oil has risen, so too has the world price of manufactured goods* 
Consequently, part of the benefits of increased oil prices have 
been lost because they have been partly converted into increased 
prices for manufactured goods. To compensate for more expensive 
manufactured goods by further increases in oil price would, by a 
cost push mechanism, simply lead to further increases in the price of 
manufactured goods* Barter deals alleviate this problem by translation 
of the terms of exchange into units of real output.
There have been indications towards the end of 1973 that 
the benefits outlined above have encouraged the host countries to 
seek such barter deals. In January 1974 it was announced that an 
agreement had been initialled between France and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia was to sell 800 million tons of oil over the next 20 
years to France in return for Mirage jets and heavy arms# At 40 
million tons of oil per year this represents 18$ of Saudi Arabia*s 
total offtake and 39$ of French crude oil consumption for 1971,
Similar agreements have been reported and rumoured between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain, and Iran and other industrial countries 
If the trend of barter agreements of this magnitude 
continues, it will have some implications forthe future structure 
of the world oil market.
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In particular, if the trend of Government - Government 
agreements continuethen the future role of the oil companies 
in the Eastern hemisphere seems uncertain. The first implications 
is that the companies will have difficulty in replacing their losses 
of owned crude by recourse to the arms length market, If supply is 
limited by the host countries, then each barter deal represents a loss 
of crude to the arms length market from which the private companies 
obtain their crude* This however need not, per se, prove disastrous } 
if the consuming governments then make their acquisitions of crude oil 
from barter deals available to private companies in order that they 
should process and market it, rather than have the crude processed 
by government owned companies.
Two factors suggest that the companies position in this 
matter may be far more complex and uncertain* It is very likely 
that where the consuming government has its own national company^  
then the national oil company will receive preferential treatment 
in the supply of crude oil. In addition, the producing countries 
still seek an entry into downstream operations. As a result, a 
logical course of action would be for them to obtain this downstream 
activity by the formation of joint ventures with the consuming 
governments.
If this were to develop on a large scale then not only would 
the companies1 role as buyers and owners of crude oil be threatened, 
but their role as product producers and marketers would also come 
under attack. Since the new governmental joint venture companies 
would seek to capture an increasing share of the existing product 
market, the form of 1 the attack1 would almost invariably mean price 
competition in the product markets* In such a price war, the owner­
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ship of crude and the surplus funds available would almost certainly 
lead to the predominance in the product market of the new government 
joint ventures. Taken to its logical conclusion^such a course of 
events could ultimately eliminate the oil companies in their present 
form.
There is one final implication of Tparticipation1 which 
relates to the future position of the oil companies. This concerns 
the effect of the companies1 buy back prices on the world price of 
oil.
As has already been pointed out several times, under 
participation1, whatever terms are finally agreed upon, the host 
countries will receive far more crude oil than they can directly 
market themselves. As a result arrangements have been, and are 
being made, for the companies to Tbuy back1 some of this crude oil 
for processing through their own integrated channels. The companies 
will pay for this oil at a buy back price.
For example, in April 1974, it was arniounced^^^ that 
agreement had been reached between Qatar and its companies^whereby 
the buy back price was fixed at 93$ of the posted price for the 
first six months of 1974, subject to review on a quarterly basis* 
Similar agreements can be expected between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and Abu Dhabi and their respective companies. This represents a 
considerable victory for these producing countries who have for some 
time been insisting on a buy back price equal to 93$ of the posted 
price.
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The implication of these buy back arrangements is that the 
companies are effectively underwriting the present price of crude 
oil. At present, the governments of the consuming countries regard 
the price of oil as Hoo high1. This suggests a strong conflict 
of interests between the companies who are prepared to maintain the 
present price of oil in order to assure themselves of an oil supply, 
and the consuming governments who wish to see the present price of 
oil reduced.
This potential clash of interests adds further weight to the
argument that consuming governments through government-govemment
barter arrangements and other measures^'*^ may seek to weaken,
if not replace, the oil companies in their present form. This,
on the grounds that the oil companies are no longer serving the
(137)interests of the consuming countries*
One weakness in this argument lies in the time span of the 
buy back contract. If these contracts were fixed on a long term 
basis, say anything over five years, then the above argument would 
be fairly strong, However^the present buy bade arrangements are 
to be subject to a quarterly review. At first sight there is no 
reason why the companies should not seek to renegotiate the buy 
bqck prices at a lower level^if market conditions allow it. In 
this sense the companies are only underwiting the pi*ice of oil 
for three months at a time*
However, two factors m y  require that this proviso under­
goes further qualifications'! Fitstly, as the buy back agreements 
are formulated on the basis of formal negotiations between the 
host countries and the companies, the producing countries may be
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able to keep better control over the market* Since buy back prices
are announced as a percentage of the posted price, a mechanism is
provided to detect the tcheatingr described earlier* Secondly,
it has been assumed that the companies1 interests lie in a reduction
in the price of crude oil, but it would appear that company
profitabilitr^ has risen with the rising price of crude* If there
is a connection between this improving pro fitability and the rising
price of crude, then obviously the companies have no incentive to
renegotiate lower buy back prices* If this is the case then the
governments of the consuming countries will be likely to closely
evaluate the extent to which the oil companies are serving their 
(139)interests* The conclusion may well result in the weakening
of the role of the companies in the way described above*
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Conclusion
This conclusion is intended to serve two purposes.
Firstly, it is an attempt to bring together the strands of the 
different chapters in an effort to evaluate what has been learnt about 
oil joint ventures in the context of the Middle East. Secondly, 
it is an attempt to explore what the future role of the joint 
venture may be in the Middle East, not only in oil, but also in 
other fields of activity.
Before an attempt at evaluation, it would be useful to 
recall the initial objective of the thesis as outlined in the 
introduction. The objective was twofold. To examine the factors 
which have affected the development of joint ventures in Middle 
East oil, and then to examine the effects of the development of 
these ventures on the oil industry itself. Given the objective, 
in some ways the thesis achieves its purpose and in other ways it 
falls short.
In terms of describing the factors which influenced the 
rise of the joint venture agreements, a considerable difficulty 
was to examine the experience of different countries whose back­
ground and experience may widely differ, and from this, produce 
general factors. Despite this problem certain general influences 
have been identified* The first of these was dissatisfaction with 
the ’old style1 concession form of agreement* This dissatisfaction 
arose partly from the Trigidity* of these agreements and partly from 
the managerial freedom which they granted to the operating companies, 
at a time when the host countries expressed a growing interest in 
participation in oil operations. These factors go a long way towards 
explaining why the concession agreement was replaced for new acreage,
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and changes sought for existing producing acreage.
The reason that the replacement agreement took the form 
of the joint venture arrangement was essentially because of 
shortages faced by the host countries. These shortages were 
shortages of foreign exchange, skilled manpower, technology and 
markets. The term shortage is of course a relative rather than an 
absolute measure, and it is not suggested that the host countries 
had none of these factors. They did exist in the host countries 
to one degree or another, but not on a scale for all the factors to 
meet the needs of the host country in any programme of intensive 
oil development* On the other hand, the foreign companies had 
access to all these factors, but lacked rights over oil producing 
areas. The joint venture arrangement enabled these complementary 
factors and requirements to be brought together in one company.
Thus the joint venture arose from the complementary needs of the 
two parties to the agreement*
An important factor which encouraged the rapid spread of 
these venture agreements once they had been introduced^was the 
mechanism described by the ’law1 of increasing terms. Once the early 
agreements were signed, and their apparently relatively favourable 
terms to the host country were known, it became virtually a political 
necessity for new acreage to be let on this basis; either with the use 
of an equity joint venture, or a contract agreement, which, if the 
earlier definitions are recalled, is also a form of joint venture.
Much of the explanation of the effect of these ventures on the 
oil industiy arises from their complementary base. The joint venture 
developed in Middle East oil in a period of intensified conflict 
between host country and foreign company. This intensification
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of conflict arose largely because the host countries were beginning 
to flex.their bargaining muscles, and so swing the relative bargaining 
power which existed between them and the companies in their favour. 
Because of the complementarities of the joint venture, the venture 
acted as a new mechanism of coexistence between the host country 
and company. It was as a potential reducer of conflict that the 
joint venture had its greatest impact on the industry. This is 
not to suggest that the venture arrangement eliminated conflict.
In fact as has been shown, in some ways potential conflict was 
intensified. However, a new framework was provided in which it 
was possible to resolve conflicting interests.
As to the effects of the joint venture on specific aspects 
of the oil industry, these have already been described and analysed 
in the relevant chapters, and need not be repeated.
This brief summary of the thesis would be incomplete if 
mention were not made of some of the shortcomings of the work.
Firstly, the thesis does not evaluate any particular venture, 
particularly with respect to the financial costs and benefits 
involved. However, it should be pointed out that this was not the 
intention of the thesis,which was to examine joint venture in 
general rather than the activities of any particular venture. 
Unfortunately, because of the small number of operating ventures, 
the work leans heavily for its practical analysis on the experience 
of the three Egyptian joint ventures. It is therefore legitimate 
to ask if a general study can be based on such a relatively narrow 
base of experience? Obviously the study would be improved by the 
addition of material from other operating ventures, although the
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’narrow base’ of the three Egyptian ventures does represent a 
’sample’ size of 43% of the population of operating ventures.
Also, the Egyptian experience exhibits the common factors mentioned 
earlier, namely dissatisfaction with the concession and relative 
shortages of some of the key factors*
Secondly, given the general approach and the limited 
number of operating ventures studied, there still remain gaps in the 
information. The origin of these omissions have several sources*
In the best of circumstances the researcher in the field of oil is 
constantly hampered by what the participating governments and 
companies choose to hide under the label of 1commercial confiden­
tiality’* In addition, in the Middle East, where many of the 
countries consider themselves to be in a state of war, refusal 
to supply infomation on the grounds of ’commercial confidentiality’ 
is strengthened by claims of national security, particularly in a 
sector as strategic as oil. On these grounds collection of adequate 
data can at best be difficult.
In a study on joint ventures^  acquisition of information 
faces yet a further problem. Much of the interest over joint 
ventures centres on the problems of conflict and disagreement 
between the parties and individuals within the venture, far more 
so than in a study of unified companies, Naturally enough, members 
of the ventures are reluctant to elaborate on these difficulties 
to an outsider. As a result central issues in the study of joint 
ventures are frequently obscured for lack of adequate information* 
Furthermore where the infomation is available it is often based 
on informal discussion. This makes the processing of the infomation 
by statistical analysis very difficult if not impossible, mid thus
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more liable to the personal bias of the researcher. While it is 
hoped that this may be offset by the objectivity of the researcher, 
to misquote an historian, it is a veiy dull researcher who does not
have a bee in his bonnet. The secret is to listen for the buzzing.
Work has been done on joint ventures on the basis of formal 
questionnaires, but the limitation here is that the questionnaire, 
to be effective, must be short, and therefore limited in scope.
For example, the study cited earlier by A.K. Rifai on Egypt was 
based on a questionnaire which would have taken several hours to 
complete. On these grounds alone the validity of some of the
findings must be considered dubious.
As a consequence of all this, gaps do appear in the work, 
but two deserve specific explanation. Most of the existing works 
on joint ventures spend much time on a discussion of the motivations 
and objectives for Hie entry of a foreign company into a joint venture 
type arrangement. In the case of oil however, such a discussion is 
redundant. Given the oil companies decision to seek sources of owed 
crude, the way in which the company is to acquire this crude, at 
least since the early sixties, has been determined by the wishes of the 
host country. The second omission is that this study which professes 
to be a study on joint ventures in Middle East oil virtually ignores 
the operations of the most important joint ventures in this area 
namely the operating companies of the major concessions. The reason 
for this omission is simply that a study of these ventures is a study, 
and a veiy considerable one, in its own right, and has already been 
done,^^ Also the purpose of the study was to examine ventures in 
which the host government, directly or indirectly, was a major partner#
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The reason for this emphasis is that given the role of government 
in the economies of most Middle East countries, future joint ventures 
in the area, both in oil and other fields, are likely to have the 
government as a partner.
What then emerges as the present and future role of joint 
ventures in Middle East oil? h^eir role began as the provider of 
a framework and mechanism whereby complementary needs could be met^  
and conflict between the host country and foreign company could find 
means of resolution* Whether or not the venture succeeded in this 
role depended on how far the venture was able to implement decisions 
which, while being optimal for the venture, nay have been sub-optimal 
for one of the partners# When such a situation arises, then the 
venture could be said to be resolving conflict by the discovery 
of an identify which is independent of either parent# In other 
words, the venture begins to act as a unified company rather than as 
an agent which simply represents the two partners* When and if such 
a situation arises^ is a function of two factors* It reflects the 
way in which the staff of the venture see their role with respect 
to both the venture and the parents# It is also a function of how 
far the parents objectives diverge, and the extent to which the 
common interests expressed in the idea of the venture are stronger 
than the interests of the individual partner*
This role of the venture appeared to reach its peak in the 
Middle East when it was proposed to convert the operators of the major 
concessions into such ventures# However it appears that this role of 
the vent tire has been overtaken by events as the host countries seek 
more or less immediate total control over the major oil operations.
The fact that the situation appears to have outgrown the venture is the 
result of several factors* It is apparent that the host countries 
now feel that their individual interests are stronger than the 
interests they may have had in comnon with the major companies in the 
creation of joint ventures to operate the major concessions* This 
in turn arises because one of the key shortages, markets, no longer 
appears as a shortage. Once this situation arose, the mechanism 
of the tlawt of increasing terms led to its rapid spread#
The question now to be asked is if this outdating of the 
joint venture is permanent, or if joint ventures will have any 
future role in the oil development of the Middle East? It seems 
likely that there will be a future role for the venture for the 
following reason# Even though the host countries nay take control of 
the major concessions, shortages of the factors mentioned earlier 
will still remain# This mil be so^especially for the smaller 
oil producing countries, and in the marginal areas of the major 
producers* Therefore, in these two areas at least, it is likely 
that the trend towards greater use of joint ventures will continue, 
and may even accelerate as oil becomes a more important commodity.
This is because in these areas risk capital for exploration, 
technology and skilled nan power will have to be provided from outside 
the economy if other sectors of the econony are not to be started 
of these resources. The joint venture arrangement has already 
proved itself as a mechanism by which these factors can be trans­
mitted .
The joint venture will also have an important role to 
play in the development of non oil sectors for similar reasons.
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The watchword now in the Middle East, more than ever, is economic 
development. Economic development requires just the sort of factors 
which the oil joint ventures have shown they are able to transmit 
from the industrial countries. Consequently^ it can be expected 
that there will be a very rapid expansion of the numbers of joint 
ventures outside the field of oil.
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NOTES
Introduction
1* For a further discussion of the problems involved in these 
definitions see S.J* Rubin, The International firm and the 
National Jurisdiction. In the International Corporation,
C.P. Kindleberger (Editor), M.I.T, Press 1970*
2* The old style concession is also a contract agreement in a
legal sense.
3* Hereafter referred to as joint venture. The other forms
of joint venture i.e. old style concession and contract, 
will be specified as such.
Chapter 1
1# Hereafter, referred to as the concession.
2* S„L. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, Chapter 2, Oxford 
University Press, Third Edition, 1968,
3. Ibid.
4* Ibid* Chapter 7.
5, See E.T# Penrose, The Large International Finn in Developing 
Countries* p* 59«62.
George Allen and Unwin Ltd*, 1968.
6 . Originally the Near East Development Corporation included Jersey 
Standard, Socony Mobil, Atlantic Ref inning, Gulf Oil and Pan 
American Petroleum and Transport Company. In 1930 Atlantic and 
Pan American Sold their interests to Jersey Standard and Socony 
(now Mobil Oil). Gulf did likewise in 1934*
7. United Nations Statistical Yearbook*
8, Participants in the Iranian Oil Participants Ltd* (the Consortium) 
were as follows, Jersey, Socal, Texaco, Mobil and the Gulf Oil 
Company (Gulf) 7% each. BP 40%, Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) 14%, 
Compagnie Francaise des petroles (CFP) 6%, and the IRICON agency 5%. 
See Longrigg op.cit. Chapter 16.
9* These were Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group#, British Petroleum Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, Texas 
Oil Company, Standard Oil of California and Mobil Oil Corporation 
(formerly Socony Mobil), Some writers refer to eight majors by 
inclusion of Compagnie Franqaise des Petroles.
10* See Penrose, large Firm op.cit, p* 78,
11, For example, in 1950 the seven majors controlled 72% of refinery
capacity* This figure covers the same area as the figure for 
oil production. Ibid,
12, The exception was GulbenkianTs 5% holding in IPC, although
GulbenkianTs share of the Oil went to the majors.
13, See Penrose, large Firm op,cit. Chapter V.
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14, For Iran the life was 93 years, for Iraq 75 years, for Saudi 
Arabia 66 years and for Kuwait 93 years. The earliest to end 
was the concession with Iran,which was to end in 1994, while the 
longest was with Kuwait,which was to end in 2026. See Z* Mikdashi,
An Introduction to Middle East Oil Relations Prior to 19®)
Table 1# In Continuity and Change in the World Oil Industry 
p. 85 ff. The Middle East Research and Publishing Centre,1970#
15* Longrigg op.cit* p. 407.
16# Mikdashi op.cit* p* 87.
17. The concession areas were as follows:- Iran about 500,000 sq* miles 
out of 600,000 sq# miles* Saudi Arabia 617,000 sq* miles out of
860,000 sq* miles. Almost all of Iraq and Kuwait# See Mikdashi op.cit* 
p* 90.
18. By 1963 Aramco had given up 75% of its original territory* E.T.
Penrose. OPEC and the Changing Structure of the Oil Industry. In 
Continuity op.cit. p. 154*
19. By Law 80 of 1960 Iraq sequestered more than 99% of IPCTs 
territory,IPC was allowed to retain only the producing fields.
20. For example, in May 1962 Kuwait Oil Company (ICOC),owned by BP 
and Gulf, relinquished 2,700 sq. miles out of a total of 5,800 sq. 
miles,with provision for further relinquishment, Longrigg op.cit, 
p. 400.
21. For example the Arabian Oil Company agreement of 1957-58.
Longrigg op.cit, p. 311.
22. In the 1954 agreement, which created the Consortium, the two 
operating companies formed by the Consortium each had two Iranian 
directors out of seven directors for each company. Longrigg 
op.cit. p. 277. In 1959,Aramco took two Saudis onto the
Board Ibid. p. 295.
23. Various attitudes within the host countries towards the oil 
companies are summarised in D, Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in 
the Middle East. Faber and Faber, 1966.
24. For example, see Mikdashi op.cit. who puts forward this viewpoint.
25. See Chapter IV for a further discussion of this point.
26. There were other aspects of the operations involved, but many of 
these can be covered under the broad heading of managerial freedom, 
for example, the flaring of gas.
27. Penrose, Large Firm op.cit p. 201.
28. The extent of the control demanded by the host countries varied, 
not only between countries, but also between groups within the 
same countries.
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29* For a brief survey of the dependence on revenues see M* Iskandar, 
Economic Development Plans in Oil Exporting Countries. In 
Continuity op.cit. p. 39ff*
30. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual reports for the 
relevant years*
31* The Shah of Iran has pliinly stated that a situation in which 
foreigners can control the rate of development of his country!s 
resources is intolerable. E.T. Penrose, Iran as a Pacemaker 
in Middle East Oil. In E.T. Penrose, The Growth of Firms and other 
Essays* Frank Cass, 1971*
32. For example, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Minister of Oil, stated, 
in the introduction to the Petromin Annual Report 1968, that one 
of the main aims of the national oil company was the 1 encouragement 
of the private sector and mobilisation of national capital... to 
profit from the country*s wealth and resources*'
33* In practice the foreign companies have tried to maximize their
local purchases. For example, Aramco set up an Industrial Development 
Department (AIDD) to encourage the development of local suppliers.
See C.S. Coon, Promoting Industrial Development in Saudi Arabia*
In Hands Across Frontiers, ed. H.M. Teaf and P.G. Franck, 1955.
34. In Saudi Arabia,in 1955, 75% of such gas was flared. In 1965,
64% was flared, representing 800 million standard cubic feet per 
day.
35* The Kuwait Petrochemical Company and the Saudi Arabia Fertilizer 
Company were both founded on the basis of this 'unwanted* gas*
36. See Chapter VI.
37. In the case of Iran, acreage had been available since the 1954 
settlement, However, it was not until 1956-57 that the institutional 
framework existed to handle this acreage. See p* 31-34.
38* Apart from considerations of resource inputs, in 1959, only Iran 
and Egypt had national oil companies to provide the institutional 
framework* Not until 1965 did all the countries under consideration 
have national oil companies.
39* For an outline of the limitations which applied in Egypt and 
Iran, see pages 20-22 and 31-34*
40* Longrigg op.cit. p. 278. For the reasons behind the American 
independent's desire to enter the Middle East see J*G. Maclean 
(Chairman Continental Oil Company), The Importance of Newcomers in 
the International Oil Business* Middle East Economic Survey 
(MEES), Vo. XI, No. 24.
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41* For a description of some of these indepndents and their acquisitions 
of acreage see Penrose, The Large Firm op.cit. p. 33-144 and 
p. 73—76.
42* Quoted by Abdallah Tariki in Z. Mikdashi, A Financial Analysis of 
Middle East Oil Concessions 1901-1965. p. 238* Praeger, 1966*
43* Penfose, Large Firm op.cit. p. 74.
44. Petroleum Press Service (PPS). September 1964, p* 331.
45* Longrigg op.cit* p. 310-311*
46. Ibid. p. 407-408.
47. See Chapter II.
48. Just how the joint venture agreement fulfills these requirements 
is the subject of Chapters III and IV.
49. The companies were not only prepared to pay signature bonuses, 
but also to offer very favourable terms to the host countries.
Chapter II
1* The Gharib field began production in 1938, and was owned by Anglo 
Egyptian Oil fields Ltd* (AEO). See Petroleum in the United Arab 
Republic 1960* General Petroleum Authority.
2. Ibid. Table 8-1, p. 536-7
3* The first serious petroleum legislation came with a Council of 
Ministers’ decision in 1906. Ibid. p. 305-7.
4. For the 1920 Law see Ibid. p. 307-319, for 1937 Ibid* p* 320-324, 
for 1948 Ibid* p. 324-330, for 1953 Ibid. 330-342.
5* See Longrigg op.cit. p. 255-261 *, as a result of the 1948 Law, 
by 1951, all foreign companies had ceased drilling*
6. Ibid. p. 40* The Abu Durba field was handed over to a local 
company, The Egyptian Oil Syndicate, for exploitation*
7* Ibid. p* 40*
8. For details of the training school and other aspects of trainihg, 
see Petroleum op.cit. Chapter IV.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. p* 40*
11. For the details of Law 135 see Petroleum op.cit. p. 346-348.
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12. Article 2, Law 135 of 1956.
13. Petroleum op.cit. p. 351.
14. Ibid.
15* For an outline of the developments in the Egyptian economy in this 
period see P.K. O ’Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System.
R. Hair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasser. State University Press, 1971 
and P* Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt. Penguin, 1969.
16. See note 5.
17. Petroleum op.cit. p. 417-429,
18. Jersey had withdrawn from Egypt because of the 1948 legislation.
19. The ’nationality* clause which caused so much difficulty in the 
1948 Law was dropped in Law 66 of 1963. Instead, it only stated 
that the 'applicant must have the necessary financial and 
technical requirements for this purpose' Article 26* *This purpose* 
was the production of crude oil.
20* M.A. Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources* Middle 
East Research and Publishing Centre, 1966*
21. Because of the absence of any published infomation on COPE, 
the information which follows draws heavily on discussions with 
many of the people involved. These discussions took place 
during my field trip to Egypt in 1972.
22. For a discussion of these exploration control devices see p. 49-53.
23* Before the 1957 agreement, which created COPE, was signed, Agip 
had bought out the American interests in IEOC.
24* In 1959, IEOC had agreed to take only 50% of the profits of COPE,
thereby giving up 1% of its previous 51% share* The change in
equity in 1961 came as the result of new regulations in May 1960,
which precluded any foreign controlled company (i.e. with a majority
of the equity) from operating in the Western Desert* See Longrigg op.cit, 
p* 342.
25. Nationalization on a large scale began in February 1960*
26. See Longrigg op.cit. p. 342-344 and Petroleum op.cit. p. 453-458.
27. This oil came from the Bakr and Karim fields discovered in 1958.
28. In 1958 Egypt imported, 38 million barrels of crude, in 1960 
imports were 132 million barrels. Petroleum op.cit. Table 8-7 
p. 543.
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29* Federation of Industries of the UAR, Yearbook 1970*
30. AEO was effectively nationalized in 1961; COPE in 1962.
31, MEES, Vol. V.;No. 8.
32* Ibid. Vol. VI.,No. 37.
33. Eng* Ali Wali (Former Minister of Industry) Interview, Cairo 
29/9/72.
34. A subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of Indianna.
35. A subsidiary of the Phillips Petroleum Company.
36. The source for the details concerning this,and all other joint 
venture agreements cited^is the English translation of the agreement 
in question, unless otherwise stated.
37. In 1962 the GPA became the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation 
(EGPC). See p. 27f.
38. See Chapter V.
39 . Ibid •
40. Since June 1967, apart from some contract drilling for other
companies, COPE has ceased to function as a producing company.
41. See Chapter V.
42. Eng. Ali Wali Perspective on the Egyptian Oil Industry MEES.
Vol. XII, No. 52 p,3.
43. MEES. Vol. XI, No, 45.
44. By 1964, the re were eight companies | the GPC and COPE, the Suez
Oil Processing Co. El Nasr Petroleum Co* (formerly AEO).
The Alexandria Petroleum Co, Petroleum Pipelines Co* COOP 
and the Misr Petroleum Co*
45. For example, in the second five year plan 1965-70, the oil sector 
represented by EGPC was allocated a total of LE 122 million.
46. MEES. Vol. XV, No. 20.
47. MEES, Vol. XV, No* 46.
48. In 1971-72 Oil Production was 24% below the previous year
MEES. Vol. XVI, No. 7.
49. MEES. VqDCVI, No . 15.
- 232 -
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. Vol. XVI, Nos. 30 + 31.
52. Ibid. Vol. XVI, No. 39
53. Penrose, Iran opscit. p. 296.
54. For example, with respect to the importance of oil in the 
economy and the domination of Iranian oil by the majors.
55. Tbr a description of these developments see Longrigg, op.cit. 
Chapter X; G. Stocking, Middle East Oil. Chapter 7* Vanderbilt
University Press, 1970; and B. Shwadran, Middle East, Oil and
the Great Powers. 1959. Chapter VI.
56. Article 4 of the Agreement.
57. Stocking, Middle East op.cit. p. 161.
58. This greater participation was hoped for^not only in the 
Consortium,but also in oil developments outside the control of 
the Consortium.
59* Stocking, Middle East op.cit. p* 163.
60* For example, NIOC set up the Iranian tankers Ltd. and the first 
tanker was delivered in 1958.
61. Longrigg op.cit. p. 286.
62. Petroleum Act 1957, Article 1.
63. The Chairman of ENI, and very much the driving force of that 
organization. See P.H. Frankel, Mattei, Oil and Power Politics. 
Faber and Faber, 1966.
64. Dow Vatow, The Six Legged Dog p. 20. University of California 
Press, 1966.
65* Agip-NIOC 1957, Article 12.
66. MEES. 4a, 1957.
67. A term used to describe the majors^allegedly invented by Mattei*
68. See Vatow op.cit.
69* See Table 2.2, page 15.
70* MEES. Vol. 11, No. 40.
71. Ibid. Vol. Ill, No. 9.
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72. For an outline of the aims of Petromin see A. Yamani1 s foreward 
to the Petromin Annual Report 1968* p. 5ff. i
73* Ibid.
74* A subsidiary of Enterprise des Recherches et d*Activites 
Petrolieres (ERAP).
75* All other agreements contained provision for international 
arbitration. See p* 83-85*
76* For an outline of the dispute and the negotiations which
produced the attempted 1965 settlement see Longrigg, op.cit. 
and G. Stocking, op.cit.
77. After the death of President *Aref in 1966, dissension grew in
INOC over the 1965 agreement until its ratification was postponed, 
finally, Law 97 of 1967 forbade the return of North Rumaila to 
IPC which made the agreement unworkable.
Chapter III
1. Some writers have made the distinction in this context between the 
geological and commercial risk. (For example T. Stauffer,
Measuring the Profitability of Petroleum Operations. 8th Arab 
Petroleum Congress, paper 11Q (Al). The commercial risk is defined 
as the risk involved in the production of a good, which is brought 
to market, where it must sell at a certain price to recoup an# 
outlay and secure a return. The geological risk lies in the fact 
that the product of exploration is knowledge of geology, and the 
risk is whether this knowledge will be such as to find oil in 
sufficient quantities to provide a financial return to justify the 
original investment. However, whether a field is commercial in 
the sense of providing an acceptable rate of return is a function 
of both commercial factors (mainly the price of oil) and geological 
factors, \diich partly determine the cost of oil* Given this 
mutual dependence, to divide the risk into commercial and geological 
seems somewhat superious.
2. fbr example, both in Egypt and Syria, the period of exploration
was made distinct from the period of development and production
by the issue of exploration permits* Development licenses were 
then issued on commercial discovery*
3. Signature bonuses reflect the *attractiveness* of the acreage
i.e. the degree of promise shown by earlier exploration efforts.
Egypt has never been considered sufficiently attractive to warrant 
signature bonuses*
4. For example, the signature bonuses paid by Shell and the Tidewater
group in 1965 to Iran were $9,833 per sq*km. and $17,777 per sq.km*
respectively* Those paid by the Atlantic group and the group 
formed by Agip, Phillips and the Indian Government were $3,125
per sq. km. and $4,250 per sq.km* respectively. The first two 
failed to find commercial oil, the last two did find oonmercial oil.
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5. Most agreements allow any detits or credits incurred in the 
minimum obligations in one period^to be carried over to the next 
period*
6. F. Parra* Oil concessions and contracts dealing with uncertainties. 
MEES, Vol. VI, No. 14*
7* For example, if at the time of surrendering the area, 'expenditure 
in prior years and in the year in which such notice of surrender 
is givenjhave aggregated less than the amounts specified for such 
years ... an amount equal to one half the deficiency shall be 
paid to the Government1. Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article 6 section b.
8. Ibid. article 16 section a*
9* Ibid* article 6 section d.
10. Law 66 of 1953, Article 27.
11. Ibid article 68 section d.
12* For example see Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, Article 1 section h*
13. For example Pan-Am-EGPC 1963 specifies 500 bd over a thirty day 
test run, while the Hispanoil-KNPC 1968 agreement specifies
15,000 bd.
14* In a paper to the Eighth Arab Petroleum Congress (Paper 91
(A-I) on the question of commercial discovery, Eng. A.M# Dareer 
points out that the divergences in the barrel per day criterion in 
joint venture agreements represents a ratio of 30:1* On the 
other hand the differences in production cost are approximately 3:1, 
while the price differences are approximately 4:1*
15. For example, Pan-Am-NIOC 1958, article 15, states that a commercial 
discovery exists if the quantity of oil is such that delivery of 
oil at a seaboard leaves a net profit of greater than 25# of the 
posted price, after the cost of production, transport and 12*5#
of the posted price have been deducted.
16. Agip-NIOC 1957, article 8 section e.
17* For further details see p. 62-63*
18. These two conditions have been taken from E.T. Penrose, Vertical 
Integration with Joint Control of the Raw Material* Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol. 3, April 1963*
19. The period 1957-1970 was a period when crude oil prices were falling,
and the crude oil market was generally slack* See Chapter VI.
Consequently, it way anticipated that the national oil companies
of the host countries, who were largely sellers of crude oil 
as opposed to processors, would have some difficulty in disposing 
of their offtake. The Iranian agreements actually make the 
explicit assumption that NIOC will be the underlifter.
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20. All the foreign companies entering joint ventures to date have 
been crude deficit companies, in the sense that their refinery 
capacity exceeded their supplies of owned crude.
21. It is still open to the foreign company to sell the crude on an 
arms length basis, i.e. outside its own integrated channels.
22. This assumes that the national oil companies can use only a small 
proportion of their crude as inputs to their own domestic 
refineries. Except for Egypt, this is the case.
23* This assumption is legitimate to facilitate analysis, and most 
writers acknowledge the assumption.
24. This is in fact the case with IPAC in 1971. Crude A is Darius 
crude, crude B is Cyrus crude.
25* Cope 1959, Article IX.
26. Agip-NIOC 1957, article 12.
27* Cope 1959, article XI, Underlining mine.
28, For example, Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article VII section d.
29. Ibid. article XIV section b paragraph 21.
30* Ibid. paragraph 7.
31* Ibid. paragraph 5*
32, Ibid. article XIV section e.
33* When the foreign company acts as a marketing agent there is 
greater room to alter price.
34* Eng. Ali Wali, interview op.cit*
35* Article X.
36* H.0.*Connor, World Crisis in Oil. p. 297. Eleck Books* 1963.
37. These roles can be reversed and the realised price used as a
tax reference price, while the posted price can be used as a
market offer price when marketing allowances are introduced.
38. Cope 1959, article IV.
39* See p. 105.
40* Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article XII section c.
41* See for example, Ibid, Annex D on accounting procedures, and 
Annex E on Taxable Profits.
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42. Cope 1959, Article IV.
43* For example, Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, Article XVI section e.
44. In some cases,the national oil company of the host country was
subject to the income tax provisions, but this merely represented
a move of income between institutions belonging to the same entity.
45. Except in the Saudi Arabian agreements,where the Government had the 
right to unilaterally alter tax rates. Also in the 1971 vintage
of Iranian agreements, the income tax rate was fixed at 55#.
46. For example, the His pane il-KNPC 1967 agreement provided for a 
production bonus of KD 1 million when production reached 100,000 
b.d*, and a further KD 1 million on each additional 100,000 b.d. of 
production up to 500,000 b.d.
47. If no commercial discovery is made, the foreign company must 
withdraw leaving the signature bonus to the host government,
48. See Chapter I note 33.
49. MEES. Vol. V, No. 21.
50. For example Petrolube was formed by Petromin with Mobil holding 
29# of the equity* For other examples see Petromin Report op.cit.
51. MEES. Vol. V, No. 21.
52* Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article IX.
53. Agip-NIOC 1957, article 5.
54. Ibid. article 6.
55. Pan-Am-NIOC 1958, article 9 paragraph 1.
56. The initial capital for the Iranian operating agencies was
2.5 million Rials.
57. In fact, in most joint venture agreements outside Iran,the hast 
government is also a signatory to the agreement.
58. For example, IE0C-EGPC 1963, article XXXIV.
59. One purpose of royalty oil is to allow the host government to sell 
it abroad,to keep a check on whether the prices claimed to have 
been obtained by the companies are realistic*
60. In the Egyptian agreements,there is also a clause which allows the 
Government to requisition the entire offtake in the event of a 
'national emergency'.
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61* The Government has options on a further 5#,at cost,on the third 
anniversary of granting the concession,or when production reaches
300,000 b.d. and a further 5# on the same terms on the sixth 
anniversary,or when production reaches 700,000 b.d.
62. In all, the Saudi Government has options on up to 30# of the 
offtake, some of this at very favourable terms.
63* See p. 64-67.
64. The marketing allowances are only used in agreements where the 
idea of 'ijjSsted price' is used.
65. For a discussion of the validity of this premise see Chapter VI.
66. W.G. Friedman & 0. Kalmanoff (eds*), Joint International Business 
Ventures, p. 5. Columbia University Press, 1964.
67. In the Iranian ventures of 1957-58, a clause was inserted which 
granted 1# of the equity to a Swiss bank. The purpose of this
was to provide an arbitrator in the event of a deadlock between the 
two parties. The clause was never actually operated.
68. Each side provides four directors. The Board requires a majority 
of six to pass any resolution.
69. In the agreements the title of this post varies, but general 
manager comes closest to an accurate description.
70. Egyptian Law 114 of 1961.
71. See Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article VII section c.
72. Agip-NIOC 1957, article 33.
73. Pan-Am-NIOC 1958, article 13.
74. For example, Mobil-NIOC 1971, article 12 section 7.
75. Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article XXIX section 6.
76. For further details of the legal aspects of this see Mughraby, 
Permanent Sovereignty, op.cit.
77. See Agip-NIOC 1957, articles 42-44. and Pan-Am-NIOC 1959, 
articles 39-41.
78* Law 66 of 1953, article 45.
79. IEOC-EGPC 1963, article XVI section e.
80. Pan-Aiik-EGPC 1964, article XLII section c.
81. Dr. H. Kholi, Head of Agreements Department EGPC. interview,
Cairo 19/7/72.
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Chapter IV
1. The reason for the examination being brief^is that much of what 
follows,has been said before by others. However, a short outline 
will assist the understanding of the contribution of joint 
ventures.
2. This applies not only to oil agreements, but also to the other 
concession agreements for the extraction of natural resources.
For example see T.H. Moran. Pulling, Pushing, and Shoving: A model of the 
relations between foreign investors and host countries in large 
natural resource concessions. Mimeographed paper.
3* Much of the following discussion is drawn from J. Pen, The Wage 
Rate under Collective Bargaining. Harvard, 1959.
4. The length of the short run depends on how soon the company is 
able to develop new soureds.
5* Pen op.cit. quoted in K.W. Rothschild (ed.) Power in Economics, 
p. 112. Penguin, 1971.
6* The company need not be a foreign company. The same would apply 
to a local company.
7. This assumes that one’s economic power, or lack of it, is reflected 
in one’s bargaining power.
8. It may be more realistic to think of the concept as a principle 
or tendency rather than as a ’law*.
9. The principle will apply very strongly in one country, unless 
the acreage which is offered emerges as very poor indeed. A good 
example of the effect of theLaw can be seen in relation to the 
negotiations carried on in Egypt in 1972 with foreign companies.
One of the foreign companies offered EGPC a joint venture in 
which EGPC would have 55# of the equity. This offer was declined 
by EGPC. The main reason for the refusal was the fear, on the 
part of the EGPC officials, that if they had agreed to a 55# equity 
share, great pressure would be brought to bear on them to convert 
all existing ventures into ventures in which EGPC would own 55#
of the equity* It would also mean that all future ventures 
would also have to have a similar division of equity,
10. For the ’law* to operate between countries, there must be some
degree of competition for the acreage. An example of the role of 
'political competition' is provided by the creation of GUPCO.
When El Morgan was declared coiunercial, and GUPCO was being created, 
the initial agreement (Pan-Am-EGPC 1964) came under attack from petroleum 
'radicals' outside Egypt* This pressure was taken up by groups
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within Egypt and directed towards the Minister who was accused 
of being too lenient to the foreign companies* As a result, 
the Minister actually approached EGPC on the advisability 
of a revision of terms* EGPC, in response, rejected any such 
suggestion most strongly, on the grounds that this would upset 
existing agreements and frighten off potential bidders. This 
advice was accepted,although some minor changes were introduced.
In this case the ’Law1 did not operate totally between countries, 
but this is partly because of the dissimilarity between the 
joint venture agreements and the concession agreements with 
which they were being compared.
11. The timprovementt may well be illusory.
12. In the Middle last, subsoil mineral rights are the property 
of the state.
1 3 While it is true that the agreements are concerned with other 
aspects than finance, to establish a mechanism for sharing 
the benefits is its main purpose.
14* This assumes that the economic power is reflected in the relative 
bargaining power, which in turn is reflected in the terms of the 
agreement.
15. For a discussion of the concept of exploitation, see E. Penrose,
profit sharing between countries and companies* Economic Journal 
Vol. LXIX, June 1959* And C.P* Kindleberger, International 
Economics, p. 418-419. R*D. Irwin, 1963.
16* See p. 81*
17. This second category often arises after discussions over various 
aspects of the first cate go ry, have been going on for some years*
18. Participation and control, from the view point of the host 
country, can be defined as a situation which allows the host 
country to restrict the managerial freedom of the foreign company.
19. This ignores royalties, rental etc*
20. Adelman, World Oil Market op.cit. p* 210.
21. This, in a sense,normalizes foreign investment in oil. Foreign 
investment in the USA or UK simply pays the taxes laid down by 
the Government with no argument over the principle. Although, 
there may be ’discussion* over what is deductible etc.
22. See p. 117**120*
23* The extent of participation depends on how far the potential is
used.
- 240 -
24. It is unlikely that a country, with veiy little to offer in the 
way of manpower or finance, would enter a joint venture. The 
only exception would he if the ’Law* of increasing terms were to 
*fotce* a country to do so. It is significant that the only 
concessions granted in the Middle East since 1961 have been in 
the Trucial States.
25. See Chapter I.
26. It was partly in anticipation of this problem that the sole risk 
clause was introduced.
27* This is not strictly true in an economy with a high level of 
central government control. Here, the Government has its own 
intersectoral logistics to consider* Unfortunately, while many
accept the validity of the companies* logistics, the government’s
logistics tend to be dismissed as bureaucratic inefficiencies.
28* See p* 58.
Chapter V
1* Most of the data will be drawn from Egypt, since it was in Egypt
that the majority of my field studies were carried out.
2. MEES. Vol. XII, No. 51.
3. This was a contract agreement rather than an equity venture.
See p. 27-31.
4* Dr. H. Kholi, interview op.cit.
5. Iran, in particular, has been criticized for this. See MEES.
Vol. 1, No. 34*
6* There have been many improvements in the technical obligations 
concerning the number of rigs to be used, etc.
7. GUPCO & WEPCO Annual Reports 1969-70.
8. For example, see the definition in the N0S0-EGPC 1970 agreement,
Article 1 section h*
9. A 28**API low sulphur crude.
10* Mr* G. Lamfranchi, General Manager IEOC. Interview, Cairo 27/9/72*
11. Mr* M* Rushdi, Economic advisor fco EGPC* Interview, Cairo 10/9/72.
12. See p. 137.
13. Petroleum op.cit. and the Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review, 
relevant years.
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14. To a large extent, Egypt’s experience between 1967-69 
is distorted by the war*
15. MEES. Vol. XIV, NO. 40.
*16. G.Stocking, National Oil Companies and OPEC’S Aims. MEES.
Vol. X, No. 29.
17. The original agreement was not published. The details of the 
financial development and managerial development of COPE are 
drawn from discussions with a great number of people during
my field trip to Egypt, some of whom prefer to remain anonymous. 
Because much of my findings do not show ENI in a veiy favourable 
light, I invited comment from AGIP in Milan, to preserve a 
balance* Unfortunately, AGIP declined to make any comment.
18. For the mechanism see p. 68-72*
19. Appointed outside the scope, ef the agreement.
20. Defined as the ratio of owed to owned capital.
21. A further implication of a high gearing ratio is that the 
Amortization element of oost, further reduces the size of taxable
profits.
22. Notably Vatow op.cit.
23* Ibid., p. 19*
24* November 14th 1961.
25. This occured partly through IEOC's right to be paid in convertible 
currency.
26* The ways in which this deterioration manifested itself are 
outlined on p. 147.
27. IEOC had refused to accept COPE's accounts for the period 1962-65.
28. This represents 31*45 million barrels which is quite large compared 
to COPE’s output. See page 107, table 5*3
29. The only activity of COPE after 1967 was some contract drilling 
and ’lending* of staff to other companies.
30. It is not clear whether ENI is receiving compensation from Israel 
for the loss of Belayim.
31. For a further discussion of the reasons behind the change to 
operating agencies see p. 120-148.
32* GUPCO Annual Report 1971-72.
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33. 31.5# of the $7 million was in Egyptian currency.
34. MEES. Vol. XIV, No. 6.
35* R. Steihler, General Manager WEPCO, Interview, Alexandria 7/8/72.
36# T.R. Stauffer, The ERAP agreement, a study in marginal taxation 
pricing. 6th Arab Petroleum Congress paper 72 (A-l).
37. This was the first contract agreement to be signed in the area.
38. For a criticism of Dr. Stauffer’s paper by Dr. K. Shair see 
MEES. Vol. X, No* 27.
39. MEES. Vol. XV, No. 39.
40. better* in this context means more profitable to the host country.
41. Presented to the Eight Arab Petroleum Congress, reprinted in
MEES. Vol. XV, No. 39.
42* This is however a retrospective exercise and is of limited use 
to the policy maker considering future agreements.
43* A1 Ahram A1 Iqtisadi, 15th October 1971.
44. MEES. Vol. XIV, No. 6.
45* Two notable exceptions are J.W.C* Tomlinson, The Joint Venture 
Process in International Business (India & Pakistan) MIT Press, 
1970. And L.G. Franko, Joint Venture Survival in Multinational 
Corporations. Praeger, 1971.
46* W* Skinner, American Industry in Developing Economies, p. 3.
J* Wiley and Sons Inc., 1968.
47* The Organization and Function of COPE, The Organization 
Department of COPE. February 1971.
48* This was the interpretation of the management side.
49. In the projected organization of COPE (Organization op.cit.)
there are to be six directors, two from each party. A majority 
of five will be needed to pass any resolution.
50. These decisions include anything concerning the budget, the 
approval of the Annual Balance Sheet and profit and loss account, 
the distribution of profits, changing the size of share capital 
the winding up of the company, and any amendment to the statutes.
51. For example, 'Such decision or judgement (taken by GUPCO) is the 
result of the mutual agreement of EGPC and Pan-An, the principals 
of GUPCO*$ Pan-Am-EGPC 1964, article VII section e.
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52. Mr* I, Naguib, Legal Advisor COPE, interview, Cairo 13/9/72.
53. Ibid.
54. Minutes of the COPE Board, May 29th 1962*
55* This can be defined as a decision taking body of more than one 
person of equal status.
56* M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p* 398, 
The Free Press, 1964*
57. Ibid, p. 398.
58. Dr. M. Amin. Chairman WEPCO, Interview, Cairo 22/7/72.
59. The Coordinating Committee consisted of the General Manager 
and the Divisional Heads.
60. See p, 128 Two of the Directors representing Phillips, like their 
counterparts in COPE, were non executive, but at least they were 
based in Alexandria where WEPCO also had ifcs offices. This would 
make ad hoc Board meetings easier to arrange than in the case of 
COPE.
61. For a definition and discussion of this see p* 135 f.
62. Annual Reports for the relevant years.
63* Organization op.cit.
64, Eastern Hemisphere Petroleum Directory. Relevant years. The only 
Iranian was the personnel director,
65. This was because workers could not be made redundant, coupled with 
the generally poor employment prospection in Egypt.
66* This change came too late to affect COPE.
67. Or ffF0111 one o;f parents affiliates. For example many of the 
Egyrjrfan staff of the ventures came from EGPC^ subsidiaries.
68, Amin;interview op.cit.
69* In the light of this, dualism in COPE could be expected to last 
longer, since promotions from within the venture were hampered by 
the grading system. See p, 135,
70. In both cases the foreign company agreed to the Egyptian's 
proposal rather than have the sole risk clause invoked.
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71* For discussions on this see Skinner op.cit*
i'y/^ Acuse
72* Unpublished Ph.d. University of Southern CiiHrfUAiiiaw 1965*
73* Franko op.cit*
74* Defined as a change in the dilfision of the equity between the 
partners*
75* See p* 111-115*
76* For example, The development of the Alamein field by WEPCO
was financed entirely by Phillips, who lent EGPC’s share of the 
funds •
77* For example, see Pan-Am1s role in the development of El Morgan* p* 115*
78* See Freidmann and Kalmanoff op.cit.
79* See P* 84—84. 1
80* Mr. I* Rad van, Economic Advisor EGPC • Interview, Cairo 29-30/8/72.
81. The general consensus of the senior managers with whom I discussed 
this seemed to be that once the Annual budget and work report 
had been agreed upon, the venture was left to . implement them without 
interference.
82* Particularly by means of the Consultative Committees,which are 
composed of experts from the different companies,affiliated to 
EGPC and whose function is to advise the Board of EGPC.
83. Mr. A.D, Campbell. Vice President AMOCO (Formerly Pan-Ara),
Interview, Cairo 26/9/72.
84* For example, the Minister decreed that oil products should be sold 
at the same price in Upper Egypt as they were sold inLower Egypt, 
despite the much greater transport^ cost. The subsequent loss 
on marketing operations in Upper Egypt was felt to be justified for 
social reasons.
85* See p* 124.
86* The difference between total and partial withdrawal is outlined 
below*
87* See p* 125.
88. See Chapter IV note 10,for the effect of this during the setting 
up of GUPOO.
89* See for example the dispute over Abu Qir p* 106.
90. MEES. Vol. II, No. 2.
91* It can be assumed that if there had been no favourable reaction 
from EGPC, the withdrawal would have become total.
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Chapter VI
1. When the term participation is put in quotation marks, this refers 
specifically to the idea of participation outlined by Sheikh Ahmad 
Yamani and others ,from 1967, which led to the General Agreement of 
1972.
2. This participation clause was excluded from the 1933 Anglo-Iranian 
concession.
3* Article 34-1925 concession agreement.
4, See Chapter I.
5* For the definition of Managerial freedom1 see p* 9. The only 
progress made was the admission, by several of the operating 
companies, of host government sponsored directors. For example, 
in 1959 Aramco allowed 2 directors to be appointed by the Government.
6* For an outline of these Resolutions see M.A. Mughraby, Recent 
Developments in Permanent Sovereignty. MEES. Vol. X, No*14.
7. UN Resolution 2158, Section 1 Paragraph 5.
8. For the papers and Discussion of the 6th Arab Petroleum Congress 
see MEES. Vol. X, No. 21-25.
9. For example, see the paper by D.M. A1 Khariji of Petromin, entitled, 
State Participation in the Administration of Oil Concessions.
10* For an outline o£ the abortive Iranian nationalization see.
Longrigg, op.cit., Chapter X; B. Shwadran, op.cit.; Chapter VI 
Stocking, Middle East Oil op.cit* Chapter 7.
11. For details see Chapter II.
12. In Syria, the granting of exploration and development licenses 
was similar to Egypt, in so far as they were granted separately.
In the early sixties, a consortium of Concordia and the Atlantic 
Refining Company, were seeking to convert Concordia *s exploration 
license to a development license for the Suwaidiyah field, discovered 
in 1959 by Concordia. In 1964, Decree 133 excluded foreign 
participation in oil development, and so the General Petroleum 
Authority of Syria 'nationalized1 the discovery wells. For further 
detail see Middle East Economic Consultants, Report No. 4,
Syrian Oil Policies* May 1970.
t \
13. Successfully in the sense of reaching a settlement with the 
companies, thereby allowing the country to market its oil 
without legal hindrance.
14. The analysis which follows relies heavily on M.A, Adelman, The World 
Petroleum Market* Resources for the Future Inc* John Hopkins 
University Press, 1972,
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15. OPEC, Resolution 1.2,
16. Much of the initiative came from Venezuela, who, as a high cost 
producer, stood to lose most from competitive price reductions,
17. For some of the problems see Adelman World Oil Market op.cit* p* 
182-186.
18. Based on the Rotterdam composite figures Ibid* p* 83.
19* Ibid. p* 190. For the reasons behind this price decline see
Ibid* p* 199-204.
20* For example,see 6. Stocking, The National Oil Companies and 
0PECrs Aims. MEES. Vol* X, No. 29*
21. For a discussion of the Failure of prorationing, see Z* Mikdashi,
The Comnunity of Oil Exporting Countries* Ch. 5. Allen and Unwin,
1972.
22. MEES. Vol* X, No. 25. As the idea of 'participation* developed, 
Yamani used the Oil Seminar of the American University of Beirut 
as a platform from which to outline his ideas. Ideas on 
participation had been expressed before this^by Saudi Arabia, 
but were aimed at participation in acreage let to newcomers.
For example, Saudi Arabia had signed its first joint venture 
agreement with Auxirap in 1965, see p. 42.
23* MEES. Vol.XI, No. 32.
24* Use of the general term 'host governments' suggests that Yamani 
was advocating a policy for application beyond Saudi Arabia.
25. Reprinted in Continuity and Change op.cit.
26. Throughout, Yamani defined the terms 'majors' and 'independents' 
in a particular way. A major was any company which pursued a 
policy aimed at the maintenance of stable prices. An independent 
was any company which operated in a way irrespective of its 
impact on the stability of prices. Thus, an independent company 
in the more usual definition could be a 'major', and vice versa,
27. In terms of Yamani's definition outlined in footnote 26 these 
national oil companies could behave either as majors or independents*
28* M. Iskandar, Arab Oil after the Summit. MEES. Vol* X, No. 46.
29. MEES. Vol. XI, No. 51.
30. Those that expressed direct interest other than Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait,were Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi and Qatar.
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31. Iraq joined the negotiations with an interest in the Basrah 
Petroleum Company*
32. See p. 173-178.
33. The signing of the agreement by Kuwait had limited significance, 
as ratification by the Kuwait National Assembly was required.
This ratification was not forthcoming as the Assembly refused 
to accept the agreement.
34. The official reasons for the hostility,are outlined below,in the 
outline of the participation debate,
35* As early as May 1971, B.P. induded among alternative assumptions 
in their company plans,assumptions of 20% participation and 50% 
participation*,
36. Ibr the details of this, and subsequent analysis, see Adelman,
World Oil Market, op.cit. p. 250-256, and Mikdashi, The Conmunity 
op.cit. p. 145-156.
37* In 1972, Kuwait's production was 5% less than its production in 
1971, in Libya the figure was 19.3% less*
38. The Agreement was published in MEES. Vol. XVI, No. 9.
39. Article 3b.
40. Natural gas,not associated with oil production^was to be the 
subject of a separate agreement.
41* The crude oil production facilities included, 'exploration,
development, production, pipelines, storage, delivery and export 
facilities, as shall be defined in the applicable Implementation 
Agreement^ Article 3 Section b.
42. The undivided interest form of concession ownership corresponds 
to the operating agency. The corporate form corresponds to the 
partially integrated venture.
43. Article 6 section b.
44* The importance lies in an apparently comnon assumption that the 
•Participation' agreement replaced the existing concession, 
agreement,
45* See Pan Arab Consultants for Petroleum, Economic and Industrial 
Development (Parcon), 'The General Agreement on Participation in 
respect of crude oil concessions'* p. 139-143*
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46* The use of the per barrel cost of productive capacity is an 
unsatisfactory measure of the cost of entry, since it ignores 
the reserves which the host countries have access to. Using 
the reserves given by the Oil and Gas Journal, Dec. 25th 1972, 
for each $1 of compensation paid, the host countries have 
ownership to the following number of barrels of reserves.
Compensation $ m 25$ of Reserves No, of Barrels of
for 25$ of the Reserves Obtained
operating Co.  (mb) per $
Saudi Arabia 500 34,500 69
Kuwait 150 16,222 108
Abu Dhabi 152 5,195 34
Qatar 71 1,750 24.6
47. For explanation^of these terms, see below p, 169-170,
48. At the time the agreement was published (December 1972) this 
was not an unreasonable assumption, since Yamani was predicting 
an output of 20 m b,d, by 1980,
49. See I^n Seymour's outline of the agreement MEES. Vol, XVI, No, 9,
50. See MEES. Vol, XVI, No. 6.
51. For example, shortly before publication of the agreement,
(although the terms were generally known) the chairman of the 
Kuwait Assemply's Economic and Finance Committee urged Kuwait 
to take steps to control all national rigjbts over national 
resources. See MEES, Vol.XVI No. 3.
52. MEES. Vol. XVI> No. 11.
53. Interview in 1 Al-Madinah', 27 October 1972-reported in MEES. 
Vol.XVI, No. 2.
54. *Kuwait Oil Minister defends participation1 MEES. Vol, XVI, No. 14. 
Underlining mine.
55. Ibid,
56. MEES. Vol. XVI, No. 34,
57. At the time of writing (January 1974) it appears that Kuwait 
has succeeded in obtaining an immediate 60$ participation, 
while Saudi Arabia is in the process of negotiations. Through 
the mechanism of the *Iawf of increasing terms, the most 
favourably negotiations will almost certainly be taken up by
the other host country signatories to the 1972 General Agreement.
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58* For further details, see International Crude Oil and Product 
Prices, 15/4/1973*
59* However, in the first seven months of 1973 output of Middle East 
Oil rose some 23$ compared to the same period in 1972* Yet,this 
considerable increase in supply, appears not to have had any 
impression on prices. Quite clearly,there is,some where,an element 
behind the increased prices which remains to be identified.
60* See table 6*5, p* 172*
61. MEES. Vol* XVI, No* 29*
62. MEES. Vol* XVI, No. 34.
63* For example,see table 6*1, p* 164*
64* OPEC announced a further increase in posted prices of 130$ (Sic.) 
as from January 1st 1974* In the revised participation agreement, 
it is likely that bridging and phase in crude will be dropped 
altogether*
65* For example, see the details of the Iraq-IPC settlement of 
February 1973 in MEES. Vol. XVI, No* 19.
66* Stated by the Libyan Minister of Oil MEES. Vol, XVI, No* 3.
67. MEES. Vol. XVI, No. 43,
68* The Oasis Group consists of the Continental Oil Company,
The Marathon Oil Company, Amerada Hess, and Shell*
69. Ibr Occidental, total compensation was $135 million, which
represented $194 p.b* of 25$ of the productive capacity
(compared with the Gulf figures given in table 6*3). However,
on the basis of recoverable reserves (see note 50) 
for each dollar of compensation Libya was getting access to 
41 barrels of oil (c.f. Saudi Arabia!s 69 KuwaitTs 108)
70* The Libyan buy back price was $4,90 p.b*, compared to the 
average negotiated Gulf buy back of $2*50 p.b, MEES. Vol.
XVI, No. 43.
71* Parcon op*cit*
72. Ibr details see MEES. Vbl. XVI, No* 52,
73. MEES. Vol. XVI, No. 1.
74. MEES. Vol* XVIII No. 8.
75* For further discussion of the role of the parents in a venture 
see p. 141.
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76* For further discussions of the techniques of de facto control,see 
J.W.C. Tomlinson, The Joint Venture Process op.cit.mandflJKidron, 
Foreign Investment in India* p* 258-298* OUP 1965.
77* See p* 81*
78* The extent to which ‘mutual trust1 is a necessary condition for a
successful venture is debatable, but Egyptian experience suggests it 
is*
79* See p* 12*
80* The following discussion draws heavily upon E. Penrose, Equity 
Participation and Sovereignty* Arab Oil and Gas, Vol* 1 No* 3.
81* See page 173-178.
82* Ibid.
83* British Petroleum Company Ltd* Annual Report 1971*
84. For further discussion see p* 188-199*
4"
85* The assertion that a bigger company requires ‘better1 staff than 
a smaller company may be an over simplification. It may be, 
that the qualities required by the senior management of a large 
company, are quite different from those qualities needed by 
senior management of a smaller company. For example, the ability 
to successfully, delegate* This may well invalidate any comparison 
on the basis of ‘better* or ‘worse*.
86* In joint ventures, downstream operations are not an integral 
part of the operation, as was assumed to be the case with 
participation.
87. The operating companies were already joint ventures see p* 1*
88* E. Penrose, Government Partnership in the Major Concessions of the 
Middle Easts The Nature of the Problem. MEES. Vol. XI, No. 44
89* Between 1957*70 the seven major*3 return on net worth fell from 
18*9$ to 11*3$. See Mikdashi, Community op.cit* p. 139, It 
should be pointed out that some doubt has been cast on the ‘accuracy* 
of oil company accounting methods* See T.R. Stauffer, Measuring the 
Profitability of Petroleum Operations. Conceptual and Empirical 
Difficulties* Paper 110 (A-l) 8th Arab Petroleum Congress.
90. Pentose, Govt1 Partnership op.cit* p. 224 in Penrose, Growth op.cit.
91. For further discussion of the ‘balancing act* of the majors see 
Adelman World Oil Market op*cit* p* 82f.
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92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98. 
99*
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110,
For the offtake history of Egypt, see p. 104-106.
See p* 163-169.
See p. 165.
The exception is if the company sells surplus crude on the arms 
length market.
For example, by insistence on the implementation of boycotts 
against certain goods or countries.
See page 145.
See Chapter V, Note 84.
This ‘return* may be in financial terms or no re simply in terms 
of crude oil obtained.
See p. 82.
See Chapter IV. »
This is dependent upon how far equity division is reflected /a/ 
the voting division at Board level. However, even a voting 
majority on the Board does not necessarily give a de facto control*
Fbr an outline of the mechanism by which this can occur see 
p. 136-137.
See p. 137.
This assumes that a reasonable general educational background 
exists. If it does not, then the training period has to be 
lengthened accordingly.
A possible solution may be the hiring of expatriate managers, 
but there may be political constraint on such a course of action.
The extent to which the interests of the host country may 
suffer, depends on the size of the divergence of interest between 
country and company, and on its position in the policy making 
structure of the venture.
It is a reasonable assumption that the 'law* of increasing terms will 
ensure that the new terms secured by Kuwait will rapidly be 
adopted by the other Gulf countries.
For details of such comparisons see p. 117-120*
For estimates of the actual quantities of crude involved under the 
terms of the General Participation Agreement see p. 170.
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111* See Adelmn World Oil Market, op.cit* p. 166-182.
112. See Mkdashi, Coraminity op.cit. Chapter 5.
113. Adelman, World Oil Maxket, op.cit. p. 88.
114. The market price is the rate of exchange between money and goods. 
The supply price is the least that needs to be paid to bring 
forth the output*
115. See Adelman World Oil Market op.cit. p. 199-200*
116. Ibid. p. 220. For details of some of the agreements concluded by 
the national oil companies to sell oil, see Ibid* p* 21&-220*
117. See Mikdashi, Conmunity op.cit. Chapter 5*
118. See Adelman, World Oil Market op.cit* p. 210-211* Where producing 
countries produce oil under a system of posted prices and income 
taxes, a mechanism exists whereby tcheatingt on the cartel can
be detected. Tax is a public record. If there is a continual 
fall in a nation's tax revenues from oil, not explained by a move 
from higher to lower taxed crude, or by a fall in offtake, this 
suggests Cheating', i.e. the offer of more favourable 
terms to the companies to expand offtake. Also, tax changes 
are difficult to keep secret.
119* See pages 173—178*
120. As will be discussed shortly, this assumption o£ maximizing 
revenues in fact begs the whole question.
121. In reality, companies may make agreements with 'their1 host
governments without recourse to the market.
122. It should be pointed out that at the beginning of 1974, most Middle 
Eastern producers were pushing for further price increases. Only 
Saudi Arabia wanted a reduction in price. See MEES* Vol* XVII,
No. 22. r
123. Adelman, World Oil Outlook op.cit. p. 84.
124. See Mikdashi, op.cit* p. 116-119.
125. There may also need to be some adjustment for inflation audioss of
potential interest^if the oil were lifted and the money invested.
126. These estimates are based on the assumption that the revenue is 
calculated on the basis of posted price, with no allowance fdr 
participation.
127. There will be a few exceptions of countries with a relatively 
small offtake, for example Algeria.
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128. It is true,that in the mid sixties,when prorationing was discussed, 
Kuwait indicated a desire for further revenues, despite her 
surplus financial position* However, this was at a time when it was 
assumed that the price of oil would fall in the future*
129. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Vol. XXVI, No. 12,
130. It is also, of course, a function of the ability of the Industrial 
countries to be able to export sufficient goods and services, to cover 
the cost of oil imported on a barter basis.
131. A Reuters report, March 1st 1974, indicated that Iran was to buy two
military control planes, at a cost of $ 100 million.
132. Missiles etc, have the characteristics of non-durable consumer 
goods, i.e. they can be 'used* once only.
133. By March 1974, it appears that there may be disillusion with 
barter arrangements from the producing countries. There are also 
indications that the initial spate of barter agreements may have 
had certain political motivations, particularly in the case of 
Saudi Arabia.
134. For example, ERAP in France and ENI in Italy.
135. MEES, Vol. XVII, No. 26.
136. For example, by the use of fiscal weapons.
137. Such sentiments have been increasingly expressed, after the 
companies agreed to the price increases at Teheran and Tripoli.
138* See Note 118,
139. Ebr example, the recent hearings carried out in USA on the
Profitability of American Oil Companies, already suggest such 
thinking.
Conclusion
1. Notably, Penrose, The Large Firm, op.cit*
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